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Chapter 1 
Content and process views of organizational change 
 
Even though it has been repeatedly pointed out that organizations do not realize radical 
change programs (e.g., Boonstra, 2000; By, 2005; March, 1981; Mintzberg, 1978), the main 
theoretical attention in the organizational change literature is on radical change (e.g., 
Greenwood & Hinings, 2006). While some empirical studies observe that small changes occur 
more often than radical change (e.g., Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Grinyer & 
McKiernan, 1990), small organizational changes are hardly researched as a topic on its own. 
From a radical change research perspective, small changes get attention insofar as they set in 
motion other changes in the organization (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly & Barnett, 1993; Weick & 
Quinn, 1999). 
We argue that this perspective ignores the fact that small changes are important to the 
organization itself. When organizations exploit their competences, they will prefer small 
changes to radical change because small changes build on the existing organization instead of 
turning the organization upside down. Moreover, we argue that even the smallest possible 
change is relevant to the organization because its implementation absorbs scarce 
organizational attention and resources. Therefore, small changes are likely to be chosen 
carefully by the organization. As such, we think that small change should not primarily be 
seen as a step in a larger change process. As such, we argue that they need to be studied as 
relevant phenomena on their own. 
To illustrate this argument, we present in Table 1.1 a sequence of organizational 
changes, which is documented in Belgian newspaper articles. The organizational changes 
happened at Lokeren1, a soccer club in the Belgian premier league during the season 2006/7. 
The first reported change is the within-season trainer turnover on October 29, 2006. The 
newspaper headings give some clues why the coach was replaced at that specific moment in 
time. The first clue is that Lokeren was defeated during a cup match by Antwerp, a club that 
plays in a lower division. The second clue is that Mr. Muslin, who had been a coach at 
Lokeren before, was without a job.  
Table 1.1 further shows that the decision to replace the coach did not result in better 
organizational performance. Instead, Lokeren kept on underperforming. The chair of the club 
                                                 
1
 The official name of the club is Koninklijke Sportclub Lokeren Oost-Vlaanderen. We truncate the name of the 
club to Lokeren. Similarly, Antwerp stands for Royal Antwerp Football Club.  
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TABLE 1.1 PRESS COVERAGE OF A TRAINER TURNOVER AT LOKEREN 
19/10/2006 Lokomotiv Moskou fires coach Muslin (ex-Lokeren)  
24/10/2006 Antwerp walks over Lokeren 
29/10/2006 Lokeren fires coach Mr. Jacobs 
02/11/2006 Lokeren hopes for Mr. Muslin  
03/11/2006 Mr. Muslin this weekend already at Lokeren 
05/11/2006 Lokeren starts talking with Mr. Muslin on Sunday 
14/11/2006 Mr. Muslin not yet coach of Lokeren  
15/11/2006 Lokeren gives Mr. Muslin time until Wednesday evening 
19/11/2006 Mr. Muslin asks Lokeren extra time  
23/11/2006 Lokeren no longer counts on Mr. Muslin  
23/11/2006 Mr. Demol nominated as coach of Lokeren 
24/11/2006 Mr. Demol denies having talked to Lokeren 
27/11/2006 Mr. Muslin and Lokeren come to an agreement 
11/12/2006 New coach misses comeback at Lokeren 
19/02/2007 Lokeren-chair takes blundering Mr. Muslin under his wings  
07/03/2007 Mr. Muslin is under fire  
17/04/2007 Exit Mr. Muslin?  
15/05/2007 Split Mr. Muslin-Lokeren comes closer 
21/05/2007 Lokeren lets go Mr. Muslin and international Kristinsson  
22/05/2007 Lokeren wants AA Gent coach Leekens  
26/05/2007 Mr. Leekens linked to Moeskroen 
30/05/2007 Mr. Leekens stays at AA Gent 
01/06/2007 Mr. Leekens gone for three years to Lokeren 
08/06/2007 Calm settles down at Lokeren. The board is working on new transfers.  
27/06/2007 Mr. Leekens disposes of 25 players. Time to prepare for the next season. 
Source: Newspaper titles retrieved from the Mediargus (n.d.) database on 02/12/2007, our 
translation. 
 
however did not repeat the change intervention. He rather decided to protect the new coach, 
Mr. Muslin, against external critiques. The change process thus stopped. Yet bad performance 
lingered on until the end of the season. At the end of the season, Lokeren made some new 
small accommodations to prepare itself for the coming season. It replaced the coach and 
transferred players. 
We argue that the changes at Lokeren were not intended to radically change the club. 
Neither did the changes occur at random. They were carefully chosen and well timed by the 
club. Many of the changes were considered necessary - at least according to the sports 
journalists. We would like to know how these changes were decided. 
 
1.1 A definition of small change 
Plowman et al. (2007: 526) define small change as “a change that (1) does not require a 
significant outlay of the organization’s resources, (2) does not require a reorganization of 
other programs or activities, (3) is initiated informally as an ‘experiment’ by members - not 
by the organizations leaders, and (4) had no intended goal or timeline associated with it.”. 
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Although, it is the only definition of small change we found, it is difficult to make use of it in 
this study, because trainer turnovers and player transfers do not meet three of the four criteria. 
First, trainer turnovers and player transfers may require significant outlays of the club’s 
resources. Second, it is hard consider trainer turnovers or player transfers as experiments. 
Moreover, they involve the commitment of organizational leaders. Third, they are instituted 
for the sake of attaining the club’s goals. As a result, Plowman et al. (2007) would not 
consider player transfers and trainer turnover as small changes. 
We think that the definition of Plowman et al. (2007) only captures small changes that 
are relevant for the radical change perspective. In their study, Plowman et al. (2007) show that 
these seemingly arbitrary changes expand into a radical change process which could not have 
been foreseen a priori. As such, they point to a paradox: while small changes simply happen 
by chance, they may end up determining the future orientation of the organization. They thus 
argue that while small changes are not the result of goals or plans, they should be considered 
as antecedents of radical change. 
We challenge this idea. Consequently, we argue that neither capital outlays, neither 
experimentation, nor the position of the decision makers are necessary conditions for 
explaining small change. We therefore leave out the first, third and fourth element from the 
definition of Plowman et al. (2007). Our definition of small change in this study is “a low-
impact change intervention that does not lead to many other change interventions shortly 
thereafter”. 
 
1.2 A research agenda for small change 
The primary goal of this study is to increase the understanding of small organizational 
changes on its own. In order to find appropriate explanations for these changes, we ask the 
same questions as in the classical perspectives on organizational change, namely the content 
perspective and the process perspective (e.g., Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004; Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). The content approach intends to find out what 
changes in the organization. The process approach tries to explain how the organization reacts 
to an organizational change. It therefore focuses on the process of changing. 
The answers to these questions differ for small changes and radical change. When we 
consider small changes, solving the content question becomes a matter of finding out which 
parts of the organization change and which do not change. When we consider radical change, 
we only try to find out when organizations change completely. Answering the content 
Content and proces dimensions of organizational learning theories 
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question thus requires a more fine-grained approach for small change research than for large 
change research. 
Also the answer to the process question differs substantially for small changes and 
radical change. Because radical change assumes that everything may change, research 
traditionally focuses on high-impact change interventions. As such, it ignores the possibility 
that organizations do not respond to a change intervention. When something in the 
organization changes, it is expected that the organization responds by making new change 
interventions. On the contrary, when small change is considered, the odds of non-response 
should increase. As a consequence, small change research will focus mainly on low-impact 
change interventions. 
While we have extrapolated the research questions of the traditional change literature to 
the context of small change, we use organizational learning theories to formulate the main 
propositions/hypotheses in this study. Organizational learning theories, like A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1992) and Threat Rigidity Theory (Staw, Sandelands & 
Dutton, 1981), argue that organizational decision makers only consider changes which do not 
harm their stakes in the organization. They argue that small changes only occur under the 
condition that the stakes of the decision makers are safeguarded or reinforced. We therefore 
draw from organizational learning theories to formulate answers to the content question. 
The same organizational learning theories are also interesting from a process 
perspective, because they reverse the order in which change interventions will occur. 
Organizations will first try out low-impact changes before moving on to more radical 
interventions. Consequently, organizational learning theories predict that change processes 
will be short. This idea is breaking new grounds for theories of organizational change. 
While promising, the implications of organizational learning theories for small change 
need to be refined further because there are different organizational learning theories, which 
give different answers to the content and process question. Since organizational learning 
theories advance different answers, we need a methodology to contrast the theoretical answers 
empirically. Our methodological framework will draw on the piecewise linear methodology 
of Greve (2003c) which allows to test under which circumstances change will occur.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we will underpin the research agenda of this study in 
three sections. In the first section a historical overview of the academic literature on 
organizational change will be given. In the second section, we will use a diverse set of 
ecological and institutional theories to show that radical change is an epiphenomenon and 
small change is not. Finally, we will flesh out the content and process research questions of 
this study by means of organizational learning studies. 
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1.3 Current views on organizational change 
The long tradition of research on organizational change has resulted in a myriad of 
dimensions on change (e.g., Amis et al., 2004; By, 2005). Major dimensions are the triggers 
(e.g., Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997), the motors or processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995), 
the tempo (Weick & Quinn, 1999), the scale (e.g., Dunphy & Stace, 1988; Huy, 2001), and 
the sequence of organizational change (e.g., Amis et al., 2004; Huy, 2001). Although there are 
many dimensions to organizational change, most researchers concentrate only on the tempo 
and the sequence, to describe how thinking about organizational change has evolved over 
time (e.g., Burnes, 2005; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). 
  
1.3.1 The content view draws attention to the tempo of change 
The first dimension that has attracted a lot of academic debate is the tempo of change, which 
is the speed at which organizational changes are rolled out. This dimension touches only upon 
a temporal dimension of change because organizational change is assumed to have full impact 
on the complete organization. As such, organizational change is considered to be radical, 
complex and difficult-to-implement. A landmark model on organizational change is the 
normative model of Lewin (1951). He argued that organizations ought to spend time on three 
processes - unfreezing, changing and freezing - in order to successfully turn around the 
organization. Lewin’s view of slow, consensual change has been challenged by views of high-
speed organizational change. 
According to Burnes (2004) some important shifts in the business climate have led to a 
desire to replace models of slow and consensual change by models of coercive and fast 
change. He particularly points to the oil crises in the 1970s and the rise of the Japanese 
economy in the 1980s, which have made American researchers aware that firms needed to 
respond to environmental triggers more quickly. Another reason to institute large-scale 
changes quickly is that it is difficult to sustain change momentum in organizations over long 
periods of time. Therefore radical change needs to be instituted quickly (e.g., Amis et al., 
2004: 17). This shift from slow to high-speed radical change has led to models like the 
punctuated equilibrium model of Tushman and Romanelli (1985), in which complete 
transformations occur quickly, possibly within a time frame of two years after environmental 
triggers (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). 
In addition, there are severe theoretical problems with this kind of research. Meta-
studies of content research have reported severe inconsistencies between empirical studies on 
organizational change. These inconsistencies were reported for change that is consensual and 
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slow (e.g., Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). The inconsistencies are 
also reported for studies of quick radical change (Gordon, Stewart, Sweo & Luker, 2000). 
From the many inconsistencies between empirical studies, we can deduce that there is a 
problem of theory underspecification in the content view of change. 
The theory underspecification is related to the fact that the content view has focused too 
much on one kind of change, namely radical planned organizational change. In a view where 
change is planned, the process is assumed to occur orderly. The order in which change occurs 
results in periods of change that alternate with periods of stability. This alternation has some 
desirable features for research. A researcher does not necessarily need to observe the actual 
process of change to get knowledge of organizational change. If change only happens 
between periods of stability, the study of organizational change could be reduced to a 
comparison of two contents, or frozen states of the organization. Unfortunately organizational 
change rarely manifests itself that way (e.g., Boonstra, 2000; By, 2005). In many cases, 
change is not restricted to certain periods. It is even possible that change is constantly 
happening. For these kinds of change, other views and other research methodology are 
needed. 
 
1.3.2 The process view draws attention to the sequence of change 
The process theories of change solved the theory underspecification by focusing on the 
sequence in which changes occurred. According to the process theories, organizational 
change happens in not so orderly phases of stability alternated by change. The process 
theories rather assume that organizations are always evolving via small steps. Since 
organizations continuously make adjustments, the process view has put the sequence in which 
different changes occur as a central dimension of organizational change. The work of Van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) was a turning point in the discussion on organizational change (e.g., 
Durand & Calori, 2006; Van de Ven & Poole, 2005; Weick & Quinn, 1999). Their conceptual 
study proposes four different motors that can underpin the change processes. As Table 1.2 
indicates these four motors - or processes - of change are mutually exclusive. The motors 
differ in terms of unit of change (is the change process geared towards the development of a 
single organizational entity or towards interactions between two or more entities?) and the 
mode of change (is the change process prescribed by deterministic laws or is the process 
constructed?). 
An organizational learning perspective on change   7 
   
 
TABLE 1.2 PROCESS THEORIES OF CHANGE 
 Mode of change 
 Prescribed Constructive 
Multiple entities Evolutionary motor Dialectic motor 
U
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e
 
Single entities Life cycle motor Teleological motor 
Source: adapted from Van de Ven and Poole (1995: 520) 
 
According to this framework, each motor can ignite change. Organizations change because 
they age (‘the life cycle motor’); because they want to meet organizational goals (‘the 
teleological motor’); because competing forces compel organizations to change (‘the dialectic 
motor’), c. q. because of dynamics due to the appropriation of scarce resources by 
organizations in the environment (‘the evolutionary motor’). The presence of multiple motors 
makes it much harder to predict which change intervention will occur for what reason. 
Because many interventions can occur for different reasons, researchers of change are obliged 
to trace the change processes and to explain which motor underpinned the change. 
 
1.3.3 Differences between the content and process view 
In order to visualize the difference between the content and process research approach, we 
rely on a classical typology of Waterman, Peters and Philips (1980) who introduced a 
framework of seven organizational elements to describe an organization. These seven 
elements, namely the strategy, structure, staff, skills, systems, style, and superordinate goals 
are placed on the vertical axis in Figure 1.1. The horizontal axis spans the timeline during 
which the organization is observed. A mark in Figure 1.1 means that a change in that element 
of the organization has occurred at that time. A mark thus corresponds to a change 
intervention. Suppose further that the researcher combines the marks by means of a line, if he 
thinks that these change interventions are related. 
The solid line in Figure 1.1 corresponds with radical change according to the content 
view: there are periods of relative stability in which no changes are observed, alternated by 
periods of organizational change in many of its organizational elements. If content researchers 
are unable to collect data in period 7 or 8, then content researcher can still research change by 
comparing the state of organization in period 10 with the state in period 6 or even before that 
period. 
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FIGURE 1.1 TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE  
 
Legend: Solid line = content view of change 
   Dotted line = process view of change  
 
In the process view change is always happening, numerous small steps cumulate into 
something large. Therefore the researcher has to observe each change intervention in the 
organization over time. Graphically, continuous change would look like a relay race just as 
the dotted line in Figure 1.1. Change in one organizational element triggers other changes, 
just like the pattern of falling dominos. In the process view typically only a small number of 
steps are taken in one period. However, when a broader perspective is taken, the process view 
assumes that small changes can amplify and lead to fundamental change. 
The difference between the content and process view of change has divided the research 
community. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) found that only two out of 86 academic 
empirical studies that have been published between 1980 and 1994 adopted a dual approach 
combining the process and content lens. Currently, there are more attempts to integrate the 
process and content views, for example by means of complexity theory (e.g., Burnes, 2005; 
Houchin & MacLean, 2005; Plowman et al., 2007; Stacey, 1995). We do not follow this kind 
of integration because complexity theory leads again to explanations where change 
interventions are the basis for fundamental change. They thus will fail to explain the changes 
that occur most, namely small changes. 
As a graphical illustration, Figure 1.2 shows some of the organizational changes that 
have received insufficient attention so far. The dotted line in Figure 1.2 depicts the situation 
in which a series of consecutive steps does not materialize into something big. We should 
explain why an organization starts this process and what has caused the process to stop there. 
Similarly, the star at period 5 is the smallest change in Figure 1.2. For some reason, the 
organization made a change in the skills, but this did not spill over to other organizational
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FIGURE 1.2 UNEXPLORED FORMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
elements. Finally, the solid line in Figure 1.2 indicates a planned change in strategy, staff, and 
structure. Was it the intention in advance to have a trimmed version of large-scale 
organizational change? Or did the organization fail to institute a full-blown large-scale 
change? We argue that the current views on change do not explain these patterns because of 
their fascination for radical change. 
 
1.4 Radical or small change 
The problem is that the two views share an almost taken for granted assumption that 
organizational change is large-scale, either through discontinuous shifts or through emergent 
drifts. We consider this bias towards large-scale change as problematic. In both views there is 
no strong case to assume that radical change is necessarily the best option. 
The content view assumes large-scale change because of a firm belief in organizational 
fit. The central idea is that all organizational elements need to be re-aligned before planned 
change can work. It is however clear by now that the content view has downplayed the 
capabilities to manage large-scale change processes successfully. From an implementation 
perspective, we think that organizations are able to freeze small-scale change more easily than 
large-scale change. No matter how management of change is defined (see Palmer & Dunford, 
2002 for an overview of different definitions of managed change), we think that it always will 
be easier to direct, navigate, take care off, coach, interpret or nurture change when the change 
implies few elements to direct, navigate, take care off, coach, interpret or nurture. 
In the process view, large-scale change occurs because there seems to be no way to stop 
the change process half way; one step automatically sets in motion other change interventions. 
As such, organizations are assumed to drift. We argue that the concept of motors is taken too 
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far when it encourages scholars to present organizations as flows instead of states (e.g., Van 
de Ven & Poole, 2005). Weick and Quinn (1999: 366) for instance define change as “a 
pattern of endless modifications in work processes and social practice. It is driven by 
organizational instability and alert reactions to daily contingencies. Numerous small 
accommodations cumulate and amplify.”  
This view is in line with contributions from population ecology, which suggests that 
organizations that change are bound to follow a cascading path of adverse change activities 
(e.g., Hannan, Polos & Carroll, 2003; van Witteloostuijn, 1999). According to population 
ecology, large-scale change occurs because the organization has lost control over the change 
process. While it may be true in certain circumstances that change processes spiral off in 
uncontrolled ways, we think that these uncontrolled processes occur less than what is assumed 
by process theories or by population ecology. 
Moreover, we draw other lessons from the broader ecological literature for 
organizational change. We have especially focused on new lines of thought that took place in 
population ecological and institutional theories (e.g., Durand, 2006; Washington & Ventresca, 
2004). Initially it was assumed that the ecological selection mechanisms and coercive 
institutional pressures suppress managerial discretion. Organizations and their agents were 
firmly discouraged to go against environmental dictates. More recent theories suggest that 
external pressures do not lead to radical organizational change because even under ecological 
pressure to survive and institutional pressure to conform, organizations have some discretion 
to respond to the pressures in ways that are most beneficial to them. We will show that new 
ecological and institutional theories suggest that organizations select and influence their 
institutional and ecological environment. Consequently, we will argue that organizations try 
to shape their environment and cope with external constraints smoothly by means of small 
accommodations and only occasionally by means of complete turnarounds. 
 
1.4.1 Implications of early external theories for change 
First, we review the early ecological models, which assume that the best odds of surviving is 
by making no fundamental changes at all. Organizations rather need to resist the ecological 
variation. For example, Campbell (1965) used high levels of variation in his Blind Variation-
Selection-Retention (B-VSR) model as one of the three necessary conditions for optimal 
evolution of a population of organizations. The first condition is that there needs to be a 
constant flux of random and blind variations. When the variation would have been selective 
rather than random, the evolution would have been suboptimal because organizations would 
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only be attracted to solutions they think are optimal. Variation also has to be blind to ensure 
that organizations are willing to adopt a variation without knowing what it will bring them. 
Blind variation ensures that organizations will be encouraged to experiment. The second 
condition in the B-VSR model is that there are selection criteria that consistently separate 
good adoptions from bad adoptions. Finally, the B-VSR model assumes that the will to 
survive triggers organizations to stay the same because surviving organizations learn that they 
have survived, but not why they survived. Consequently, organizations strive for consistency 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Second, we review institutional theory which argues that organizations have to conform 
by adopting to the visible rules of the institutional environment. Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) describe several scenarios in which organizational change is likely to happen 
according to institutional theory. First, an organization sometimes needs to make 
organizational changes in order to conform to the pressures of the institutional field to which 
it wants to belong. The second scenario for organizational change is that the institutional 
pressures themselves change and all organizations adopt the visible new rules. In institutional 
theory, the probability of change thus depends on the context. 
 
1.4.2 Implications of new external theories for change 
Both the initial ecological and institutional models were updated by models where 
organizations cope with external constraints more smoothly. A first amendment was proposed 
by co-evolutionary views which assume that organizations can keep pace with the 
environment by mimicking the external variation-selection-retention process. Other strategic 
management scholars have proposed that organizations can even influence the external 
environment.  
The first update of ecological models thus occurred by co-evolutionary models. These 
models argue that when organizations think that the selection mechanisms change, they ought 
to mimic the external selection processes through managed selection (e.g., Volberda & Lewin, 
2003). Co-evolutionary models thus challenge the B-VSR model by suggesting that 
organizational change can be appropriate for surviving organizations. The opportunity for 
change is for example indicated in the literature on multi-business firms. Galunic and 
Eisenhardt (1996; 2001) argue that the units of a multi-business firm are good in their 
ecological niche but not good at undergoing radical change. Therefore the corporate center of 
the multi-business firm repeatedly assigns new businesses to the divisions based on its core 
competences. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) suggest that small organizational change occurs 
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because the new assignments create a slight misfit between the actual and the needed 
competencies. The misfit is so small that the business units are able to learn the missing 
competences. According to Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) this kind of learning costs less than 
the bankruptcy costs and start up costs together. These co-evolutionary studies thus suggest 
that mimicking variation leads to small and efficient accommodations but not to radical 
change. 
The theory of strategic balance also suggests that organizational change is not radical 
Deephouse (1999). This theory argues that a firm that is similar to its competitors will feel the 
pressure to change its strategic position in order to avoid zero profit rents. It will therefore 
make a legitimized move to a niche, which can be rewarded with increased performance. 
Increased profits as a result of the repositioning can inspire the organization to make more 
similar changes. This process however stops once the organization takes a step outside the 
institutional context. Then, the exchange partners of the organization will oppose the 
legitimacy of the action and will force the organization to return to its original context. As 
such, Deephouse (1999) has formulated an upper bound for change. Organizational change is 
bound by the institutional context wherein organizations maneuver. 
The contribution of Deephouse (1999) triggers an unanswered content question. It is 
unclear why organizations find it more feasible to accept the current institutional pressure in 
combination with ecological repositioning. Would it in some cases not be a more rational 
strategy to stick to the ecological position and to focus on reducing the costs of institutional 
pressures? Such a theory would account that organizations might spend time legitimizing their 
ecological niche. 
In that perspective, we highlight that new institutional theory assumes that organizations 
can select pressures of conformity. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) have suggested that in any 
given institutional context, individual firms still have some discretion. They argue that the 
pressure to conform largely depends on the different stakeholders within an organization who 
can develop a countervailing power that opposes conformity. This pressure to oppose 
conformity will occur in organizations where there is low interest satisfaction and low value 
commitment by a powerful group of stakeholders in the organization. As such, it will trigger 
powerful agents to select and change to other institutional contexts where interest satisfaction 
is higher. 
Similarly, Washington and Ventresca (2004) have shown how universities decide which 
sport leagues they will offer to the students. Next to their own experience with certain sports, 
universities rely on selective pressures to conform. Universities chose sports that were 
organized by national sports associations and the sports offered by universities in the vicinity. 
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Washington and Ventresca (2004) found that universities did not choose sports simply 
because they were the most popular. Instead they showed that the decision to conform is 
calculated. New institutional theory thus shows that individual organizations take into account 
internal interests when they decide how they will conform to institutional pressures. 
The idea that internal interests influence whether external selection criteria are relevant 
to the firm can also be found in the new ecological approach of Durand (2006). He argues that 
successful organizations will try to preserve the selection criteria that have favored them in 
the past. When organizations face the threat of being sidetracked, they may as well try to 
redefine their selection criteria. This attempt does not imply that they will succeed; nor that 
they will try to change the selection criteria for other firms or complete industries. But if they 
succeed in redefining their selection criteria, they unintentionally create variation, simply by 
surviving. Durand (2006) thus assumes that organizations are strong survivors, not necessarily 
strong performers because the selection criteria are assumed to be weak. By assuming that 
firms can try to fortify or alter the selection criteria, the possibility decreases that 
organizations will institute radical change. If the model of Durand (2006) is correct, it is a 
question whether radical change is a serious option at all. We conclude that the environment 
is only moderately powerful at dictating what the organization should do. 
 
1.4.3 Implications for organizational change 
In sum, there are environmental constraints which influence organizational decision making 
and change. We should however acknowledge that these constraints leave plenty of room for 
maneuvering by most organizations. External theories therefore increasingly suggest that 
change will not be radical, complex or painful. They rather point out that organizations seek 
sensible strategies to cope with the environment. Their search is to minimize the negative 
impact of the external pressures on the current organization. Consequently, powerful agents 
will select which pressures to conform. Similarly, agents will use their power to influence the 
selection criteria. Only once organizations are unable to influence their external environment 
in ways that are beneficial to them, will they consider radical organizational change. This 
scenario thus only applies to organizations on the verge of being selected out, as well as 
organizations with high costs of compliance. 
Moreover, we think that organizations that cope successfully with ecological selection 
and institutional pressures will not be inert. Rather, they will institute small changes in order 
to survive. Co-evolutionary models and the model of Deephouse (1999) suggest that 
organizations will explore new markets or market positions. But it is also possible that the 
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organizations try to make changes to their environment so that they can stick to the current 
strategy. Whatever kind of change is considered, the odds are high that choice will have little 
impact on the organization in terms of the number of change interventions. 
Put differently, while it is true that firms keep on aging, set new goals, face internal 
competition and external selection, we think that most organizations can take control over the 
motors of change most of the times. Control means that they can steer and turn off some of 
the motors. While the environment may shape organizational changes, we believe it is strictly 
secondary to the immanent forces for development within the organization. We therefore 
think that organizations can turn off the ecological and life cycle motors more easily than the 
dialectical and teleological motors. Organizations have great difficulty to turn off dialectical 
and teleological motors because surviving organizations constantly seek ways to legitimize 
their raison d'être and try to extend their survival. While organizations may have started as 
most cost-efficient solution to governance problems (e.g., Barney & Hesterly, 2006), we are 
more inclined to see organizations as “goal-directed, boundary-maintaining, activity systems” 
(Aldrich, 1979: 4; see also Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). This way we stress that 
mature organizations shift from being a means for a transaction cost problem to an end on its 
own. Because organizations seek ways to survive and ways to secure their goals as good as 
possible, we think that the teleological and dialectical motors are the fundaments for a theory 
of small change.  In light of these assumptions, we were attracted by organizational learning 
theories, which can be considered as political models where competing views of different 
agents with substantial stakes in the organizations lead to organizational dynamics. 
 
1.5 Organizational learning theories 
In the previous section, we have shown that regardless of the external context, organizations 
have a bias towards small changes as organizations are concerned with their own survival. 
Before elaborating on why in particular organizational learning theories can explain this bias 
towards small change, we point out that the psychological literature also has a theoretical 
explanation for this managerial bias towards small change. Especially, the contribution of 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) is germane to us. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that 
forecasts in the organization and actual decision making are two loosely coupled 
organizational processes. Forecasts and scenario analysis lead to optimistic biases resulting 
into big plans. Organizations like to believe that their future is bright. They have strong ‘can-
do’ beliefs; they feel that they can beat the odds, that they will be able to reap opportunities 
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and to outlive current threats. These can-do believes may thus explain why organizations talk 
about radical change. 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) can then be used to explain why many radical change 
programs that work well on paper do not materialize in reality. They argue that due to specific 
psychological traits of managers, only timid choices are made. In particular, because 
managers are exposed to loss aversion and near proportionality, decisions are not framed in 
the big plan. Managers rather consider each decision moment as unique. Therefore they prefer 
small interventions over large interventions because they do not raise questions of survival. 
Thus, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that loose coupling of forecasts and actual choice 
prevents that organizations are exposed to severe risk-taking due to bold forecasts. 
This explains why small changes occur. At the same time, it makes us wonder why 
organizations select and retain managers who only dare to make timid choices. It then seems 
rational to simply replace managers who fail to deliver results by managers who can make the 
bold forecasts come true. If, for some reason, no other managers can be selected, then 
questions rise as to why organizations use bold forecasts at all. Admittedly, the assumption, 
that managers can make only timid choices, is not strong because there also exist managers 
who are prone to empire building and executive hubris as well (e.g., Hiller & Hambrick, 
2005). Thus an explanation based on personality traits can explain why small change occurs 
but can no longer explain why radical change occurs occasionally. In sum, we do not find it 
straightforward to reconcile the loose coupling of bold forecasts with timid choices based on 
psychological traits of managers. 
We argue that organizational learning theories make a stronger case to explain small 
change. A first reason is that organizational learning theories have a lead over psychological 
theories to study change because they are process theories by nature (e.g., Argote & Greve, 
2007: 338-339; Cyert & March, 1992). Since organizational learning theories study 
organizational dynamics, it becomes relatively manageable for us to link them to theories of 
change. On the contrary, the static approach of Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) who rely on 
universal and relatively stable personality traits of managers does not have this advantage. 
A second reason is that organizational learning scholars claim to study real processes, 
not the intended processes, because they have “organizations as the ultimate object of study, 
decision making as the privileged channel for studying organizations, and behavioral 
plausibility as a core principle underlying theory building.” (Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio, 
2007: 523). Therefore they are unlikely to be attracted to bold forecasts that generally do not 
materialize in reality. We think that the realism in organizational learning theories is essential 
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for studying change processes. We illustrate the realism by means of one organizational 
learning theory. 
Brunsson (1989; 2007) uses the same ingredients as Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) to 
describe organizational decision making, namely the discrepancy between talk and action, but 
in a more realistic way. Brunsson (1989; 2007) suggests that strange combinations of 
organizational talks (i.e., the bold forecasts) and organizational action (i.e., the timid choices) 
are rational from an organizational point of view when they help resolving the conflicts that 
may have arisen between organizational members, because they pursue slightly different 
goals in the organization. In such a context, it may happen that a majority in the organization 
wants to take an action but that there is a problem because it does not satisfy all stakeholders. 
Brunsson (1989; 2007) argues that instead of reversing or forsaking the action because of the 
goals of one disgruntled stakeholder, the majority can go along with the action if they try to 
reduce the dissatisfaction by communicating that the action does not reflect the future 
orientation. Communicating this piece of information is valuable as it intends to give solace to 
the stakeholders whose goals are unmet by the action. Brunsson (1989; 2007) thus 
realistically explains why communication will be bright. The content of the message is: at this 
stage we cannot satisfy all your goals, but in the future we can. Stakeholders whose goals are 
unmet will believe the organizational communication to the extent that the change does not 
lower the organizational abilities to meet future goals. Stakeholders will believe that 
organizations can meet their goals in the future if the deviant decision is timid and the change 
small. Brunsson (1989) can thus explain in a realistic way why small organizational actions 
coexist with bright forecasts. 
We have used Brunsson (1989) as an example to illustrate the realism of organizational 
learning theories. We argue that the realism in organizational learning theories arises because 
they acknowledge the political context in which organizational decision making occurs. In 
particular, organizational learning theories acknowledge that organizational decision makers 
need to find creative ways to cope with new situations. This creativity entails convincing 
other powerful agents in the organization that the proposed way is the most sensible to 
proceed. Exploiting the difference between talk and action is only one possible creative 
solution. 
There are situations where striving for differences between action and talk will not 
work. Other approaches need to be considered then. Brunsson (2007: 121-122) differentiates 
5 different ways to balance the conflicting demands between organizational agents. 
Organizations can let the demands of one agent dominate; they can cultivate a difference 
between action and talk; they can try to find a compromise; they can logroll, and they can 
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attend demands of different agents sequentially. Many of these creative solutions proposed by 
Brunsson (2007: 121-122) have been formalized in an organizational learning theory. In 
Chapter 2 we therefore discuss organizational learning theories that worked out these 
mechanisms and show how organizational learning theories can contribute to the content and 
process research questions. 
In sum, although it is not the main intention of organizational learning theories to 
explain organizational change, we think that we can extrapolate their insights to the context of 
small change. Beck, Brüderl, and Woywode (2008) have also used organizational learning 
theory to downplay the occurrence of continuous change processes. Beck et al. (2008) argue 
that a change intervention will only lead to more change interventions if the organization is 
dissatisfied with the change that took place. Consequently, as long as there is opportunity to 
learn from the change intervention, the odds are high that other change will occur. Beck et al. 
(2008) find in three different samples that previous change inhibits future change most of the 
times and that learning of change occurs quickly. 
Our approach differs from Beck et al. (2008) in two ways. The first difference concerns 
the notion of satisfaction. We do not think that organizations have to be satisfied with the 
change intervention. Instead we derive from organizational learning theories that 
organizations want to be satisfied with the organizational performance, which is an indicator 
of how good the goals are being met. Because of a dedicated focus on overall organizational 
performance instead of change, organizations have no compelling need to learn everything 
about a particular change intervention. This difference with Beck et al. (2008) is fundamental, 
because it leads to different propositions about the process of change. Whereas Beck et al. 
(2008) relate the length of a change process to the timing of its successful completion, we 
acknowledge that organizations may already stop considering change interventions even if the 
change intervention has failed. The reason then is that performance has indicated that there is 
no longer a need to make changes. We thus argue that organizations may accept that they 
have implemented change interventions sub-optimally. 
The second difference between our approach and the approach of Beck et al. (2008) is 
related to the content of change. Because Beck et al. (2008) regard the accumulation of 
change interventions as a learning process aimed at successfully implementing a change in the 
organization, they narrow the range of possible change interventions to related change 
interventions. Their focus is on implementation issues. On the contrary, we will follow an 
approach where organizations may try out very different change interventions. In our view, 
change interventions may be triggered by concerns of strategy implementation but they also 
may reflect true strategic changes. In the next two sections, we motivate our choice to do so. 
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1.5.1 Organizational learning theories as content theories for small 
change 
Small change research makes a content research approach interesting because we need to 
know what changes in the organization and what not. In this section, we illustrate that 
organizational learning theories may be used for studying small organizational change from a 
content perspective. Organizational learning theories give clues about where low-impact 
change interventions could start. Greve (2003c: 178) summarized this point as follows: 
“Changes will occur near the symptom, in units with low power, and in units that have 
recently changed. These are competing theories of where change will occur, and further 
research is needed to know which is true. They may all be true in the sense that these are the 
areas where an organization is most likely to make changes, but the specific area chosen will 
vary depending on the circumstances.” From this summary, we only know thus that change is 
unlikely to start far away from the problem; it will not start in parts where there is strong 
resistance to change, and it will not start in stable parts of the organizations. However, change 
can start anywhere else in the organizations. The challenge is to rule out the predictions of 
these organizational learning theories further. 
In Chapter 2 we will therefore explore the differences of two classical organizational 
learning theories to make more precise predictions. In Threat Rigidity Theory, organizations 
try to impose the demands of one agent when there is a conflicting situation (e.g., Staw et al., 
1981). We will propound that Threat Rigidity Theory corresponds to changes in areas that 
have changed before and in units with low power. The Carnegie School relies more on 
compromise, logrolling and sequential attention of goals as mechanisms to resolve goal-
conflict (e.g., Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Cyert & March, 1992; Gavetti et al., 2007). In 
Chapter 2, we will thus propound that the Carnegie School corresponds to changes near the 
problem, but these changes are not necessarily near to a particular solution. 
1.5.2 Organizational learning theories as process theories for small 
change 
We think that organizational learning theories can contribute to process theories of change 
because they reverse the sequence in which change interventions are likely to occur. Because 
of the bias for radical research, there is an almost taken for granted assumption that 
organizational change should start by changing high-impact elements so that the change 
process can take off. Organizational learning theories seriously challenge this premise. From 
an organizational learning perspective, it seems that organizations will start with change 
interventions on low-impact elements. Because organizations can only survive by maintaining 
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relationships with various agents who have certain interest in the organization, change will 
only entail solutions that are acceptable to the current organization. This explains why Greve 
(2003c: 178) argues that organizations will only tackle problems; they will only make 
changes in units with low power; or they will only make changes where they used to make 
changes. Organizations follow the line of the least resistance, which implies that the number 
of change intervention will be kept to a minimum. This idea will again be further explored in 
Chapter 2. As a summary of this chapter, we graphically present the research question 
hierarchy in Figure 1.3.  
The top bar of Figure 1.3 describes our conclusion from the literature on 
organizational change. We argue that too much attention is paid to radical change (processes) 
lately; it is unrealistic to assume that organizations cannot take control over organizational 
change processes. They must be able to control change in certain cases, under certain 
circumstances.  
In organizational learning theories, having control over change processes implies that 
conflicts are contained and goals of different agents are attuned. The implications of 
organizational learning theories may be substantial for both the content and process views of 
change. From the content perspective, we propound that organizational learning theories will 
focus more on small-scale change because the theories point towards changes that have little 
impact on the rest of the organization. Because there are many overlapping organizational 
learning theories the question what a low-impact intervention might be, remains unanswered. 
From the process perspective, we think that organizational learning theories argue that 
changes with low impact on the organization will be considered first. If a mechanism that 
reconciles conflicts is successful, then it will no more lead to extra change interventions. On 
the contrary, unsuccessful interventions will not trigger more changes because both the 
dialectical and teleological motor of change will be ignited and level each other off. We aim 
to uncover these sequences better in this study. Consequently, the two central organizational 
learning questions are presented in the second bar of Figure 1.3. The lowest bar in Figure 1.3 
shows that we will try to answer these questions in this study by means of data from Dutch 
soccer clubs2. We used sports organizations because of the good data coverage. 
                                                 
2
 We also considered studying other small changes, namely changes in the business portfolio of large diversified 
firms (De Schryver, 2006). 
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FIGURE 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS HIERARCHY 
A general research agenda 
 
Are organizations able to control the organizational change processes most of the 
time? 
  ↓ 
 Organizational learning questions 
 
Content: Where does organizational change start? 
 
Process: What is the impact of the first intervention on the change 
process?  
Which change interventions are related? 
                                                   ↓ 
 
  Empirical questions 
 
Content: Where does organizational change start in soccer clubs? 
 
Process: Which change interventions are  
related in soccer clubs? 
  
 
1.6 Outline 
Finally, we give an outline of the chapters in this study. In Chapter 2, we review why and how 
organizational learning theories can contribute to organizational change. The review results in 
a new research methodology for testing small change. 
Chapter 3 contains a literature review of change in soccer clubs, a detailed description 
of the sample, a discussion of the important measures and a motivation of the statistical 
methodology. 
Then three empirical chapters are presented. Chapter 4 is a pure process study where 
we investigate whether similar change interventions follow a continuous pattern over time. 
The focus is on trainer turnover decisions. Chapter 4 replicates findings from the academic 
soccer literature using insights from Chapter 2. We will contrast threat-rigid responses against 
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problemistic search in the within-season analysis. We also will analyze shifts in attention 
from a within and a between-season point of view making use of the psychological risk-taking 
model of March and Shapira (1992). 
Chapter 5 and 6 focuses on the process and content dimension of change by 
investigating whether change interventions made by one agent are aligned to change 
interventions made by another agent. In Chapter 5, we explore how the chair and coach react 
to the same performance signals.  
In Chapter 6, player transfers are related to between and within-season trainer turnover 
and to between and within-season change in the board. We take a more external perspective 
by relying on entrainment theory. The focus continues to be managerial because we research 
to what extent between-season changes of coaches and staff are synchronized by the top of 
the club. 
Chapter 7 summarizes and integrates our main conclusions from the empirical and 
theoretical chapters. 
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Chapter 2∗ 
Content and process dimensions of organizational learning 
theories 
 
In Chapter 1 we have argued that organizational learning theories can make a substantial 
contribution to the understanding of organizational change by its assumption that 
organizational change mainly involves low-impact interventions. In this chapter we find out 
which low-impact interventions can be expected from various organizational learning 
theories. We also try to find out how change interventions are related in these theories. The 
expected change interventions will ultimately be compared against the observed change 
interventions in the empirical setting. This comparison should enable us to assess if 
organizational learning theories substantially contribute to the explanation of observed change 
interventions. 
In this chapter, we will show that it is not always easy to find deviations between 
theoretical expectations and empirical observations because organizational learning theories 
sometimes tolerate different responses. As an example, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(ABTF) suggests that an organization can respond to negative performance feedback by 
ignoring the information or by making organizational changes. It is thus hard to tell whether a 
single observation fits with ABTF. Observations need to be contextualized thoroughly before 
a lack of fit between theory and data can be assessed. We therefore propose in this chapter a 
research methodology that points out the circumstances under which certain interventions 
should or should not occur according to the organizational learning theories.  
2.1 The challenges for organizational learning theories 
Psychological theories frame organizational change as a risky decision because an 
organizational change intervention has unknown consequences, due to the fact that it may 
unintentionally ignite other motors of change. As indicated in Chapter 1, the problem with a 
psychological approach is that not all managers who are confronted with the same decision 
are willing to take the same degree of risk. Except for Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) who 
focus on universal feelings of loss aversion and near proportionality, many other 
                                                 
∗
 This chapter builds further and substantially extends an earlier literature review on small change (De Schryver, 
in press). 
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psychological scholars suggest that managerial risk-taking depends on the individual 
experience of the manager with risk-taking at large and on his risk-propensity with the 
particular decision (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin 
& Weingart, 1995). 
Given that there are differences in risk-taking between managers, we use the Variable 
Risk Preference Model (VRPM) of March and Shapira (1992) to illustrate that even the 
slightest difference in managerial risk-propensities between two managers may result in a 
large difference in opinion about how the organization should proceed. As such, the VRPM 
clearly shows that triggers of change cannot lead to automatic responses in organizations with 
distributed decision making. The more organizational decision making is distributed, the more 
likely it becomes that some managers will propose to take little risk, whereas other managers 
will propose to take much risk. The question then becomes how these differences in risk-
taking propensity will be reconciled. 
Since the different agents will try to put their stamp on change processes, psychological 
theories have to give the floor to organizational learning theories where the organization is the 
main level of analysis. Organizational learning theories easily incorporate these influences 
from different agents into their theories. Still, choosing for organizational learning theories 
cuts both ways. It is not straightforward to translate the theoretical ideas into good hypotheses 
for testing. In particular, the salient political dimension of organizational learning theories 
creates a huge challenge because it is not easy to observe organizational learning processes in 
a longitudinal sample of many organizations. 
The difficulty to systematically study these internal processes has two important 
research implications for this study. First, because we can easily be mistaken, it is sensible to 
consider different competing explanations at the same time (e.g., Van de Ven, 2007: 205). 
Therefore we decided to concentrate on two established strands in organizational learning 
theories: 1) the Carnegie School and 2) Threat Rigidity Theory (TRT). According to the 
Carnegie School, organizations take decisions after an internal process of quasi-resolution of 
conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search and organizational learning (Cyert & 
March, 1963). In TRT, the internal processes imply a restriction in information processing, a 
constriction in control and a focus on efficiency (Staw et al., 1981). We highlight the 
differences between the two strands of theories in two ways. A first difference is that the two 
theories choose different kind of processes to reconcile managerial differences in opinion. In 
the Carnegie School boundedly rational responses will prevail because the focus in the theory 
is on what is possible and on consensus. In TRT emotional responses will prevail because the 
focus of the theory is on feelings of threat and feelings of control. According to TRT 
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organizations stick to what they know because they want to control as good as possible the 
things they still have under control. Second, the internal processes of TRT suggest that the 
organization know what it will change when the organization is failing, whereas the internal 
processes in the Carnegie School suggest that the organization knows what will change when 
it is winning. Despite these two salient differences between the two strands of theories, the 
communalities between the theories are also clear. Both theories acknowledge that decision 
making has to fit in the organizational context. It is a context in which the possibility of 
political maneuvering is highly likely. This context has important research implications for 
change. Most change interventions will most likely be small and the planned change 
processes will be short. 
The second research implication is that we need to study processes, which are 
fundamentally tacit, indirectly. While there exist studies that have carved out the 
organizational decision making process, we think these approaches have low external validity. 
As an example, McDonald and Westphal (2003) show how advice seeking with different sorts 
of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) mediates the relationship between performance feedback 
and strategic change instituted by the CEO. While the study gives rich insights into how 
CEOs respond to performance feedback, the lacuna of this study is that the search for 
solutions was a priori limited to one person and to a search for external solutions. The study 
does not take into account that individual learning in organizations rarely corresponds to 
organizational learning (Cook & Yanow, 1993), because the solutions of one person need to 
be shared by the rest of the organization too. Because this kind of organizational learning is a 
largely tacit process, the possibilities to measure intervening variables are dim (for 
exceptions, see e.g., Capron, 1999; Greve, 2003a; McDonald & Westphal, 2003). The fact 
that organizational learning theories contain unobservable constructs creates a serious 
challenge for empirical testing.  
Godfrey and Hill (1995) have shown that many influential theories in the organizational 
economics and strategic management literature also contain unobservable constructs. In spite 
of this imperfection, these theories are highly influential because they explain empirical data 
consistently better than other theories. Godfrey and Hill (1995) thus argue not to reject theory 
just because it contains key constructs that are unobservable. Instead they juxtapose 
alternative theories and determine which theory explains the phenomena of interest best. This 
is done by a realistic approach. It entails shifting focus from the unobservable construct to its 
observable effects. While it is impossible to measure unobservable constructs, some 
observable antecedents and outcomes of these unobservable constructs can be measured and 
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used for hypothetico-deductive research. Theories with unobservable constructs hence 
deserve attention as long as the tests corroborate the underlying hypotheses.  
Because of the fundamental political and tacit nature of organizational learning, we 
have followed this realistic approach. We in particular rely on the methodology developed in 
Greve (1998; 2003c). By measuring the timing and the outcome of the deliberation process, 
Greve (2003c) makes a judgment on the deliberation process. A didactical case helps 
illuminating Greve’s methodology. It could be used to find out when people perform rain 
dances. Clearly, one expects that people will only consider the ritual when it is extremely dry 
for a long period. When it rains, people will stop performing the ritual or will not start the 
ritual at all. By relying on a statistical technique of piecewise linear models, Greve would 
compare the number of times the rain dance was performed during rainfall and drought. 
This information thus reveals what decision makers think is the appropriate course of 
action at a certain time point, but it does not show whether the course of action is effective, 
nor why it is taken. We think that it is possible to relate the information from this 
methodology to unobserved processes of persuasion and enforcement. In this chapter, we 
therefore link Greve’s methodology to both the Carnegie School and TRT. We will also show 
that the methodology has been applied to various sorts of organizational decision making and 
change. 
 
2.2 Psychological theories 
Psychological theories are good at showing the ambiguous relationship between information 
and action. March (1987: 387) once daringly asked why organizations should pay for bad data 
or for information they already know. He argued that this kind of information is unlikely to 
inspire decision making and organizational action. Still, organizations invest in information 
systems and receive information on a plethora of situations. When it is business as usual, 
these systems will more often than not indicate that nothing exceptionally different is 
happening. In other cases, the information systems will signal opportunities or threats. 
Shapira (1995) argued that threats and opportunities always put decision makers in an 
uncomfortable position because, irregardless of what is decided, there is the chance of making 
a costly mistake. Thus, when the information system has spotted an opportunity, a decision to 
pursue the opportunity can turn out to be a costly move, because in the end it appeared to be 
an unrewarding move. Yet, deciding to ignore the opportunity might imply missing out 
valuable resources. Similarly, faced by a threat, organizations should decide what is worse: 
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ignoring the threat that turns out to be real or putting a lot of efforts in a threat that does not 
materialize in the end. 
When information is monitored regularly, decisions do not have to be taken 
immediately. It is possible to wait and to learn more. Unfortunately, learning by repeated 
observation can still lead to costly mistakes. Psychological research suggests that more 
information does not necessarily lead to better decision making. By means of experiments, 
Hertwig et al. (2004) show that learning from repeated measurements increases the odds of 
underweighing rare events. They show that humans downplay the odds of extreme events 
because they only take into account small samples of repeated information and base decisions 
on most recent information. 
It seems that also managers under-weigh the odds of rare events, but perhaps for more 
deliberate reasons. Lampel and Shapira (2001) have shown that professionals are taken by 
surprise even though they were repeatedly updated with information about very concrete 
threats. They show that the American and Israeli intelligence services were taken by surprise 
at Pearl Harbor and in the Yom Kippur war because the information was released gradually. 
They argue that the intelligence service was increasingly insensitive to new information 
because false alarms were costly to issue. Similarly, Lampel and Shapira (2001) showed that 
when different organizations belong to the same institutional environment, heavy discounting 
of new information occurs because more weight is placed on the long-term relationship than 
on information about recent behavior. Whatever the reason, it is clear that signals from the 
external environment were not picked up automatically and lead to the ‘correct’ action. 
The link between information and action is even more difficult when we restrict 
ourselves to performance feedback. This kind of information leads to extreme internal and 
external attributions and biases (e.g., Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Johns, 1999; Miller, 1994, 
1999), which makes performance information not a very reliable source of information. 
Nevertheless, the information is interesting to research because it gives legitimacy to act. We 
use the VRPM of March and Shapira (1992) to show that managers can respond differently to 
any kind of performance signal. 
The VRPM of March and Shapira (1992) needs two axioms to describe managerial 
decision making. The first axiom is that managerial risk-taking increases monotonically as 
performance is away from a reference point (like an aspiration level, or sign of bankruptcy). 
The second axiom of the model is that a decision maker always takes into account more than 
one reference point to evaluate information. In the original model two reference points were 
assumed: a fixed survival reference point and a variable reference point set by the aspiration 
level. At any time managers can draw their attention to one reference point. Once the manager 
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FIGURE 2.1 VARIABLE RISK PREFERENCE MODEL FOR ONE AND TWO MANAGERS 
 
(a) (b) 
Source: adapted from March and Shapira (1992: 175). 
 
has picked a reference point, the expected degree of risk-taking the manager will take can be 
determined via the first axiom. 
The original model is graphically displayed in Figure 2.1 (a). It can be used to show 
how a single manager may shift attention in function of new performance information. To 
illustrate a shift, assume that a manager focuses on the reference point which is situated 
closest to the observed performance level (P1). In Figure 2.1 (a) performance (P1) almost 
reaches the aspiration level (L). Therefore the manager will most probably take risk to 
achieve the aspired performance. If the risk-taking does not pay off and the organizational 
performance deteriorates sharply to P2, then the manager will decide to focus on survival (F), 
because the performance is closer. Consequently, he declines to take risks. 
Assuming that each manager makes his own choice (e.g., Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), then 
different managers may disagree about the way to proceed. We use the VRPM to show that 
information in organizations may lead to substantial disagreement when the goals of the 
managers differ only slightly. Since managers are not completely alike, we introduce a second 
manager to the model. We further assume that the two decision makers have only slightly 
different reference points and slopes which makes them willing to collaborate. In Figure 2.1 
(b) manager 1 focuses on survival and L1 and manager 2 focuses on survival and L2. Since the 
observed performance (P) is now to the right of the aspiration level (L1), manager 1 does not 
want to take many risks. Since the observed performance (P) is to the left of the aspiration 
level (L2), manager 2 wants to take risks. Given that both decision makers respond to their 
aspiration level, a conflict occurs. A solution to one manager may constitute a problem to the 
other. Manager 1 will consider performance satisfactory and strongly declines to take risk, 
while manager 2 will consider performance disappointing and will be keen on taking more 
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risk. This situation will not be resolved automatically and may explain why organizations 
decide things that are no longer related to the information signal. The VRPM does not help in 
resolving these differences and explaining what truly happens. 
 
2.3 Differences in opinion 
We have used psychological theories to describe the context in which organizational decision 
making occurs. There are two ways to proceed from here. First, the decision makers may try 
to resolve their differences in opinion. As suggested in the first chapter, there are different 
ways to resolve the conflict (e.g., Brunsson, 2007). Second, the managers ignore the opinion 
of the other. It is interesting to point out that this scenario can occur in organizations as 
indicated by Self-serving Theory. The different scenarios are displayed in Figure 2.2 and 
explored in the subsections. 
 
2.3.1 Self-serving Theory 
If decisions makers in organizations do not try to reconcile opinions, it does not mean that the 
organization collapses. Rather, since organizational members have a stake in the organization, 
they will stick to the organization. Self-serving Theory suggest that disagreement over 
performance may be a perfect soil for everybody in the organization to get what they want 
(Johns, 1999). Decision makers can pursue their goals because cause-effect relationships are 
already masked. It leads to the comfortable situation for managers to select the most 
convenient piece of information for the action they had in mind. 
The possibilities for self-serving behavior in organizations are however constrained. 
Self-serving behavior in organizations only leads to actions that are not too far away from the 
organizational goals. Actions would otherwise result in sharp performance decreases, which 
makes the situation unambiguously clear and takes away the breeding ground for self-serving 
behavior in organizations. Thus, as long as the implications of self-serving behavior are minor 
for the organization, powerful agents can get away with these actions and make small changes 
that benefit them most. While this is clearly an interesting area for future research, also for 
research on organizational change, we do not pursue this scenario further in this study 
because Self-serving Theory sticks to the individual level of analysis. This is not the main 
focus of this study. 
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2.3.2 Organizational learning theories 
If decision makers in organizations do try to reconcile opinions, the attention shifts from the 
performance signal to the processes inside the organization to find an organizational response. 
We concentrate on the processes advanced in Carnegie School and TRT. On the one hand, the 
Carnegie school of thought groups theories that focus on consensus based responses. On the 
other hand, TRT focuses on control. 
 
FIGURE 2.2 THEORY GROUNDED PROCESS AND CONTENT ELEMENTS OF CHANGE 
 
 
Legend: ABTF = A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
  GCM = Garbage Can Model 
  SST = Self-serving Theory 
  TRT = Threat Rigidity Theory 
 VRPM = Variable Risk Preference Model 
 
2.3.2.1 Carnegie School 
The three foundational works of the Carnegie School are Simon (1957), March and Simon 
(1958), and Cyert and March (1963). The impact of these works, their communalities and 
differences are excellently summarized in Gavetti et al. (2007). We have chosen to focus in 
this study on Cyert and March (1992) because of its strong emphasis on conflict and 
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organizational politics and its de-emphasis on hierarchy and communications which is more 
central in Simon (1957) and March and Simon (1958) (see also Gavetti et al., 2007: 528-532). 
A focus on organizational politics is important to us because, as indicated in Chapter 1, we 
need organizational learning theories to explain how strong differences in opinions can be 
reconciled. Next to ABTF, we rely on the Garbage Can Model (GCM), which strictly 
speaking does not belong to the Carnegie School, but is considered as a radical development 
of the Cyert’s and Marches (1992) line of thought (see also Gavetti et al., 2007: 524, 529). 
According to ABTF, organizations take decisions after a process of quasi-resolution of 
conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search and organizational learning. Cyert and 
March (1992) see the decision making process as a widening search for satisficing solutions. 
Organizations thus engage in problemistic search by devoting more attention when 
performance is problematic than when performance meets performance aspirations. The 
amount of problemistic search is however limited. When no consensus is found, the final 
decision may imply a lowering of the aspirations. Similarly, in the GCM, organizational 
decision making is the result of relatively independent streams of problems, solutions, 
decision makers and choice opportunities (Cohen et al., 1972). Because the four streams are 
not perfectly tied, problems thus do not necessarily lead to new solutions, new decision 
makers or new choice opportunities. Therefore organizations may have to forward existing 
solutions for new problems. However, when no existing solution can be forwarded, the 
problem remains unresolved until other solutions, decision makers or choice opportunities 
present themselves. 
Both contributions of the Carnegie School thus assume that organizations will neither 
decide easily upon change, nor that they will go to the bottom and change the organization 
radically. The theories rather propound that temporary or imperfect solutions will be 
forwarded that may be corrected in the future. The bias towards imperfection and towards 
temporary solutions is a direct result of the stakes that decision makers have in the existing 
organization. These stakes are not easily abandoned because decision-makers believe that 
more can be accomplished in the organization than by acting alone. This idea is most strongly 
manifested in ABTF where stakeholders have strong interests to stay in the organization and 
there is a minimum willingness to find solutions for problems. 
Still both contributions of the Carnegie School assume that there is a willingness to 
search in the organization. In ABTF there is slack and problemistic search. Search in the 
GCM results in a stream of new ideas and solutions. The GCM assumes that distributing 
power over agents ensures that future choice opportunities are nurtured, and new people are 
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attracted. Their ideas and search efforts may be valuable from an organizational point of view, 
as they may hold new solutions that can turn out to be crucial in the long run. 
The Carnegie School thus shows how organizations may survive in the long run. It also 
shows that organizations are not flexible in the short run. The school clearly highlights 
boundaries to the willingness to search and to the willingness to implement new solutions in 
the face of threatening information. Since the GCM assumes that organizations apply 
imperfect but already existing solutions to new problems, it becomes a matter of agreeing 
upon which existing solutions find support throughout the organization. Clearly, it can be 
difficult to find consensus for possibly imperfect solutions. By assuming that the four streams 
are only loosely coupled, agents who are able to implement a change will therefore not be 
able to dictate all future changes. However, they are able to put their stamp on other 
organizational processes, once the costs of the compromise outweighs the alternative of 
finding no solution at all. If organizations are unable to find appropriate solutions to problems 
or opportunities, the organization as a whole is worse off. Organizations have to muddle 
through and nobody in the organization benefits. 
The inflexibility in the short run is also clear from ABTF. There are strong boundaries 
because organizations do not search further than needed to control price and output volatility 
(Cyert & March, 1992: 223). Problemistic search will not lead to other solutions than changes 
in the price and production volume because organizations do not have the capabilities to 
implement these changes. Therefore, a negative performance signal will not lead to radical 
change considerations. When it is clear that the organization can not solve the performance 
problem, the organization learns that it has to lower its aspirations. 
The implications for organizational change go further than merely propounding a small-
scale of change and a small sequence of change interventions. We take the implications for 
organizational change one step further by propounding that the Carnegie School has a clear 
view on organizational change when organizations are successful, but remains vague in its 
predictions about change in unsuccessful organizations. Carnegie School theories are open-
ended theories in the face of problems because organizations cannot respond freely. 
Therefore, problemistic search can result in inertia and lowering of aspirations when the 
political decision process gets bogged down. Alternatively, it may be that problemistic search 
leads to organizational change once there is enough organizational agreement in the coalition. 
As a result, no precise predictions can be made about the change interventions in times of 
adversity. 
On the contrary, when organizations are successful, the Carnegie School is much more 
specific about the content of change. Success makes that stakeholders are willing to stay in 
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the organizational coalition. It therefore wards off any change alternatives that might 
endanger the existing coalition. It is an accelerating mechanism: the more success, the less 
likely it is that change which endangers the current distribution of power will pass through. 
Everybody in the organization becomes more complacent and refuses to institute changes that 
endanger the coalition in the organization. The Carnegie School thus propounds that 
organizational change will be restricted to change interventions than strengthen the dominant 
coalition. Success may thus lead to slack search, which on its turn can result in attempts to 
implement strategies better and attempts to replicate earlier successes. In sum, we argue that 
the Carnegie School propounds that there will be fewer kinds of small change to observe 
during periods of success then during periods of failure. 
 
2.3.2.2 Threat Rigidity Theory 
Staw et al. (1981) assume that threats will lead to an increased focus on implementation 
efforts and extreme dedication by the top to the chosen strategy. Strictly speaking, this 
dedication lacks rationality because there are no signs that the strategy is working well. There 
is on the contrary a sharp and uncontrolled increase in the number of negative performance 
signals. The top of the organization fears that they will loose control and decide to stick to the 
current strategy. Consequently, they take various actions. They constrict control, they reduce 
information processing and they focus on efficiency (Staw et al., 1981). The constriction of 
control implies increased centralization, strengthening of tightly coupled links and dissolution 
of weak links. A focus on efficiency may serve two purposes. It can be seen as a solution to 
put a halt to the stream of negative information signals. Cost cutting can also be seen as 
means of regaining power by the top when costs imply that elimination sources of power. Put 
differently, the top of the organization tries to impose a feeling of confidence in the current 
strategy, or in the own capabilities to guide the organization through the period of a threat.  
While TRT also assumes that the scale and sequence of change will be small, the 
implications for organizational change are essentially the opposite compared to the Carnegie 
School. TRT is more precise in case of low performance and is open-ended during periods of 
success. TRT does not explain clearly what will happen when there is no longer evidence of a 
threat. It does however suggest that organizations will relax the information restrictions, 
loosen control mechanism and will no longer single out efficiency. The top management will 
no longer put itself on the foreground. There are thus possibilities for experimentation and 
strategy changes that deviate from the strict commitment to efficiency. However, the 
relaxation does not imply that middle managers will start challenging the current strategy 
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because the top will not enforce or stimulate that either. In TRT, the proposition for small 
change is that there will be fewer kinds of small change to observe during periods of failure 
then during periods of success. 
 
2.3.2.3 Implications for organizational change 
The propositions of TRT and Carnegie School for small organizational change take opposite 
directions. While the Carnegie School is more precise in periods of success, TRT is more 
precise in periods of failure. We however should bear in mind that there are many subtle 
differences in processes and content of change between the Carnegie School and TRT. These 
differences are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
TABLE 2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING PROCESSES AND CONTENTS OF CHANGE 
Organizational 
learning theories 
Information 
scrutinized 
 
Process 
Content 
(Who changes what?) 
 
 
ABTF 
 
Price and output 
opportunities and 
threats 
 
Consensus 
Search widens in 
the face of threats 
 
Fixed internal 
coalition 
C
A
R
N
E
G
IE
 
S
C
H
O
O
L
 
 
 
GCM 
 
Technological 
opportunities and 
threats 
 
Consensus 
Search stays more 
or less the same 
 
Fluid internal 
coalition 
The change 
needs to be 
sold within the 
dominant 
coalition. This 
restricts the 
possibilities 
for change, 
most strongly 
after signs of 
success 
 
 
TRT 
 
 
Any threat 
 
 
Internal search 
Top of the organization declines 
to make fundamental changes.  
Typical actions are constriction 
in control, focus on efficiency, 
and reduction of information 
processing after signs of failure 
 
This leads to two difficulties in translating the theories to an empirical test. First, it becomes 
difficult to compare the two organizational learning theories against each other because the 
explanatory power of the theories depends on the sign of the performance signal. To find 
evidence for the Carnegie School, researchers need to focus on periods of success. They need 
to find fewer low-impact changes in periods of success than in the period of failure. To find 
evidence for TRT, researchers should focus on periods of failure, because TRT predicts 
precisely what will happen then. 
The second difficulty is that, although the underlying processes to reconcile 
differences in opinion are fundamentally different, the observable outcome may be the same. 
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In that line of reasoning, Ocasio (1993:23-24) has argued that there is initially no difference 
between the Carnegie School and TRT. In both theories, the response to the first signals of a 
threat is an automatic search for routine responses to adversity. Since agents are looking for 
solutions that already exist in the organization, both models assume some initial rigidity. 
Once the initial search for solutions does not pay off, differences in opinion become salient. 
Then processes of consensus or enforcement determine which action will be taken next. 
Therefore, solutions forwarded by the two theories will increasingly diverge when the 
problems persist. In the Carnegie School of thought there is a willingness to look for new 
solutions, and solutions that satisfy the powerful agents will be implemented. In the TRT the 
top sticks to rigid solutions.  
It is tempting to reduce the differences between TRT and the Carnegie School to a 
simple dichotomy. It is for instance tempting to translate the differences into the difference 
between emotional and rational responses. It is more rational to consider changes than to stick 
to the current strategy when the information persistently indicates that the current strategy 
does not pay off. Similarly, it is more rational to be satisfied only when the aspirations are 
being met. Therefore, the response described by the Carnegie School is rooted in rational 
arguments, whereas the response of TRT starts with an emotional belief in the current strategy 
(see also Gavetti et al., 2007: 530). This emotional response subsequently triggers a sequence 
of rational actions that are aimed to retain strategic control. 
Similarly, Durand and Calori (2006) made a noteworthy attempt to explain 
organizational change based on the social skills of the dominant managers. Durand and Calori 
(2006) argue that powerful agents can be practically wise or practically unwise and that this 
distinction determines the kind of change powerful agents will take. Practically wise agents in 
organizations are concerned about their selfhood, which implies that the agents strive to find 
acceptable ways for themselves in whatever context they face. Practically wise agents will 
seek solutions by encountering with others, by learning from the actions of others, by taking 
their goals and capabilities into account. The practically wise agents thus have power to act 
because they act in a poised manner. By understanding how others behave, by sharing 
information with others, they are not only able to make decisions, but they also get the 
decisions implemented and legitimized within the organization. Practically wise agents are 
thus unlikely to resort to difficult-to-implement change, because it would imply too little 
consideration for the others. We see a clear parallel between the boundedly rational response 
in Carnegie School and the response of the practically wise agents. Both theories support a 
view where solutions are consensual and small. 
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Practically unwise agents will use their power to enforce the preservation of their 
fundamental intrinsic traits. It will not refrain the unwise powerful agents to take brusque 
actions that are aimed at removing and aligning the other to their orientation. Durand and 
Calori (2006: 101) argue that practically unwise agents “will be inclined to engage their 
organizations in brusque and more recurrent movements, such as mergers, acquisitions, and 
large divestments, leading to a revolutionary process of change”. Again, we see a parallel 
between TRT and the practically unwise agents of Durand and Calori (2006) because TRT 
assumes that the powerful agents try to implement their initial strategies better. Large 
divestments, mergers and acquisitions can then be used by top managers to emphasize the 
current strategic orientation. 
Despite the parallel, we should not use psychological differences to dichotomize 
between the Carnegie School and TRT. The dichotomy is a caricature of organizational 
behavior instead of a metaphor. Not only managers but also the organization are assumed to 
behave in consistent ways. Thus, if we would assume that stable personality traits of powerful 
agents were important to explain organizational behavior then all actions taken by practically 
wise agents would be practically wise. It then becomes difficult to explain why the solutions 
between the organizational learning theories only diverge when problems persist. If 
dichotomies explain the differences between emotional and rational responses, then 
differences in actions should be salient from the onset. This shift can not be explained by 
focusing on personality traits of managers because there is no longer evidence of consistent 
behavior. 
It then also becomes difficult to assume that practically unwise actions can be mixed 
with practically wise actions. However, this behavioral ambiguity is sometimes needed to 
resolve conflicts as shown in Chapter 1. We argue that both practically wise and practically 
unwise agents benefit from mixing practically wise actions with practically unwise actions. 
Brunsson (1989) stated that organizations can benefit from combining practically unwise 
actions and practically wise actions because practically wise actions give solace for the harm 
done by practically unwise actions. It seems rational for practically unwise agents to 
accommodate some desires of others, not because they want to adjust, but because they 
understand that this is the price they have to pay to get support for other practically unwise 
actions. In sum, we expect that explanations for change that are based on categorization of 
managers as practically (un)wise or as (emotional) rational, leads to similar problems as 
explanations based on psychological explanations of change. 
Thus, instead of labeling and possibly stigmatizing managers, we rather propose to 
focus on the decisions they make. By acknowledging that solutions are only temporary; that 
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solutions are only loosely coupled to agents, organizational learning theories add power to the 
explanation only if we look at the temporary solutions themselves. We need to give room for 
behavioral ambiguity. Organizational learning theories have no problem with solutions that 
contain both emotional and rational elements. For instance, TRT clearly shows that rigid 
actions inspired by an emotion of fear can lead to well-orchestrated actions. A rigid belief in 
the current strategy may thus lead to rational actions aimed at successfully implementing the 
current strategy. We similarly think that the difference between practically wise actions and 
practically unwise actions in organizations will increase our understanding of organizational 
change more than the difference between practically wise agents and practically unwise 
agents. 
An additional reason to focus on actions instead of actors is that the problem of 
unobservable constructs can be solved. While it will be hard to correctly measure psychology 
traits of managers and to assess whether they are practically wise or unwise, it is feasible to 
draw inferences from the observable actions of the individual decision makers. Focusing on 
observable actions is thus in line with the realistic research approach of Godfrey and Hill 
(1995). 
 
2.4 A methodological approach for small change 
Before we can empirically research the observable actions undertaken by organizations, we 
need to make clear conjectures about the observable actions that will occur according to the 
Carnegie School tradition and TRT. Because the methodology of Greve (2003c) was designed 
from within the Carnegie School tradition, we have to make an adjustment so that the 
methodology applies to TRT as well. We will propose the necessary amendments that make it 
possible to apply the piecewise linear model to both the Carnegie School tradition and TRT. 
 
2.4.1 Performance Feedback theory and piecewise linear models 
The core of Performance Feedback theory (PFT) integrates the statistical technique of 
piecewise linear models with insights from the Carnegie School (Greve, 2003c: 58-64). 
Piecewise linear models are nothing more than regression models that allow one to test for 
changes in slopes in specific regions of the regressors. Greve (2003c) uses four propositions 
from the Carnegie School to model the relationship between performance and organizational 
change in periods of success and periods of failure. We have listed these propositions in Table 
2.2.  
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TABLE 2.2 FOUR PROPOSITIONS OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK THEORY 
1 Slack and institutional search are fairly stable in the short run 
2 There is problemistic search 
3 There is more managerial willingness to take risk when performance is 
disappointing than when performance is satisfying 
4 There are inertial factors in the organization that influence risk-taking and 
problemistic search 
 
In the original model, the propositions one and four describe the environmental context of the 
organization. The first proposition overlaps with the ecological and institutional pressures and 
opportunities for the firm. The fourth proposition indicates that there will always be 
organizational constraints that have to be taken into account when change is considered in the 
organization. The second and third propositions describe how the managers propensity 
towards change is affected by feedback. These propositions are largely inspired by ABTF. 
The four propositions lead Greve (2003c) to predict that change will happen after 
signals of disappointing performance only if two conditions are met. First, as proposition 
three indicates, an organization will only consider changes that have an expected non-
negative impact on future performance. Second, solutions that are hard to defend in the 
organizations will be filtered out. 
The methodology depicts three scenarios of change after substandard performance: 1) 
managers make decisions that do not require special attention, or 2) they postpone certain 
decisions because the implementation costs of the change are considered high, or 3) 
organizations are so excited about certain changes, that they speed up decision making. The 
first scenario corresponds to a negative linear relationship between performance and the 
likelihood of change. The linearity expresses that above standard performance stalls change as 
much as substandard performance triggers change. The relationship is negative because of 
proposition three. It is more tempting to take financial risk and to institute changes that are 
organizationally undemanding as performance lowers. Where performance increases there is 
no motivation to institute change. The linearity suggests that there was an automatic 
accommodation and no deliberation in the organization. It is represented by the dotted lines in 
Figures 2.3 (a) and (b). 
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Problemistic search can lead to solutions on paper but most solutions will not be implemented 
because they need to be agreed upon within the organization first. To account for this 
deliberation process, Greve (2003c) has introduced a difference in slope. Figure 2.3 (a) 
indicates that there can be strong opposition against certain solutions, as well as excitement 
for solutions, as indicated in Figure 2.3 (b). While there may be cases of organizational 
excitement, Greve (2003c) mainly concentrates on situations where organizations will face 
organizational resistance to find and/or to implement organizational change. Because of the 
resistance, the relationship between performance feedback and organizational change will not 
be linear. In particular, the relationship breaks up at aspiration level. On the right side of 
aspirations, the relationship is steep because high implementation costs make that 
organizations stall this kind of change. There is neither a performance trigger from positive 
performance feedback, nor intrinsic motivations to jeopardize the coalition by difficult-to-
implement change. On the left side of aspiration the picture is completely different. Negative 
performance feedback triggers managers to look for financially rewarding changes. Still, the 
solutions are resisted by other parties in the organization, inflating the perceived 
implementation costs. Because difficult-to-implement change may occur, 1) once easy 
alternatives have failed, or 2) once there is enough support for difficult-to-manage change, or 
3) if aspirations cannot be lowered, the relationship between performance and strategic 
change is negative but flatter than it is on the left hand side. 
 
FIGURE 2.3 UNLIKELY CHANGES (A) AND LIKELY CHANGES (B) 
 
(a) (b) 
Source: adapted from Greve (2003c: 63). 
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2.4.2 Piecewise linear models in empirical studies 
Since the differences in slopes reveal which changes will be considered first and which 
changes will be delayed, the methodology of Greve (2003c) is able to reveal which change 
interventions get priority. This was shown in the first empirical studies of PFT. Greve (1998; 
2002) chose to first study the US radio broadcasting industry with PFT because radio stations 
rely heavily on performance feedback. In particular, radio stations scrutinize market share 
figures because market share largely determines future organizational performance. Market 
share thus determines the likelihood of new ads being placed. When market shares are too 
low, radio stations may reflect on how to position themselves better within their market. 
Greve (1998) found a monotonic negative, non-linear relationship between performance and 
business strategy changes, which indicates that business changes are not instituted 
lightheartedly. The shape of the curve indicates that positive performance feedback stalls 
strategic change faster than negative performance feedback triggers strategic change. This 
result is not very surprising. It is counterintuitive for radio stations to change winning 
business strategies which are the cornerstones of their achieved performance. Radio stations 
will only change business strategies which do no longer pay off. 
The strength of the methodology became clear when Greve (1998) showed what radio 
stations precisely preferred to change after disappointing performance. He therefore analyzed 
three single strategic decisions separately: making changes in the broadcasting format (format 
changes), investing in satellite emission (satellite changes) and making changes in the 
production of radio programs (program changes). All changes have an unknown impact on the 
ads and, therefore, entailed financial risk. From an external point of view, satellite changes 
and production changes were assumed to have the lowest risk since no new customers were 
explicitly being targeted. Format changes were considered more risky because they had to 
appeal to other customers. From an internal point of view, satellite changes were 
organizationally the least demanding, while format and production changes implied 
participation of many different organizational members. In particular, program and format 
changes imply serious conversion and other learning costs for the program makers which may 
possibly invoke strong resistance in the organization. The differences are summarized in 
Table 2.3. 
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TABLE 2.3 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FROM GREVE’S (1998) MODELS OF CHANGE  
Radio 
broadcasting 
industry 
 
substandard 
performance 
 
satisficing 
performance 
 
 
Difference 
All changes 
 
  
Satellite changes  
  
 
Format changes  
 
 
 Production changes  
s: -0.048 (p <.01) 
h: -0.054 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.114 (p <.01) 
h: -0.072 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.008 
h: -0.053 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.046 
h: -0.003  
s: -0.187 (p <.01) 
h: -0.168 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.194 (p <.01) 
h: -0.080 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.219 (p <.01) 
h: -0.136 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.210 (p <.01) 
h: -0.264 (p <.05) 
s: 0.139 (p <.01) 
h: 0.113 (p <.01) 
 
s: -0.080  
h: -0.008  
 
s: 0.210 (p <.01) 
h: 0.084 (p <.1) 
 
s: 0.164 (p <.1) 
h: 0.267 (p <.05) 
Source: adapted from Greve (1998: 75, 77) with permission 
Legend: s = social aspiration level 
   h = historical aspiration level  
 
For satellite changes, Greve (1998) found a linear effect between performance and the 
likelihood of satellite changes. This result indicates a low resistance to change when there is 
negative performance feedback. Moreover these changes are implemented without a lot of 
commotion in the organization. The picture is different for format changes. Greve (1998) 
found a non-linear relationship between performance and format changes. In particular, when 
performance is above aspirations, format changes are more likely to be stalled as performance 
gets better. On the contrary, when performance is substandard, the effect of performance on 
format changes is much weaker. This relationship indicates that organizations do not like to 
make format changes even if performance is severely deteriorating. The financial risk of 
format changes made the managers wary. Also a non-linear relationship between performance 
feedback and program changes has been found, which indicates that radio stations are not 
very receptive to program changes even when performance was deteriorating. Here, 
differences in learning costs and strategy implementation costs determine the slope. In 
summary, the separate analysis of different actions in the business strategy reveals important 
departures from the picture drawn by the overall analysis of the business strategy. The 
analysis learned that radio stations preferred to change to satellite broadcasting over the other 
options because the other options entailed too much financial risk or too large implementation 
costs. 
Subsequently, Greve (2003a; 2003b; 2003c) and Audia and Greve (2006) applied PFT 
to the Japanese shipbuilding industry where capital investment decisions and innovation 
strategies were studied. The result on innovative strategies again showed organizational 
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dynamics that were in line with PFT. When performance is too low, there is a clear shift from 
financial risk-taking to psychological or organizational constraints. Greve (2003a; 2003c) 
showed that the shipbuilders disliked to invest in technological innovations as a solution to 
disappointing performance. In terms of the commitments to the R&D budget, Greve (2003a; 
2003c) found no indication of increases in the R&D budget when substandard performance 
worsens. On the other hand, he found that performance above aspiration loosens the discipline 
of shipbuilders to commit resources to R&D as performance gets better. The combined results 
indicate that there is strong organizational reluctance to invest in R&D in the Japanese 
shipbuilding industry. 
Similarly, Greve (2003a; 2003c) used two models testing the effect of performance 
feedback on launching innovations. There is a model testing whether innovations are 
launched (Greve, 2003c) and a model on the number of innovations (Greve, 2003a). Greve 
(2003a; 2003c) found that Japanese shipbuilders postpone launching innovations when 
performance is satisficing. These innovations are more likely to be launched when 
performance is substandard. However, the effect of performance feedback is severely curbed 
by organizational inertia when substandard performance worsens. 
It soon became clear that the piecewise linear methodology depicts other dynamics than 
the ones Greve had in mind. The analysis of capital investments in the shipbuilding industry 
has revealed non-linear relationships that are different from PFT. Capital investments are 
financially risky decisions. On the one hand, they involve sunk costs that cannot be 
recuperated easily when economic downturns indicate excess capacity. On the other hand, 
they can lead to efficiency gains, knowledge and less capacity constraints that allow 
shipbuilders to quickly react to economic boosts (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2003b: 103). 
The capital investment decisions were measured in three possible different ways. Greve 
(2003b; 2003c) found a non-monotone relationship between performance and machinery 
growth indicating that 1) shipbuilders are less willing to make new investments as 
substandard performance deteriorates and that 2) shipbuilders are less willing to make new 
investments as satisfying performance increases. Also, Audia and Greve (2006) who 
measured investment behavior in ways that reflect the investment decision better, found the 
same non-monotone relationship, namely an inverted V-relationship. Again, deteriorating 
performance when performance is already substandard, seemed to stall investment behavior. 
And, improving performance when performance is already above standard stalls factory 
expansion. The fact that shipbuilders most likely make investments when performance is 
close to aspirations, indicates that somewhere the resistance in the organization grew as the 
gap between performance and aspirations widened. Clearly, this behavior can be explained by 
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TRT, where the resistance to change increases as the level of performance becomes more 
threatening. This possibility will be explored later. 
Other scholars have adopted this methodology to describe the relationship between 
performance feedback and different sorts of change (e.g., Audia & Brion, 2007; Baum, 
Rowley, Shipilov & Chuang, 2005; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Park, 2007; Wezel & Saka-
Helmhout, 2006). For example, Park (2007) applied piecewise linear models in the food 
processing industry to show that performance feedback influences the strategic position taken 
by organizations with respect to their competitors. He finds that disappointing performance 
leads to the adoption of strategies that are more similar to the strategies of highly performing 
companies, while strong performance makes them willing to move away from the benchmark. 
Park (2007) thus indicates that successful organizations dare to go their own way, while low- 
performing firms are more inclined to follow well-known recipes. Most interestingly is that at 
least two empirical studies reveal different non-linear relationships between performance and 
organizational change. 
First, Baum et al. (2005) studied whether network extensions to non-local ties in the 
relational banking industry were considered after performance feedback. While the use of 
networks is a common part of the business strategy for banks because they can spread the risk 
in large financing projects, extensions of the network remain risky decisions. Banks tend to 
rely in particular on the same network ties. On the one hand, adding new ties implies search 
costs for reliable peers and may lead to negative spillovers if a member of the network 
defaults. On the other hand, extending new ties can have positive performance effects, 
because it increases possibilities for new financing opportunities and may bring along new 
expertise and new customers. Network extension is thus a difficult decision. 
Baum et al. (2005) found a new kind of non-linear relationship between performance 
and change. The V-shaped relationship between performance and network extensions 
indicates that risk-taking occurs when organizational performance is extreme. Banks consider 
extensions to the network, the further performance is located from aspirations. Thus, when the 
already satisfying market share of banks increases further and when disappointing market 
share worsens, banks are more likely to extend their network with non-local ties. From a 
theoretical point of view, the result on the right hand side of aspirations is the most interesting 
because it suggests that successful organizations will consider change while they are winning. 
Second, Baum and Dahlin (2007) report V-shaped and inverse V-shaped patterns in the 
railroad sector, which made them conclude that performance away from aspirations triggers 
search for new ways of doing, whereas performance close to aspiration leads to local search. 
Content and proces dimensions of organizational learning theories 
 
44 
Overall, the empirical results show that Greve’s (2003c) methodology is gaining acceptance 
by many different scholars who applied it to a broad range of solutions in various contexts. 
The empirical studies also reveal that this methodology is still in an experimental phase 
because the interpretation of the results implies great care and can lead to results that are not 
accounted for by PFT. 
 
2.4.3 Piecewise linear models revisited 
We see two main reasons to update Greve (2003c). First, there is a need to extend it to other 
organizational learning theories than the Carnegie School, notably TRT. Second, there are 
many empirical studies that indicate that other relationships exist than the ones assumed by 
Greve (2003c). 
We found two recent successful extensions to the methodology. In order to get a better 
model fit for the data, Harris and Bromiley (2007) made adjustments from piecewise linear 
models to piecewise curvilinear models. They first used piecewise linear models to test 
whether extremely low performance makes organizations resort to financial 
misrepresentation. They found that piecewise linear models are able to show that financial 
representation occurs more in low-performing firms but that the methodology had difficulties 
showing that it is the last resort for desperate firms. Harris and Bromiley (2007) switched to 
other nonlinear approaches in the zone of failure to show that financial misrepresentation 
occurs especially at the far extreme. In the next section we will propose an alternative 
adjustment. 
The methodology of piecewise linear models has also been adjusted to combine TRT 
with the Carnegie School. Greve (2003c: 61) is aware that piecewise linear models could 
serve other theories as well. He argued that a positive slope during failure accounts for TRT 
responses. Still, Greve (2003c) does not explore this possibility further by arguing that threat-
rigid responses typically occur more in zones of survival, far away from aspirations. 
Consequently, Greve (2003c: 61) considers a positive relationship between performance and 
the likelihood of change when performance is disappointing as a spurious result. This idea is 
followed by Shimizu (2007) who starts from two reference points and then combines the 
effects of the two reference points into a curvilinear piecewise linear model. Curvilinearity is 
achieved by combining a positive slope for the survival reference point and a negative slope 
for the aspiration reference point. By extrapolating the negative slope to extreme losses, he 
assumes that negative effect between performance and change tapers off at the far extreme. 
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Shimizu (2007) also finds a tapered negative relationship between performance and 
divestiture decisions in a sample of US-based publicly held firms. 
Despite the attempts of Harris and Bromiley (2007) and Shimizu (2007) we argue that 
the methodology should be extended further. The distance between the empirical results that 
have been observed in the literature (e.g., Baum et al., 2005) and the organizational learning 
theories has not been bridged sufficiently. We especially have some reservations with regards 
to the idea that threat-rigid responses cannot occur at aspiration level. TRT applies to any 
threat (Staw et al., 1981), and not just to the threat of survival. Therefore, strong survivors 
who are low performers as well, may also experience feelings of threat because aspiration 
levels are not attained. Indeed, Lant and Hurley (1999) argue that escalation is typically 
happening close to aspiration, because there is still a believe that gaps can be closed by 
implementing the current strategy better. Therefore, we argue that a positive relationship can 
reflect a true behavioral situation. 
Assuming that rigid responses can also occur in non-life threatening contexts marks a 
clear difference between our research approach and the one of Shimizu (2007). Since we do 
not think it is necessary to introduce two reference points, we only focus on the aspiration 
level of performance as a reference point. We then try to extend the methodology by 
reinterpreting the fourth proposition of PFT (see Table 2.2) differently. The fourth proposition 
describes the internal context in which managers search for solutions and take risk. The 
context consists of inertial factors that influence risk-taking and problemistic search. More 
precisely, Greve (2003c: 59) states that “inertial factors reduce the rate of adopting 
organizational risky actions regardless of the organizational performance”. The last part 
“regardless of organizational performance” can be interpreted in two ways. It could mean 
that the inertial factors in the organization are fixed. Because inertia always stays the same 
over time, the relationship between performance and organizational change should always be 
negative. Performance has to worsen before inertia can be over won and change can take 
place. 
Alternatively, “regardless of organizational performance” could simply mean that there 
will always be inertial forces in the organization, but that the strength of the inertial factors 
may vary over time. When inertia is variable, it can be influenced by managers. A striking 
example of how the inertial perceptions can change is found in the mergers and acquisitions 
literature. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) observed that corporate managers postpone 
discussions about strategy implementation issues to secure the deal. Once the deal is closed 
concerns about strategy implementation issues rise. We assume that this is not an isolated 
case. Powerful managers attempt to persuade (or to forsake) other members in the 
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organizations to make certain changes, by exaggerating (or smoothing over) the 
implementation costs of organizational change. When organizations do not make certain 
changes, it is not necessarily because they are difficult to implement. It is because they are 
difficult to sell. 
When inertial forces can vary in organizations, it becomes possible to allow non-linear 
relationships that have positive slopes. We will show this by means of TRT. The theory 
assumes that top managers perceive the costs of strategy change higher than the costs of 
strategy implementation. On the contrary, middle managers perceive the costs the other way 
round. When they try to implement changes, TRT predicts that top managers will take over 
control of middle managers, because the top perceives the initiatives taken by middle 
managers to be wrong. Thus, in TRT, the most likely reaction for really new changes happens 
when the turmoil started, not when the organization is trying to regain control, because then 
there is a ban on experiments. Since the top only tolerates efforts to implement the current 
strategy more thoroughly, TRT thus corresponds with a negative relation between 
performance and strategy implementation efforts when performance is disappointing. 
Similarly, TRT corresponds with a positive relationship between performance and strategy 
changes when performance is disappointing. 
When the fourth assumption is relaxed, it is also possible to have a positive relationship 
when performance is successful. A positive relationship between performance and change 
then indicates increasing willingness to opportunity seeking behavior. This is clear for the 
results in Baum et al. (2005) where the inertial pressure to stick to the existing network is 
highest when banks have a financial performance that is comparable to their peers. As a 
consequence, network extensions that endanger the conformity will be stalled around 
aspiration. However, when performance is extremely high (or low), additions with non-local 
ties becomes an interesting option, because the inertial pressure to conform are low anyway 
and the financial incentives for managers (threats or opportunities) are high. 
It is also important to state that the relaxation of the fourth proposition does not have 
implications for using PFT within the Carnegie School. We only expect that the perceived 
costs of implementing change stay largely the same. In this scenario, managers are unable to 
influence inertia. Therefore, managers will be making changes that are more difficult to 
implement because of the growing dissatisfaction with performance exceeds the costs of 
implementation. The negative sign indicates that the changes will only be installed when it is 
really necessary and possible. 
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TABLE 2.4 RELAXING THE PROPOSITIONS OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK THEORY  
1 Slack and institutional search are fairly stable in the short run 
2 There is problemistic search 
3 There is more willingness to take risk when performance is disappointing 
than when performance is satisfying 
4 The inertial factors that influence risk-taking and problemistic search may 
change and can be influenced. Risk-taking depends on the difficulty to sell the 
risk in the organization 
 
Figures 2.4 to 2.6 graphically illustrate the 6 distinct scenarios that can be accommodated by 
piecewise linear models, once the fourth proposition of PFT is relaxed. In all figures, we will 
assume that the original 3 assumptions apply (See also Table 2.4). There is a stable context of 
slack and problemistic search and disappointing performance feedback leads to problemistic 
search and increased risk-taking. The third proposition, namely the risk-taking propensity of 
managers is visualized by a negative straight line. The extent to which inertial factors have an 
impact on change is reflected by non-linearity. It makes the slopes become more positive or 
more negative. 
 
FIGURE 2.4 CHANGES WITH VARIABLE LEVELS OF INERTIA 
 
(a)        (b) 
 
Figure 2.4 (a) suggests that organizational inertia is lowest when performance is around 
aspirations. Managers then implement changes in order to avoid feelings of failure. However, 
once there are clear signs of failure or success, managers postpone action. In the case of 
extreme low performance, the preparedness of the decision makers to take risk is countered 
by increasing levels of organizational inertia. In the case of extremely high performance there 
is no financial incentive for managers to take risk. 
Figure 2.4 (b) suggests that the resistance to change is low when performance is 
extremely low and high, which allows managers to take risk and make changes. In Figure 2.4 
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(b), managers seem to be unable to manage the levels of organizational inertia when 
performance is around aspiration. 
 
FIGURE 2.5 CHANGES WITH STRONG LEVELS OF INERTIA 
 
(a)       (b)  
 
Figures 2.5 (a)-(b) show changes that become popular when performance gets better. The fact 
that the overall relationship turns from negative to positive indicates that the inertia towards 
this kind of change in the organization is very strong. Only good performance grants 
managers the authority to take risk and commit towards change. Managers therefore commit 
to this action as long as they think it is allowed by the organization. 
Figure 2.5 (a) shows that the popularity to commit action as performance improves, is 
stronger when performance is already above aspirations. The inertia to change is very high for 
performance below aspiration. Figure 2.5 (b) shows the reverse picture. The strong positive 
trend at the left side of L reflects that the best context for managers to introduce change is 
when performance just begins to fail. The more the organization shows signs of success, the 
more organizational inertia creeps in. 
Finally, Figures 2.6(a)-(b) retake the original formulation of PFT, but with variable 
inertial pressures. The dotted line again reflects a decreasing incentive of managers to take 
risk. Therefore, changes are only considered when performance is low. Figure 2.6 (a) shows 
that strong managerial incentive to take action is offset by strong signs of organizational 
inertia when performance is low. On the contrary, Figure 2.6 (b) shows that the managerial 
commitment to changes as performance gets worse, is stimulated by low levels of inertia. 
Managers feel they get the mandate from the organization to make changes to the 
organization and are able to institute changes that in normal situations are difficult to sell to 
the organizational members. 
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FIGURE 2.6 CHANGES WITH RELATIVE STABLE LEVELS OF INERTIA 
 
(a)      (b)  
 
2.4.4 Critical remarks and a research strategy 
Figures 2.4 to 2.6 show that piecewise linear models can easily account for different attitudes 
towards change under different contexts. Even though piecewise linear models are easy to 
use, we should apply them carefully. Since the assumptions that underpin piecewise linear 
models can not be verified empirically, the risk of ad hoc explanations looms. Ad hoc 
narrative theory that explains the results of the regression analysis at hindsight, should be 
avoided because the interpretation of the correlation always hinges on unobserved 
intermediate processes. We argue that the risk of ex post reasoning is much higher for the new 
methodology than in the original PFT. Although, in practice it is also possible to come up 
with ex post explanations of the results in the original Performance feedback model, it is 
much harder to explain away results that deviate from the Carnegie School. Since the new 
method has cut off links with a particular organizational learning theory, the temptation to 
resort to ex post explanations increases. 
In this section, we propose three necessary steps to reduce the possibility of ex post 
reasoning. These steps aim to embed piecewise linear models more firmly in the 
organizational learning theories again. The first step is to show that only observable strategy 
changes can discriminate between the Carnegie School and TRT because “observable” efforts 
to implement strategies better can always be considered. The second step is to adopt a 
multilevel approach that tries to find out if observable actions are indications of concerted 
action or reveal initiatives of an individual agent within the organization. Whereas the first 
and second step will lead to fitting more piecewise linear models, it is not enough. The third 
step is to increase the number of independent tests. There is more evidence for a theory with 
unobservable constructs if two or more independent tests corroborate the theory compared to 
evidence from only piecewise linear models. Loosely drawing on the population ecological 
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methodology (Amburgey et al., 1993) and also on process research (Poole, Van de Ven, 
Dooley & Holmes, 2000), we have formulated tests about the inbuilt capacity of change 
interventions to ignite other change interventions. Our approach is novel in the sense that we 
try to explain the triggering effect from within the organizational learning approach. There is 
an interesting parallel with Beck et al. (2008)’s contribution. 
 
2.4.4.1 Strategy changes 
First, we make the distinction between TRT and the Carnegie School in terms of strategy 
changes and strategic implementation. We define strategy implementation as those observable 
actions that occur due to the refinement and extension of the existing competencies. Strategy 
implementation is the result of unobservable processes of exploitation. We define strategy 
change as the observable action(s) underneath processes of exploration. 
We believe that only strategy changes can highlight which organizational learning 
theory describes organizational change best. On the one hand, TRT essentially assumes that 
organizations know what they do when they are loosing. After threats organizations will 
implement strategies better because organizations have decided that they will stick to their 
strategy. They will not consider strategy changes. Consequently, organizations under threat 
will only consider strategy implementation. This is not the case in the Carnegie School where 
the organization does not know what to do when it is failing. Therefore, they may be 
exploring ideas that are fundamentally new to them. Hence, the Carnegie School does not a 
priori rule out strategy changes. According to the Carnegie School, organizations are 
increasingly willing to consider strategy changes because there is information that the existing 
strategy does no longer succeed in achieving the goals. Yet, constraints may force 
organizations to stick to the current strategy and implement imperfect solutions. This leads to 
two important conclusions. First, strategy change and strategy implementation are both 
possible in the Carnegie School after signs of failure. Second, when organizations decide to 
search for strategic changes, the process of change will be constrained. 
Thus, because there is an increasing possibility that failing organizations change their 
strategy in the Carnegie School but not in TRT, we should focus on strategy changes during 
failure. We propound that when the relationship between performance and strategy change is 
positive during periods of threat, there is more evidence for accepting TRT than the Carnegie 
School proposition. Similarly, when the relationship between performance and strategy 
change is negative during periods of threat, there is more evidence for accepting the Carnegie 
School than the TRT proposition. 
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TABLE 2.5 A RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR SMALL CHANGE  
 Carnegie School TRT 
Signs of failure Strategy implementation 
Short process of exploration 
No strategy change 
 
Signs of success No strategy change 
 
Strategy implementation 
Short process of exploration 
 
As illustrated in Table 2.5, the idea that particularly strategy change allows us to discriminate 
between the Carnegie School and TRT applies to periods of successes as well. We argue that 
exploration does not happen after successes in the Carnegie School because fundamental 
strategy changes are difficult to sell in successful organizations. On the contrary, exploitation 
may occur because it builds further on the organizational successes in the past. Therefore, 
strategy implementation in successful organizations is in line with the Carnegie School. In 
TRT, both strategy implementation and strategy changes are possible after periods of success. 
Because there is no longer a constriction of control and a focus on efficiency, the organization 
is open to various initiatives. Since TRT only suggests that exploration is no longer 
discouraged, not that it actively encourages strategy changes, the process of exploration after 
signs of success should be short in TRT. 
 
2.4.4.2 Multilevel approach 
The second step to tighten the link between piecewise linear models and organizational 
learning theories is to formulate hypotheses for each agent in the organization. Since 
organizational learning theories acknowledge that many important decision makers 
simultaneously try to influence the organizational commitments, empirical tests of 
organizational learning theories should include more than one decision maker and try to take 
into account multiple levels at which change may occur.  
We thus should try to make the distinction between organizational and individual 
behavior. If all hypotheses from one theory are corroborated, there is evidence of concerted 
action and of organizational behavior as explained by the theory. If only an incomplete set of 
hypotheses is corroborated, then there is less evidence to assume concerted action. 
Consequently, the organizational learning theory does not explain the behavior well. This 
situation is far from ideal because it leads to new questions. It may be that another 
organizational learning theory fits the organizational behavior better or that the results explain 
individual behavior in the organization. 
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In sum, simply by including different decision makers in the model, we take into 
account that there are multiple levels in our research. There can be individual or concerted 
(i.e. group or organizational) behavior. Multilevel research is a promising area of research to 
integrate organizational level theories with more psychological approaches to change (e.g., 
Shimizu, 2007). Introducing a multilevel approach thus reduces the risk of caricatured 
descriptions of organizational behavior. Moreover, we believe that this step is particularly 
important for small change because it recognizes that linkages between persons and levels are 
not automatically made. It is not because somebody in the organization has large scale change 
in mind that the rest of the organization will follow his idea. By observing different reactions, 
we can test the difference between big unrealized plans and big plans that have come into 
action.  
We believe that it is not only necessary to derive hypotheses for multiple agents from 
each organizational learning theory. It is also possible to make the distinction between 
organizational and individual behavior. A strong test for ABTF is that all stakeholders should 
be satisfied after signs of success. It is therefore important to find not one, but many negative 
slopes during success. A rare occurrence of a positive slope during signs of success may 
suggest that this kind of change gets organizational support. It remains a sign that should be 
inspected carefully. It is also feasible to formulate separate hypotheses for different managers 
by means of TRT. It is particularly interesting to make the distinction between the top and the 
middle manager in TRT. Because of constriction of control, it is more likely that top 
managers will replace middle managers, leading to an expected positive relationship between 
performance during signs of failure and middle management turnover. No such relationship 
should be expected between performance and top management turnover during signs of 
failure, because the top managers try to stay in control of the organization. In a similar logic, 
we expect that foremost middle managers will have to implement strategies better. Finally, to 
find and organizational response in line with TRT, we expect that the top of the organization, 
not middle managers,  restricts the information. If it were middle managers who restrict 
information then the results would rather point out towards individual behavior. 
 
2.4.4.3 Multimethod approach 
The third step is to combine the empirical results of piecewise linear models with tests that are 
independent from piecewise linear models. We in particular suggest to test whether previous 
change interventions trigger other change interventions subsequently. These tests can simply 
be performed by adding other change interventions as main effects or as interaction effects in 
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the regression models. Positive main effects and positive interactions between change 
interventions indicate that the scale is large or that the change process is long. Large-scale 
change or long change processes may indicate that the change process is out of control. In line 
with our initial assumptions outlined in chapter 1, we do not expect to find many positive 
main effects and interactions. 
It is however a simplification to assume that organizational learning theories never will 
predict positive effects for these tests. For instance, in ABTF a short sequence of change 
interventions may be an indication of incremental search. Then, we test whether imperfect 
solutions are tried out and reversed subsequently. Also in TRT, combinations are possible 
because it is assumed that a focus on efficiency is combined with a restriction in control and 
combined with a restriction in information processing. Therefore, we should expect a positive 
correlation between middle management turnover and shifts to implement strategies more 
efficiently. Of course it may require skilled interpretation to conclude whether a change 
pattern is the result of concerted action or whether the organization is getting out of hand. We 
believe that tests about sequences and combinations on their own can not really rule out 
whether a complex change process is in or out of control. Neither piecewise linear models nor 
tests of sequences and combinations are the litmus proof for organizational change. We argue 
instead that a combination of different tests can lead to more plausible results. 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
In sum, we expect that this new research method can lead to fine-grained conclusions about 
small organizational change. Piecewise linear models can do more than providing suggestive 
evidence when more and loosely related hypotheses are formulated. In combination with 
complementary tests, it is possible to highlight how organizations respond to opportunities 
and threats. Of course the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We will therefore apply this 
new research methodology in the Dutch soccer setting in the fourth and fifth chapter. 
The Dutch soccer setting was chosen for its quasi-experimental features. First, there is a 
natural production of performance feedback during the season. Second, since clubs are fairly 
simple organizations, we could limit the number of powerful agents in soccer organizations to 
only two, namely the coach and the chair. For the sake of simplicity, we will furthermore 
assume that chairs represent the top of the organization and the coaches the middle managers. 
We will show that the decisions these agents typically have to make are difficult and 
imperfect. Consequently, if they want to institute these risky changes, the agents need to be 
able to sell the decisions to the other agent and external stakeholders like fans, stockholders 
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and the press. We can thus apply the methodology of this chapter to explain what kind of 
resistance these agents meet. 
In particular, we will focus on whether disappointing performance within the season 
leads to problemistic search and the implementation of imperfect solutions, or to a response 
for increased control by the club. On the one hand, problemistic search implies that both 
coaches and chairs are willing to search for solutions. Therefore, changes in coaches may 
occur as well as changes in playing tactics within the season. Imperfect solutions occur when 
coaches institute interim coaches. These decisions are likely to spill over to between-season 
trainer turnover and increased player transfer. On the other hand, low performance may lead 
to rigidity in the top of the club. Since they want coaches to implement the strategy better, it 
should result in within-season trainer turnover together with increased focus on efficiency. 
For better strategy implementation, we expect a negative non-linear relationship between 
performance and strategy changes, with a slope that is less steep during failure than during 
success. In a TRT-scenario, other strategy changes by the coach will be curtailed by the chair. 
We will also test whether replacement of coaches and increased efforts for strategy 
implementation are related. These hypotheses will be worked out in detail in the subsequent 
chapters. In order to facilitate the understanding of the translation of the theory to the 
empirical setting, we will describe first, in Chapter 3, the setting, the relevant academic 
literature of soccer, the data gathering procedures, the sample and the statistical procedures. 
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Chapter 3 
Data on Dutch soccer clubs 
 
This chapter outlines the choices that were made to study small changes empirically. First, a 
motivation is given for why we study soccer clubs. In the next section, we review the 
literature on three important change interventions in soccer clubs: trainer turnover, change in 
playing tactics, and player transfers. Subsequently, we describe the data collection procedures 
and the main explanatory variables along with their descriptive statistics. The chapter closes 
with a discussion of the main features of the statistical models that were used in the empirical 
analysis. We discuss approaches to model non-linearity statistically and our strategy to handle 
repeated measures. 
 
3.1 Why the football setting? 
The abundance of easy-to-collect organizational data has attracted many social scientists to 
study soccer in different countries. There are many, mainly empirical contributions on topics 
like wages, transfer fees and effectiveness studies of trainer turnover (see Frick, 2007; for an 
overview). The empirical research focuses mainly on individuals in the soccer clubs. Much 
less attention is given to the organization as such. Wolfe et al. (2005) have given an overview 
of the existing body of organizational research on sports organizations. They highlight many 
opportunities for organizational research. We similarly argue that the organizational level is 
an appropriate unit of analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Advantages for organizational research 
Soccer data can be used to study organizational change. There are two reasons to prefer 
soccer clubs above other sports organizations. First, soccer clubs can make human capital 
decisions autonomously. It is up to the players and the clubs to determine whether they come 
to an agreement. There is thus no intervention by an overarching sports association that 
allocates new players using a ‘draft system’ to the clubs. The latter seems to be the case in 
many US sports (Audas, Dobson & Goddard, 1999: 306-307). Second, it is believed that the 
club performance can not be easily attributed to one particular player (e.g., Carmichael, 
Forrest & Simmons, 1999: 137) or to the coach only (Dobson & Goddard, 2001). Again this 
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is different from other sports where the club performance can be easily decomposed to the 
performance of individuals. Increasingly, clubs seem to be aware of the role they play in the 
organizational success. For instance, Jakobsen, Gammelsæter, Fløysand, and Nese (2005) 
report that the increasing concerns about good governance and organizational practices has 
led clubs to adopt more formal organizational forms. As such, soccer clubs assign clear task 
divisions, erect formal structures and new systems to manage the organization. 
We can thus see soccer clubs as organizations but we should as well take into account 
that they are fairly simple organizations. Katz (2001) argues that sports clubs are typically 
small organizations with often very homogeneous team members. The team members are 
young and of the same sex, they work closely together, and they have very specific skills. 
This brings along some advantages and some limitations for research. The advantage of small 
organizations is that it will be straightforward to model organizational behavior. 
 
3.1.2 Disadvantages for organizational research 
One limitation of this study of is that soccer clubs are not really good prototypes for all 
organizations. Clearly, sports organizations are very different from large corporations with 
loosely defined groups and diverse human capital. Additionally, we should be aware that 
soccer clubs are difficult to compare with many other small organizations for a number of 
reasons. First, soccer clubs are more visible than small organizations in other industries. 
Second, they will on the average suffer less from liquidity problems than other small 
organizations (e.g., Zuber, Yiu, Lamb & Gandar, 2005). Third, because of tight regulations by 
umbrella organizations like the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and 
the Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB), soccer clubs are limited in what they can 
and can not do. This type of inertia is unusual for small firms (e.g., Wernerfelt & Karnani, 
1987) and therefore may lower the external validity of our findings. 
A final disadvantage is that soccer clubs, like many small organizations, do not show 
high levels of financial transparency. Information on budgets and pure financial facts are not 
readily available. Still, we have important leading indicators of organizational performance. 
The scores and the rankings of soccer clubs hold information on the attainment of tickets to 
premier and European leagues in the upcoming season. These indicators determine the 
willingness to pay by fans, sponsors and official institutions and thus the future organizational 
performance. The indicators are therefore likely to affect the decisions of coaches, who need 
to secure their job contracts, and the decisions of the chair who needs to attract players and 
staff to make sure that the long-term aspirations are being met. 
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3.1.3 Coaches and chairs 
The main reason for selecting soccer clubs is that they are fairly simple organizations. It 
allows us to limit the number of powerful agents in soccer organizations to only two, namely 
the coach and the chair. We will furthermore assume that chairs represent the top of the 
organization and coaches the middle managers. By assuming that coaches are middle 
managers, we depart from empirical studies on trainer turnover which traditionally draw on 
literature of CEO turnover. Like Katz (2001), we argue that the organizational role of coaches 
in the sports literature is overstated. Coaches are only contract workers, hired with temporary 
contracts for their specialist skills to attain short-term performance goals of the clubs. They 
are not CEOs or leaders who have a mandate to make all final decisions. For example, De 
Heij, Vermeulen, and Teunter (2006: 631-632) have described various strategic actions that 
fall beyond the accountability of coaches. They identified that player trade, coach trade, 
extensions of player/coaches contracts, financial tinkering, changing the legal form, stadium 
developments, and commercial actions are activities that are typically not confined to coaches 
but to chairs or their specialist staff. 
Coaches are important because they are the linchpin in the organization. They need to 
motivate the players; they take managerial risk by means of lineups and they can give advice 
to the board on transfers. However, their span of authority does not extend to financial 
accountability. For example Dobson and Goddard (2001: 244) argue that “as the scale and 
complexity of the financial and administrative aspects of club management has increased, 
there has been a shift towards the division of responsibility between teams of specialists in the 
various functional areas of management. The modern-day manager (coach) typically takes 
full responsibility of playing matters only.”  
Moreover, Dobson and Goddard (2001) find that coaches in general have made a 
serious previous commitment to the soccer game before they can start as a head coach in a 
professional team. In general, they have more experience in the field rather than a formal 
management education. Dobson and Goddard (2001) also find that on the average, coaches of 
soccer clubs are much younger than CEOs of business companies. Research on the socio-
demographic background of coaches thus indicates that coaches do not have the profile of a 
typical CEO. 
There are thus at least two managerial levels in soccer clubs. As indicated by the 
sketchy organogram of a typical soccer club in Figure 3.1, we assume that clubs typically 
adopt a functional structure to divide the work. Chairs delegate different tasks to different 
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functional specialists. In this study, we will focus on the principal strategic decisions of soccer 
clubs, namely changes in the playing tactics and the team composition. The latter decisions 
are taken by chairs. The former decisions are delegated to a technical staff that typically exists 
of a head coach, assistant coaches, youth coaches and goal coaches. 
Moreover, these decisions are well documented, mainly due to extensive media 
coverage. However, the data coverage is only persistently good for premier league clubs. The 
flipside of this constraint is that it is easier to assume that all clubs in the sample are 
sufficiently comparable. 
Good media coverage comes in handy for research on organizational change because 
many of the clubs have very long histories. It is not unusual to trace the date of incorporation 
of clubs back to the beginning of the 20th century (Colin & Muller, 1996, 2002). It is thus 
possible to collect very long time series. One of the reasons why many clubs have been able 
to survive is that their main mission to play football overruled concerns about financial 
performance. Clubs typically stick to their strategy (e.g., Audas et al., 1999: 205; Salomo & 
Teichmann, 2002) and use technological evolutions to ensure their survival. The ease of 
survival is also apparent in Zuber et al. (2005) who found that the passion of stockholders 
seems to overrule relevant information about the stocks of soccer clubs. Fans are in general 
not very responsive to new information. The low trade volumes made Zuber et al. (2005) 
conclude that stockholders take pride in holding stock of their club, rather than to use stock as 
an instrument to cumulate wealth. 
In sum, we are able to collect information on the principal strategic actions undertaken 
by the coach and the chair, two of the main decision makers in soccer clubs. In the next 
section, a literature review is given of the most common decisions they make: trainer turnover 
decisions, playing tactics, and player transfers. 
 Chair 
Coaches 
Legal / financial/ scouting assistants 
Players 
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3.2 Organizational decision making 
First, we will concentrate on trainer turnover, which happens relatively frequently (e.g., 
Dobson & Goddard, 2001). Many reasons haven been forwarded for the high velocity in 
coaches. One reason is that it is feasible to replace coaches because the labor market in soccer 
is very flexible and the job market inside the small organizations it is nearly nonexistent. 
Another reason is that coaches are replaced because someone has to leave when performance 
is disappointing. Since clubs can rely on extremely loyal fans, it is the coach who has to move 
on. 
Second, changes in playing tactics are interesting to study because the tactical 
orientation of a coach can lead to dispute and disagreement. Playing tactics can be changed by 
means of different line-ups and substitutions of players. 
Third, we will concentrate on player transfers which occur for different reasons. They 
can be considered as a solution near the problem, a change in a vulnerable area of the 
organization, or a change that often happens anyway. Moreover, transfers are risky as they 
can turn out to be a costly or brilliant move. 
 
3.2.1 Trainer turnover 
Many effectiveness studies have pointed out that a decision to replace coaches involves risk 
because its performance effect is unclear (e.g. Balduck & Buelens, 2007; Koning, 2003; Tena 
& Forrest, 2007; Ter Weel, 2006). There are less studies that analyze the antecedents of 
trainer turnover decisions in soccer clubs. We found studies about antecedents of trainer 
turnover decisions in the UK, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. 
A very thorough and clearly documented analysis of the antecedents of trainer 
turnover in the UK is reported by Audas et al. (1999) and Dobson and Goddard (2001). Both 
studies analyzed 918 within-season trainer turnovers in the four divisions of the English 
soccer league between 1973/4 and 2000/1. The analysis of Dobson and Goddard (2001) is 
more complete than Audas et al. (1999), because they analyzed voluntary and involuntary 
trainer turnovers between seasons and during the season. 
The two studies agree that short-term performance is the most significant antecedent 
for involuntary trainer turnover, whereas voluntary trainer turnover is more dependent on the 
combined effects of short-term performance and trainer turnover characteristics. In particular, 
the most recent match results explain strongly trainer turnover, but even results from up until 
the last 12 weeks turn out to be significant. Also, long-term performance indicators had a 
significant effect on involuntary trainer turnover. These indicators are based on the ranking of 
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the club and the survival in the cup tournaments. Audas et al. (1999) found that none of the 
coaches attributes, except age, significantly explained trainer turnover. This means that all 
coaches under contract are subject to the same performance pressures. Additionally, the 
within-season analysis of Audas et al. (1999) indicates that there are important cooling-down 
and starting-up effects. Since coaches are not replaced at the beginning or the end of the 
season, it becomes clear that there is some deliberation. That is, coaches are not replaced 
automatically when performance signals urges chairs to do so. Finally, Audas et al. (1999) 
found that short-term performance also plays a role in voluntary departure, though to a much 
smaller extent and only for a short time period of less than four weeks. They argue that bad 
results trigger coaches to accept offers from other clubs. 
For the between-season trainer turnover, Dobson and Goddard (2001) reexamined the 
impact of the long-term performance signals and coach characteristics (age, experience as 
coach and player). They used the same measures as Audas et al. (1999): the club’s ranking 
and the survival in the cup tournaments. Dobson and Goddard (2001) found that involuntary 
trainer turnover is triggered by performance signals. For voluntary trainer turnover, not only 
performance signals but also coach characteristics are significant explanatory variables. They 
found that coaches in low-performing clubs have higher odds of getting fired between 
seasons. They also found that experienced coaches in highly performing clubs more easily 
accept offers at other clubs than less tenured coaches. 
Salomo and Teichmann (2002) analyzed trainer turnover in the German premier 
soccer league during 1979/0-1998/9. They found that performance feedback, recent turnover 
of the board and media coverage explain trainer turnover. In contrast to their assumptions, 
there was no evidence that coach characteristics, changes in the supporters’ base, and 
personnel turnover are important antecedents of between-season trainer turnover in Germany. 
Tena and Forrest (2007) analyzed trainer turnover in the Spanish premier league 
during 2002/3-2004/5. They only considered club characteristics as antecedents for trainer 
turnover and they found that the likelihood of change is high in the relegation zone. They also 
found that the odds increase when the team recently had lost a match, when matches were 
played later on in the season and when it was the first trainer turnover for the club in the 
season. Finally, they found that disappointing long-term performance determines trainer 
turnover. Overall, Tena and Forrest (2007) concluded that chairs cannot afford to wait for a 
revival when the club has sunk into the relegation zone and when the season is well on its 
way. Hence they suggest that chairs quickly take risk by means of trainer turnover. 
Finally, the antecedents of Dutch trainer turnover were studied by Ter Weel (2006). 
His sample covers the forced and end-of-contract turnovers from 1986/7 to 2004/5 of premier 
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league teams that have been playing in the premier league for at least 9 years. Various coach 
characteristics (age, experience, characteristics as a player, number of spells during the career, 
tenure with club), the number of players contracted by a club, the remaining time of the 
coach’s contract, performance and relative performance were considered as antecedent for 
trainer turnover. Like the other studies, Ter Weel (2006) found that most of the trainer 
attributes play little role in the determination of trainer turnover. Rather, organizational 
characteristics such as the remaining contract length of the coach at the club, the number of 
transfers that have been issued before by the club, and relative performance are important 
antecedents. More specifically, Ter Weel (2006) found that coaches had higher odds of being 
fired when the cost of breaching contracts is low. Also, when the club has brought in a lot of 
new talent, the coach faces higher odds of being replaced. 
The results of performance feedback in Ter Weel’s study are more difficult to 
interpret. On the one hand, Ter Weel (2006) finds that substandard match results, compared to 
the results of the last three matches, increase the odds of trainer turnover. On the other hand, it 
seems that a better ranking, compared to the ranking for the last three years, increases the 
odds of trainer turnover. 
Despite the lack of methodological congruence between the four studies, they all 
indicate that not trainer attributes but rather the organizational context determines the 
probability of forced trainer turnovers. Especially performance feedback from recent matches 
seems to be an important explanatory variable because it creates a sense of urgency. However, 
it is also clear that performance signals linger on. Disappointing match results of more than 12 
weeks ago as well as disappointing rankings are antecedents for within-season trainer 
turnover. This indicates that there may be inertial forces in the organization. The UK and 
Spanish studies most strongly show that trainer turnover is likely to happen later on in the 
season. 
A simulation study by Hope (2003) indicates that trainer turnover happens too late in 
the season. He identified an ‘optimal’ time to replace coaches and compared this time with the 
actual timing of trainer turnover. He found that all clubs waited for more than eight weeks, 
which was his optimal starting point in the 2001/2-2002/3 UK season, to replace coaches. One 
of the reasons for the delay may be the costs of breaching, that are calculated on the basis of 
the remaining length of the contract (Ter Weel, 2006). It is clear that replacing coaches costs 
money and that the benefits are insecure. Chairs are aware that trainer turnover is a risky 
decision and may decide to postpone it. 
The literature review thus shows that trainer turnover is a risky decision that may be 
affected by performance feedback. We will verify this relationship by means of the piecewise 
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linear methodology presented in Chapter 2. We will make a distinction between short-term 
and long-term performance to check whether the reactions are different for these two pieces 
of information. 
The literature review highlights another opportunity for research. It is unclear whether 
trainer turnover is a step in a larger change process. The results of the different studies can not 
be easily linked. Salomo and Teichmann (2002) have found a positive effect of changes in the 
board on trainer turnover, but not on player turnover. Ter Weel (2006), however, did find a 
significant effect of the number of players bought on the likelihood of trainer turnover. And 
Tena and Forrest (2007) have found that clubs are not inclined to change too many coaches in 
a year. It is important to study the order in which these change interventions happen. 
 
3.2.2 Playing tactics 
The literature on playing tactics illustrates that coaches are not only figureheads that only take 
the blame and credit for performance, but that they take concrete risky actions. Unfortunately, 
studies on the risk-taking of coaches have mainly focused on risk-taking after institutional 
changes and on risk-taking within a match. 
There is research on differences in risk-taking over the seasons because the FIFA has 
attempted to increase the appeal of the game by changing the incentive system. In 1995/6 the 
FIFA changed the reward for the winning team from two to three points while leaving the 
reward for ties and the penalty for losses unchanged, in the hope to get more offensive play. 
Correia Geudes and Machado (2002) analyzed the offensive behavior in the Portuguese 
league one year before and after the change of the incentive system. They found that a more 
offensive response largely depended on the perceived symmetry between clubs. Teams in an 
underdog position did not take more offensive moves, but rather resorted to a more defensive 
play. 
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) similarly concluded that the soccer game has 
intensified in the Spanish premier league after the change in the incentive system. They found 
a significant increase in offensive and defensive moves as evidenced by a significant increase 
in extra time, in the fouls committed, in the cards issued, in the number of attackers in the 
composition of teams, in the number of shots on goals, and in the number of corner kicks. 
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) also found an intensification of the game once a club 
has taken the lead after the change in the incentive system. More than before, coaches of clubs 
that lag behind, add more attackers; while coaches of teams that have taken the lead, add more 
defenders, indicating that these coaches try to preserve their lead by freezing the game. 
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Also, Grund and Gürtler (2005) found that risk-taking typically occurred in the midst 
of a match and much less at the beginning of a match. They analyzed risk-taking of coaches 
during one season in the German premier league by means of line-ups and substitutions. They 
found that coaches of football teams switch to less risky substitutions when they are in the 
lead of a game, while they are inclined to make more risky substitutions when they are about 
to loose a game. They did not find that coaches let the team composition vary at the beginning 
of the match in function of the strength of the opponent. This last finding is especially 
important to us. Since there is a reluctance to make severe changes in the team composition, 
Grund and Gürtler (2005) indicate that there is some rigidity in the selection of players from 
the talent pool. Therefore, a new research opportunity opens up: Are coaches prepared to 
make tactical accommodations if the performance within the season urges them to do so? 
Clearly, this is a new opportunity to research when coaches are willing to make changes in the 
playing tactics given the existing pool of talent. Coaches can adopt different styles of play 
(ExpertFootball.com, n.d.). For example, ‘Catenaccio’ is an ideal type of a defender strategy 
requiring a highly organized and effective backline defense aimed at preventing goals. Next, 
‘Brazilian Samba’ soccer is the ideal type of a prospector strategy in which the team tries to 
provoke confusion in their adversaries, fascination in the public, and goals for the team. 
Finally, there is the ‘German’ soccer style that tries to attain a clinical efficiency, which 
corresponds to an analyzers strategy. In this study, we assume that clubs combine the 
strategies into hybrid forms. A highly successful hybrid strategy is ‘Total Soccer’, first 
adopted by the Netherlands, which combines German efficiency with the Latin element of 
surprise. 
Studying these changes in tactics during a season is an opportunity for research because 
the decision situation during a match is different from the situation during the season. During 
a match the focus is on short-term gains and losses, not on strategic decisions. The distinction 
between risk-taking during a match and risk-taking during a season corresponds to the 
distinction between decisions from experience and decisions from description (Hertwig et al., 
2004). During a match, coaches make decisions from description because the FIFA prescribes 
that coaches can make substitutions. The FIFA however does not describe how teams should 
organize their play during the season. These choices are thus not prescribed but they depend 
on the experience of the coach. As Hertwig et al. (2004) show, risk-taking from experience is 
different from risk-taking from description. They argue that risk-taking from experience will 
lead to underweighting of rare events, whereas risk-taking from description will lead to 
overweighting of rare events. As such coaches may take a gamble and substitute players 
during the game, but may escalate in their strategic orientation. Underweighting of rare events 
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may thus explain why Grund and Gürtler (2005) found that clubs are unlikely to make 
changes in the team composition. We will investigate this possibility further by means of 
piece wise linear methodology. 
 
3.2.3 Player transfer 
Most research on player transfers has focused strongly on individual players and especially 
contractual clauses like players’ wages and transfer fees (e.g., Frick, 2007). Two issues in the 
soccer sector have had great impact on current player transfers and explain the research focus 
on individual players. First, there has been a steady increase in the wages and transfer fees of 
superstar players. Second, the Bosman court ruling of December 1995/6 states that out-of-
contract players older than 24 years can leave at no cost. This is likely to have had a 
triggering effect on the mobility and fees of soccer players, because it gives an incentive to 
clubs to sell their players while they are still in-contract (Carmichael et al., 1999: 147; 
Dobson & Goddard, 2001: 190). 
Unfortunately, little research effort went out to the club decision to trade players. One 
study however did. Carmichael et al. (1999) investigated for the English soccer league how 
several player and club characteristics influence the decision to trade a player. The player 
characteristics were age, experience in the league, goals scored, increase in goals scored 
compared to last year, position, overweight, international caps, young international caps, and 
number of prior transfers. The club characteristics investigated were whether it was a loan 
player, division where the team was in, team productivity indicators, whether there was a 
change of the coach, recent promotion and relegation of the club. They found that player 
transfers are most strongly affected by specific club features and to a lesser extent by player 
characteristics. Of course young, scoring, and highly visible players are more likely to be 
transferred, but whether or not it was a loan player and whether or not a trainer turnover had 
recently occurred appeared to be more important factors. 
For organizational scholars it comes as no surprise that players who are already on a 
loan basis have higher odds of being transferred, because they do not belong to the core of the 
organization (e.g., Greve, 2003c: 178). The positive relationship between player transfer and 
trainer turnover warrants more research. 
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3.2.4 Change interventions in soccer clubs 
Overall, the academic literature on change in soccer organizations seems to be inspired more 
by an obsession with cult figures and rare events. The focus is on spectacular wages and fees, 
court rulings and performance effects of coaches. In an attempt to start research from an 
organizational perspective, we reviewed the literature and showed that there are substantial 
organizational risks related to the decisions of chairs and coaches. The literature indicates that 
it is difficult to institute a trainer turnover, to decide upon changes in players transfers and to 
make changes in tactics. Agents, who want to institute these risky changes without having to 
pay a price for it themselves, need to be able to sell it to the other stakeholders. They need to 
persuade that their choice makes sense. The methodology discussed in Chapter 2 is able to 
display how coaches and chairs cope with the resistance with respect to the decisions. 
 
3.3 Sample and data collection procedures  
We collected information on all clubs that played at least once in the Dutch premier league 
organized by the KNVB during the period 1990/1-2005/6. The choice for this observation 
period is prompted by data availability concerns. Information on coach and player transfers is 
easily available on the internet from 1991/2 onwards. During that period, some important 
institutional shifts have occurred. We will take into consideration the introduction of the 
Champions League (CL) tournament in 1991/2 by the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA), the Bosman court ruling in December 1995/6 and the change in the 
incentive system for wins in 1995/6. 
We relied on secondary data sources from the internet to obtain longitudinal data fast 
and at little expense. The time savings were substantial, because many of the data could be 
downloaded from websites that had already stored the information. Clearly, we also 
experienced problems typical of secondary data. Emory (1985: 136) has identified a lack of 
flexibility, a potential lack of quality and a risk of obsoleteness as important disadvantages of 
secondary data. Poole et al. (2000: 138-139) have observed that differences in archival 
practices can lead to contradictions among recordings, biases and self-serving distortions. 
We were confronted with all these advantages and disadvantages at some point in our 
study. Both the degree of cost savings and the severity of the pitfalls of secondary data have 
largely determined our choice for specific websites. In the end, we did not consult ‘official’ 
information from the UEFA and the KNVB because information on clubs was sparse and 
could not be handled without many manual manipulations. Neither did we rely on the 
websites of the clubs because the quality and quantity of the information differs substantially. 
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Some club websites report very little historical information and/or some contain flaws. 
Moreover, there are signs of impression management when the information dealt with events 
or people that clubs would like to forget. 
Instead we decided to rely on websites that allowed us to download bulky data with 
few manipulations. Table 3.1 displays the websites we have consulted. Since these websites 
were previously unknown to us it was important to double check the information. The next 
sections describe the downloaded data and their quality. 
 
TABLE 3.1 DOWNLOADS FROM DIFFERENT WEBSITES 
Source Matches Coaches/ Chairs Players 
Footballsquads 
www.footballsquads.co.uk 
  Names, position, 
age, height, and 
weight of players 
Koning Voetbal 
www.koningvoetbal.nl 
Scores and dates 
of league matches 
  
Ronald Zwiers 
home.wanadoo.nl/ronald.zwiers 
Scores of league 
matches 
Scores and dates 
of all cup matches 
Names of 
coaches and 
chairs 
Dates of breach, 
Reason of breach 
Names, position, 
age, attendance, 
and goals of 
players and coaches 
Soccerway 
www.soccerway.com 
Scores and dates of 
playoff matches 
  
Voetbal International 
www.vi.nl 
  Names, 
attendance, 
goals, cards of 
players 
Voetbal Nederland 
www.voetbalnederland.nl 
 
 Names of 
technical staff 
(different sorts of 
coaches), begin/ 
end contract 
 
Voetbal Stats 
www.voetbalstats.nl 
 
Scores and dates 
of international cup 
matches 
  
Legend: Variables in bold means checked for consistency with another website 
 
3.3.1 Match scores 
We collected information on different kinds of matches. Clubs participate in different 
tournaments simultaneously each year. They play in double all-play-all national tournaments 
and they participate in the national and, optionally, in European cup tournaments. Detailed 
accounts of how the soccer competitions are organized nationally and internationally are not 
provided here (see e.g., Colin & Muller, 1996; 2002, for reference works). In the Netherlands, 
the all-play-all league competition is organized by the KNVB, which admits since 1966 each 
year 18 clubs to the premier league. The admission of the teams to the competition only 
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changes due to selection effects: the promotion of the top teams from the second league and 
the relegation of the low-performing teams in the premier league. Each season, the clubs play 
twice against each other. Thus, each club plays 34 matches, leading to 34 repeated measures 
for 288 (=18 x 16) club years, giving 9,792 (=34 x 288) observations in total. 
The ratings (i.e., the cumulated number of points) of the clubs are included in 
Appendix 1. The number of observations for cup matches between 1990/1 and 2005/6 is 
1,551. This number is unevenly distributed over the years because of the elimination of Dutch 
soccer clubs from the European tournaments and because of the many small changes in the 
organization of the cup tournaments.  
Two websites for the match results of the KNVB league matches were consulted, 
namely the Koning Voetbal website (Koning Voetbal, n.d.) and the Ronald Zwiers website 
(Zwiers, n.d.). Both samples contain all matches played since 1956/7, the season that the 
organization of the KNVB league started to get its current form (Colin & Muller, 1996: 85). 
The Ronald Zwiers website contains only the match scores, whereas the Koning Voetbal 
website also contains the date of the matches. Additionally, both websites report the final 
charts at the end of each season with information on the ranking, the rating, the total number 
of goals scored, the total number of goals conceded, and the total number of draws, wins and 
losses. We found only 13 inconsistencies between the two samples. These inconsistencies 
could be easily solved by aggregating the points obtained after each match and comparing it 
with the rating at the end of the season. It appeared that only the aggregated points of the 
Koning Voetbal where equal to rating in the charts at the end of each season, which were 
identical for both the Ronald Zwiers and the Koning Voetbal sample. 
Also, two websites were consulted for the match scores of the national and the 
European leagues, namely the Voetbal Stats website (Voetbal Stats, n.d.) and the Ronald 
Zwiers website (Zwiers, n.d.). Both websites report the date and the scores of the cup games. 
The difference is that the Voetbal Stats website only contains information about the 
international cup matches, whereas the Ronald Zwiers website also contains information 
about the national cup games. Again, a small systematic error - in only five games - occurred. 
It appeared that the Voetbal Stats website reported the scores without the penalties, whereas 
the Ronald Zwiers website reported the scores including the penalties. We have chosen to 
follow the Ronald Zwiers website, so both national and international cup matches will be 
treated consistently in terms of penalties. 
We also performed consistency checks on the dates of the international cup leagues. In 
most cases, the dates in the two samples matched. Only 31 observations failed to match by a 
couple of days. For fixtures from 2001/2 onwards, the dates could be double checked 
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manually with the UEFA website. For older dates, we resorted to Colin and Muller (1996; 
2002). Unfortunately, a small measurement error in some dates of the older cup matches 
remained. 
 
3.3.2 Coaches and chairs 
We consulted the Voetbal Nederland website (VoetbalNederland, n.d.) and the Ronald Zwiers 
website (Zwiers, n.d.) to collect data on the coaches. The Ronald Zwiers website not only 
reported all the coaches, but also the chairs for most of the clubs in the Dutch premier league. 
Moreover, it was done systematically, without intermittent missing values. However, the 
Ronald Zwiers website did not report club information on Go Ahead Eagles, MVV, VVV and 
Dordrecht. The information for these teams was imputed from the Voetbal Nederland website, 
which was only used as backup due to intermittent missing values. 
From the Ronald Zwiers website we downloaded the ‘name of the coach’ and the 
‘chair’, the ‘date of a breach’ and the ‘reason of the turnover’ of the coach and/or the chair of 
the club. Besides using a different format, the Voetbal Nederland website more or less 
contained similar information on the actual presence of the coaches at the clubs. 
We again did some consistency checks on the two samples. The tests indicated three 
kinds of inconsistencies. There were spelling mistakes in the names, intermittent missing data 
and dropouts, and inconsistent treatment of breaches (especially the disclosure of interim and 
duo-interim coaches and the date of the breach). After having eliminated inconsistencies in 
the spelling of the names, we used the reference books of sports journalists (Colin & Muller, 
1996, 2002; Verkamman & Van den Nieuwenhof, 2004), the club websites, local newspapers 
and the appendix in the study of Koning (2003) to resolve the remaining inconsistencies. 
With respect to the consistency checks of the dates of breach, we tolerated an error 
margin of a couple of days. As long as the date of the breach occurred between two matches, 
we did not try to resolve the inconsistency. Thus again, in the dates of the breach there may be 
a small number of minor measurement errors. 
 
3.3.3 Players 
The data about the players were downloaded from the Voetbal International website (Voetbal 
International, n.d.), the Ronald Zwiers website (Zwiers, n.d.) and the Football Squads website 
(Footballsquads, n.d.). The three websites only report player information once a year, not after 
each match. There are substantial differences between the websites. The Ronald Zwiers 
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website contains information on the (given and sur)names of the players, their date of birth, 
their position in the team, the number of games played, and the number of goals made in each 
season. The Ronald Zwiers website starts reporting from 2001/2 onwards, except for the clubs 
Ajax, PSV and Feyenoord for which the data go further back. The Football Squads website 
also reports data from 2001/2 onwards. It contains only personnel data; the (given and 
sur)name of the player, position, height, weight, date of birth, and previous club. The Football 
Squads website does not include player statistics like the number of matches played or games 
scored, but it already starts in 1990/1. The information per player is restricted to his surname, 
the number of games played, the number of goals made, and the number of yellow and red 
cards for each season. 
As a rude indication of the overlap between the samples, the Football Squads sample 
reported an average size of a team of 25.7 (= 3,866 observations/150 club years) active 
players for the period 2001/2-2006/7, the Ronald Zwiers sample reported an average size of 
25.2 (= 3,256 observations/129 club years) active players and the Voetbal International 
sample reported an average of 25.6 (=2,611 observations/102 club years) active players for 
that period. 
Still, consistency checks revealed that it is important to select the data properly and to 
prune the databases. There were again many inconsistencies in the spelling of the names 
(approximately 7% of the Ronald Zwiers sample). Beyond these inconsistencies, there is a 
more severe measurement error of about 8% in the player samples. In 8% of the cases, one of 
the three databases reported a player which according to another database did not participate 
in that team that year. Further checks revealed that most inconsistencies between the samples 
occurred for players that had hardly played in a season. We therefore restricted the analysis to 
active players. 
From the consistency checks we also learned that all players that have scored were 
present in the sample, because the sum of the goals scored by players matches the clubs total 
at the end of the season. Table 3.2 shows the inconsistencies between the Ronald Zwiers 
player sample and the true match goals of the club. In all but one3 case, the sums were lower 
than the true club totals. These differences may reasonably reflect the extent to which clubs 
have benefited from the own-goals made by their opponents. Very similar results were 
obtained when the Voetbal International sample was compared to the true totals. 
For consistency checks on the number of games, no meta-data was provided by the 
webmasters. Based on the collected information, we were unable to rule out the possibility of 
                                                 
3
 There is probably an error in the Ronald Zwiers database for NAC-player Van den Eede who most likely 
scored only two goals instead of three in 2002/3 for NAC.  
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measurement errors. We however found out that most of the players played no more than 34 
matches, suggesting that only league matches were counted. Still, both the Voetbal 
International sample and the Ronald Zwiers sample reported a minority of players who 
played more than 34 games. 
To some extent, relegation and promotion in the Dutch soccer league could explain why 
some players had statistics between 35 and 38 games. This can be explained by the fact that 
relegation in the KNVB does not happen automatically except for the club at the bottom of 
the premier league. That is, between 2001/2 and 2005/6 two low-ranked teams of the premier 
league had to play after the end of the season an additional double all-play-all playoff 
tournament4, in which two teams of the premier league face each three of the high-ranked 
teams from the second league. Unfortunately, questions remained for 19 records because 
these players had been playing more than 34 games, but did not belong to a club that played 
in the playoff tournament, at least according to the Soccerway website (Soccerway, n.d.).  
This inconsistency check revealed a more serious quality problem in the Voetbal 
International sample5. It seems that the Voetbal International sample has incorrectly doubled 
the player statistics (number of players, and number of goals scored) in many seasons before 
2000/1. To assess the magnitude of the mistake, the number of games was aggregated per 
club year. Several club years did report a figure well over 374 (= 34 matches x 11 players) 
before the millennium change. Anomalies occurred for the seasons 1990/1, 1992/3, 1994/5, 
1996/7, and 1999/0. Also, the fact that the number of goals for some clubs exceeded the true 
club totals for the seasons 1992/3, 1994/5, 1995/6, and 1999/0, made us decide to disregard 
information on player statistics from the Voetbal International sample. 
There were also inconsistencies between the Football Squads and the Ronald Zwiers 
samples concerning the date of birth of the players. Most inconsistencies could be easily 
updated by taking into account the consistency over time and the consistency between the 
samples. For the remaining inconsistencies, various websites were considered manually (most 
often Voetbal International, Frank Beijen, and Wikipedia) to find the appropriate date of 
birth. To mitigate the influence of remaining measurement errors on the analysis, the age of 
the player was subsequently rounded to years. 
Finally, we compared the Football Squads and the Ronald Zwiers sample with respect 
to the position of the players. About 12% (= 358/2,860) of the observations were inconsistent. 
These inconsistencies reflect differences in the opinions between the webmasters, rather than 
accidental archival mistakes. The reason why there are different opinions is that a midfielder 
                                                 
4
 In Dutch called the ‘nacompetitie’. 
5
 We reported the inconsistencies to the website administrator of Voetbal International.  
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can easily be confused with a defender or with an attacker, depending on the qualities of the 
players. Midfielders try to tackle the opposing team, to retain possession of the ball, and to 
feed it to the attacker, and perhaps, to score as well. As such, midfielders may play a more 
defensive role, while others may appear to be more attackers. 
Whereas the simple inter-rater Kappa was 82%, the weighted inter-rater Kappa 
increased to 87% when we took into account that midfielders are comparable to defenders and 
attackers. Moreover, since the weighted Kappa was also asymptotically significantly different 
from the simple Kappa statistic, we concluded that many of the differences are attributable to 
the blurred category of midfielders. As a matter of fact, there were only twelve combinations 
of defenders and attackers. Thus, overall there is a very good agreement between the Ronald 
Zwiers and the Football Squads sample for the position of the player.  
Given the fact that there were some measurement errors in the player samples, we took 
some precautions. First, we have restricted the analysis to players that have played at least one 
game per season. Second, we decided to ignore the information on the position for new 
players that only had the chance to play one game in their first season, even when the two 
samples agreed. Third, the data on the player’s date of birth was truncated to years. Fourth, 
we decided to retain two separate samples. The Ronald Zwiers sample is more suitable for an 
analysis that includes individual player transfers. The Voetbal International sample is 
attractive for an analysis of long-term series, on the condition that individual player 
characteristics are omitted. Finally, all records for the season 1990/1 were omitted from the 
Voetbal International. 
 
3.3.4 Club information  
We collected information about the club’s history from the Ronald Zwiers website (Zwiers, 
n.d.) and the Voetbal Nederland website (VoetbalNederland, n.d.). Both sources report the 
date of incorporation. The Ronald Zwiers website additionally gives an overview of any name 
changes, mergers and the national and international trophies. There were severe 
inconsistencies in the dates of incorporation between Ronald Zwiers and Voetbal Nederland, 
which are related to an unequal treatment of past mergers or acquisitions. The presence of 
mergers and acquisitions make it difficult to assess the date of incorporation for the club. 
Since Colin and Muller (1996; 2002) agreed mostly with the Voetbal Nederland website, we 
decided to use the dates of the Voetbal Nederland website. 
 
 
  
TABLE 3.2 GOALS AND ‘FORCED’ OWN-GOALS BY CLUB 
 
Sum 
RZ 
2001/2 
Club 
Total 
2001/2 
Differ- 
ence 
Sum 
RZ 
2002/3 
Club 
Total 
2002/3 
Differ- 
ence 
Club 
Total 
2003/4 
Sum 
RZ 
2003/4 
Differ- 
ence 
Sum 
RZ 
2004/5 
Club 
Total 
2004/5 
Differ- 
ence 
Sum 
RZ 
2005/6 
Club 
Total 
2005/6 
Differ- 
ence 
ADO Den Haag 51 . . 73 . . 35 36 -1 43 44 -1 35 36 -1 
Ajax 71 73 -2 95 96 -1 75 79 -4 72 74 -2 65 66 -1 
AZ 41 43 -2 49 50 -1 65 65 0 69 71 -2 78 78 0 
Excelsior 72 . . 38 38 0 69 . . 55 . . 66 . . 
Feyenoord 67 68 -1 88 89 -1 71 71 0 89 90 -1 76 79 -3 
De Graafschap 43 43 0 35 35 0 61 . . 32 32 0 60 . . 
FC Groningen 40 40 0 28 28 0 38 38 0 49 50 -1 46 46 0 
SC Heerenveen 54 57 -3 60 61 -1 45 45 0 64 64 0 63 63 0 
NAC Breda 54 55 -1 43 42 1 57 58 -1 43 43 0 44 45 -1 
NEC 37 38 -1 41 41 0 44 44 0 40 41 -1 43 43 0 
PSV 77 77 0 86 87 -1 88 92 -4 87 89 -2 70 71 -1 
RBC Roosendaal 76 . . 33 33 0 33 34 -1 37 38 -1 21 22 -1 
Roda JC 31 33 -2 56 58 -2 59 60 -1 59 60 -1 54 57 -3 
RKC Waalwijk 48 49 -1 44 44 0 47 47 0 43 44 -1 47 48 -1 
Sparta Rotterdam 26 26 0 60 . . 75 . . 92 . . 34 34 0 
FC Twente 40 41 -1 35 36 -1 53 56 -3 48 48 0 43 44 -1 
FC Utrecht 55 60 -5 47 49 -2 39 42 -3 39 40 -1 48 48 0 
Vitesse 43 45 -2 36 37 -1 39 39 0 53 53 0 49 52 -3 
Willem II 54 54 0 47 48 -1 46 47 -1 43 44 -1 43 45 -2 
Legend: RZ = Ronald Zwiers 
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TABLE 3.3 CLUBS IN THE SAMPLE (FIRST LEAGUE = 1956/7) 
Club 
Date of 
Incorporation A
ll
ia
n
ce
 
First 
appearance 
Last 
appearance 
Number of seasons in 
 the Premier League:  
In 1990/1 In 2005/6 
ADO Den Haag 01JUL1971 Y 1971/2 2005/6 14 19 
Ajax 18MAR1900 N 1956/7 2005/6 34 50 
AZ 01JUL1967 Y 1968/9 2005/6 19 28 
Cambuur Leeuwarden 19JUN1964 Y 1992/3 1999/0 . 4 
FC Den Bosch 19JUL1964 Y 1971/2 2004/5 9 13 
SVV/Dordrecht 90 01JUL1990 . 1969/0 1994/5 1 5 
Excelsior 23JUL1902 N 1970/1 2002/3 12 13 
Feyenoord 01JUL1920 N 1956/7 2005/6 34 50 
Fortuna Sittard 01JUL1968 Y 1968/9 2001/2 9 19 
Go Ahead Eagles 30JUL1971 . 1963/4 1995/6 24 28 
De Graafschap 01FEB1954 N 1973/4 2004/5 5 15 
FC Groningen 16JUN1971 Y 1971/2 2005/6 13 27 
Heracles Almelo 03MAY1903 Y 1962/3 2005/6 5 6 
SC Heerenveen 20JUL1920 Y 1990/1 2005/6 1 14 
MVV 01MAY1978 . 1956/7 1999/0 28 36 
NAC Breda 19FEB1912 N 1956/7 2005/6 27 39 
NEC 01AUG1981 Y 1967/8 2005/6 17 30 
PSV 31AUG1913 N 1956/7 2005/6 34 50 
RBC Roosendaal 31JUL1912 N 2000/1 2005/6 . 5 
Roda JC 27JUL1914 Y 1973/4 2005/6 17 33 
RKC Waalwijk 26AUG1940 N 1988/9 2005/6 2 18 
Sparta Rotterdam 04JAN1888 N 1956/7 2005/6 34 47 
FC Twente 01JUL1965 Y 1965/6 2005/6 24 40 
FC Utrecht 01JUL1970 Y 1970/1 2005/6 20 36 
Vitesse 15JUN1984 Y 1971/2 2005/6 5 21 
Volendam 01JUN1920 Y 1959/0 2003/4 15 24 
VVV 01JUL1966 . 1956/7 1993/4 10 12 
Willem II 12AUG1896 N 1956/7 2005/6 16 32 
FC Zwolle 01JUL1982 Y 1978/9 2003/4 10 12 
Legend for Alliance: 
 ‘Y’ = Ronald Zwiers reports a merger in the past,  
 ‘N’ = Ronald Zwiers does not report mergers,  
 ‘.’ = Ronald Zwiers has no club information. 
74                                                                                                         Data on Dutch soccer clubs 
 
3.4 Main explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
This section describes how the data were transformed into variables for analysis. We start 
with a short description of the clubs and then move on to the measures for the four main 
explanatory variables in this manuscript, namely trainer turnover, playing tactics, player 
transfers and performance signals. We also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
different measures. 
 
3.4.1  Soccer clubs 
Table 3.3 reports for each club the date of incorporation, information on merger activity, and 
the number of years present in the premier league (at the beginning and at the end of the 
sample period). It shows that when teams already have appeared in the Dutch premier league 
before their date of incorporation, some corporate activity has occurred. Table 3.3 further 
shows the presence of selection mechanisms: while some clubs had no problem in 
maintaining their position in the premier league, other clubs struggled to stick to the highest 
national level. 
 
3.4.2 Trainer turnover 
We sorted the names of the coaches in a club by date to construct measures of trainer 
turnover. Depending on whether there are name changes between adjacent observations, we 
took the following steps: 
1. As long as the names of two adjacent records are the same, there is no trainer turnover. 
2. If the names of the adjacent coaches are different and they have a contract in the same 
period, there were duo-coaches. 
3. If the names of the adjacent coaches differ in adjacent periods, there was a trainer 
turnover.  
4. The tenure of each coach within the club is measured by the number of weeks since 
the starting date of the contract until the end date of the contract. Since clubs generally 
play one match every week, expressing the tenure of a coach in terms of weeks has the 
advantage that it gives an indication of the number of games played.  
5. Finally, we counted the number of spells to go from firing a coach to the first trainer 
turnover until changes at the beginning of the next season. 
 
An organizational learning perspective on change   75 
 
We could easily compute four important pieces of information from the data: the date of a 
trainer turnover, whether it is a between-season or within-season turnover, the number of 
spells and the tenure of the coach in a club. Although it is popular to take the tenure of a 
coach as the dependent variable, we think this measure is less suited for organizational 
research, as the focus is not on the individual (the survival rate of a coach) but on the 
organizational decisions after new information has been released. The tenure of a coach may 
be an indication of organizational power and will therefore only be used as a confounding 
variable that may help to explain why coaches are being replaced. Because we are more 
interested in the organizational decision making, we have used the date of a trainer turnover, 
whether it is a between-season or within-season turnover, and the number of spells instead. 
  
TABLE 3.4 TRAINER TURNOVER IN THE SAMPLE 
Number of turnovers 
1 2 3 Total  
N N N N % 
August 1 1 . 2 1 
September 4 2 . 6 4 
October 7 11 . 18 13 
November 2 7 1 10 7 
December 8 6 3 17 12 
January 1 7 . 8 6 
February 5 10 1 16 11 
March 1 3 . 4 3 
April 7 3 . 10 7 
May 50 . . 50 35 
June 1 . . 1 1 
July . . . . . 
Total  87 50 5 142 100 
(a) 
Within- 
Season 
Between 
Seasons 
Total  
N % N % N % 
August 3 2 1 2 4 2 
September 7 5 . . 7 3 
October 22 15 . . 22 11 
November 11 8 . . 11 5 
December 25 18 . . 25 12 
January 10 7 . . 10 5 
February 20 14 . . 20 10 
March 7 5 . . 7 3 
April 2 1 8 13 10 5 
May 32 23 50 83 82 41 
June 3 2 1 2 4 2 
July . . . . . . 
 Total  142 100 60 100 202 100 
(b) 
 
Table 3.4 describes the differences between the measures of trainer turnover. We observed 
202 trainer turnovers in 288 club years: 60 turnovers started between seasons and 142 
turnovers started within the season. Since there are in total 87 cases where the old coach was 
replaced by a coach that started off in the new season, only 27 (= 87-60) of the within-season 
trainer turnovers consisted off new coaches that continued working as a coach at the same 
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club in the next season. In all other occasions, there was a temporary solution by means of an 
interim coach. In 50 occasions, the interim coach was replaced during or at the end of the 
season. Also, in five cases there were two interim coaches involved, before the new coach 
could start in the next season. The measures are internally consistent, because the column 
totals of Table 3.4 (a) sum up to 202 (= (1 x 87) +(2 x 50) +(3 x 5)) which is the cell total of 
Table 3.4 (b). Table 3.4 also indicates that the number of turnovers varies per month. There 
are clear starting-up effects, during August and September, and cooling-down effects from 
March onwards, but it is difficult to find out whether interim coaches become more popular in 
certain months. 
 
3.4.3 Player transfer 
The approach for measuring player transfers is similar to trainer turnover in the sense that we 
compare for each player his presence at a club with his presence in the adjacent seasons. We 
assume that a player is added to the team when he plays at least one match in the season and 
no match in the season before. Similarly, we assume that a player left the team when he has 
played at least one match in the season before, but did not play a match in the season 
thereafter. Clearly, both measures only approximate real player transfers. The measures rather 
reflect the decision of coaches to let him play, of the chair to add the player to the team, and 
other influences like severe injuries or retirements. 
 
TABLE 3.5 AVERAGE AGE OF PLAYER BY POSITION AND SEASON (2001/2-2005/6) 
Season All Attacker Defender Goalkeeper Midfielder 
2001/2 25 25 26 28 24 
2002/3 25 24 25 27 24 
2003/4 25 24 25 28 24 
2004/5 24 23 25 28 24 
2005/6 25 24 25 28 25 
2006/7 25 24 25 28 25 
Source: Ronald Zwiers sample 
 
The descriptive statistics of the measures show some interesting features of transfer policies. 
Table 3.5 first shows that clubs try to keep the average age of a player in the team constant at 
25 years of age for field players and 28 years of age for goalkeepers. It follows that older 
players have to be replaced by younger players. This can be verified by calculating the 
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average age of players entering and leaving the team. Table 3.6 indeed shows that the average 
age of the new players is systematically lower than the age of the incumbent players. 
 
TABLE 3.6 AVERAGE AGE, LINE-UPS, AND SCORING RECORDS OF NEW, OLD, AND INCUMBENT PLAYERS 
 Average age of a player 
who 
Average number of 
games played by a 
player who 
Average number of 
goals scored by a player 
who 
 stays  is new leaves stays is new leaves stays is new leaves 
2001/2 25 23 26 20 12 10 3 2 1 
2002/3 26 23 26 21 15 15 2 2 2 
2003/4 25 23 25 22 14 15 3 2 2 
2004/5 25 24 25 20 16 15 3 2 2 
All positions 
2005/6 25 24 25 20 15 15 2 2 2 
2001/2 24 24 26 21 25 14 5 13 3 
2002/3 25 23 25 22 16 17 6 3 3 
2003/4 25 23 25 20 15 15 6 3 3 
2004/5 24 23 23 18 17 13 5 3 3 
Attacker 
2005/6 24 23 24 18 16 15 4 4 3 
2001/2 26 21 24 20 6 8 1 0 0 
2002/3 26 24 27 20 16 14 1 0 1 
2003/4 26 24 25 22 14 15 1 1 1 
2004/5 26 24 26 22 17 15 1 1 0 
Defender 
2005/6 26 23 25 20 13 13 1 0 0 
2001/2 32 29 31 17 11 10 0 0 0 
2002/3 28 25 27 19 8 10 0 0 0 
2003/4 29 27 29 25 8 15 0 0 0 
2004/5 28 28 29 17 14 13 0 0 0 
Goalkeeper 
2005/6 29 28 28 20 15 12 0 0 0 
2001/2 25 21 24 21 13 10 5 1 3 
2002/3 25 23 25 22 16 15 2 2 1 
2003/4 25 23 25 22 16 15 3 2 2 
2004/5 25 23 24 20 16 16 3 2 2 
Midfielder 
2005/6 25 24 25 20 17 17 2 2 2 
Source: Ronald Zwiers sample 
 
Table 3.6 further indicates that players change clubs when they did not get much playing 
time. Similarly, new players, on average, get less playing opportunity in the first season at 
their new club. It should however be borne in mind that the differences in goals scored and 
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games played between transferred and incumbent players would have been less extreme if we 
had been able to account for the mutations during winter break. 
It is thus clear from Tables 3.5 and 3.6 that clubs continuously transfer players. The 
extent to which clubs transfer players is described in Table 3.7. The first column indicates the 
mean number of players who left a team. The last column reveals how many clubs were in the 
Voetbal International sample. The second until the penultimate column show how many clubs 
saw three up to 18 players leave. The average number of players who left a premier league 
club is 9; but this average masks quite some variability. Table 3.7 shows that there is a 
gradual increase over the years in the number of players who left the team. This increase is in 
line with accounts of increasing internationalization and mobility of the transfer market for 
players (e.g., Dobson & Goddard, 2001; Frick, 2007). 
 
TABLE 3.7 NUMBER OF ACTIVE PLAYERS THAT LEFT AT THE END OF THE SEASON: 1991/2-2005/6 
Number of players that left a club 
 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 Clubs  
Mean N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Season 
1991/2 6 . 4 2 . 2 3 . . . . . . . . . 11 
1992/3 6 1 2 . 3 3 . 2 . . . . . . . . 11 
    1993/4 7 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 . . . 1 . . . . 13 
1994/5 8 2 . 3 1 1 1 1 2 . 1 . 1 1 . . 14 
1995/6 7 1 . 1 5 1 1 3 . 2 . . . . . . 14 
1996/7 10 . . . . 2 1 4 3 1 3 1 . . . . 15 
1997/8 10 . . . . 1 3 1 3 3 1 . . 1 1 . 14 
1998/9 9 . 2 . 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 . . . . 1 14 
1999/0 10 1 . . 1 2 2 . 1 1 1 2 1 . . 1 13 
2000/1 9 . . 2 . 1 3 1 2 4 . 2 . . . . 15 
2001/2 7 1 . 2 4 1 3 1 2 . . 1 . . . . 15 
2002/3 9 . . 1 . 2 5 2 2 2 1 . . . . . 15 
2003/4 8 . 1 1 2 2 1 . 5 3 . . . . . . 15 
2004/5 12 . . . . . . 3 . 5 . 4 1 . 1 1 15 
2005/6 9 . . . 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 . . . 16 
All 9 8 10 14 21 25 28 23 23 25 9 13 4 2 2 3 199 
Source: Voetbal international sample 
 
Additionally, there is strong variation among the clubs within each season. While all clubs 
yearly see players leave, some clubs seem to replace almost the entire team. The challenge 
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thus is to explain the variation. The picture for the number of players added to the team is 
very similar to Table 3.7 in the sense that on average 9 new players are added to the team, but 
there is a tendency to increase the number of new players and there is a lot of club variation. 
The table can be consulted in Appendix 2. 
 
3.4.4 Playing tactics 
Since the ‘Catenaccio’ soccer style is aimed at preventing goals, ‘Brazilian Samba’ is focused 
on scoring goals and the ‘German’ soccer style that tries to win by the smallest difference in 
goals, we measure the playing tactics through the goals scored and the goals conceded. In 
particular, we measure shifts in these three styles as: 
1) A shift towards an offensive strategy as the realized increase in the number of goals 
scored per match after four weeks. 
2) A shift towards a defensive strategy as the realized decrease in the number of goals taken 
per match after four weeks. 
3) A shift towards efficiency as the increase of the net number of goals scored after four 
weeks. 
 
3.4.5 Performance signals 
All measures of performance signals used in this study are similar in the sense that they 
compare the most recent performance indicator (P) against a reference point (L). The 
introduction of a reference point is necessary to make the distinction between low (high) 
performance and disappointing (satisfying) performance. Although on average low and 
substandard performance will correlate positively, low performance does not necessarily 
imply disappointing performance because low performance does not disappoint when only 
moderate levels of performance where aspired. Similarly high performance does not equal 
satisfying performance when even higher levels where aspired. 
The academic sports literature has indicated two relevant performance indicators: 
short-term performance and long-term performance indicators. Match results can be evaluated 
on their own, but the consequences of the match result on the club’s ranking can also be 
considered. The short-term performance indicator is the score of a match which ranges from a 
win (3 points), a draw (1 point) to a loss (0 points). For the sake of uniformity we have 
applied this rule to all matches, even if it was a league match played before the FIFA changed 
the incentive system. The long-term performance indicator is the rating (the number of 
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accumulated points) or equivalently the ranking (the order based on the rating) in the premier 
league. 
For these two performance indicators, we constructed three different reference points 
as is common in organizational learning theory: historical aspirations, social aspirations and 
direct aspirations. Aspirations are needed because we know that organizational performance 
should be somewhere above zero performance, but how much above zero is unclear. 
Therefore performance can be 1) compared with the own past performance, 2) benchmarked 
against the performance of similar peers, and 3) related to some clear future goal. 
Organizational learning theory suggests that there are important behavioral differences among 
the three kinds of aspirations (Cyert & March, 1992; Greve, 2003c; Mezias, Chen & Murphy, 
2002). 
Historical aspirations set the minimum level of performance by extrapolating 
performance information from the past. They are likely to be used by organizations, because 
data on past performance is easy to collect and easy to interpret. Historical aspirations are not 
good aspiration levels in the cases of extreme performance. Extremely low performance leads 
to low aspirations and extremely high performance puts too much pressure on the 
organization. Historical performance can also instill perverse effects on organizational 
decision making when the information of the past is obsolete. 
Social aspirations set the minimum level of performance by comparisons to reference 
groups. These reference groups can be the complete industry to which the organization 
belongs or a subset of the industry. Social aspiration levels are likely to be used in soccer 
clubs, because the performance of reference groups can be easily identified. Like historical 
aspirations, social aspirations may occasionally give the wrong signs to the decision makers. 
There may be a tendency to use information about firms that are fundamentally different. 
Regularly, organizations refer to organizations that are superior to them. However, when used 
properly, social aspirations have desirable features. They give practical clues about which 
firms are likely to be selected in and out. 
Direct aspirations set the minimum level of performance without any clear relationship 
to past organizational performance or the performance of peers or superiors. If organizations 
use direct aspirations, they generally reflect optimism. For example, in the football setting, 
new entrants to the premier league may aspire to stay in the premier league. Also, teams that 
have not played European before can try to achieve tickets to the European cup tournaments. 
Although the possibility of setting direct aspirations has been acknowledged, it has 
often been skipped in empirical research. The reason is that managers of professional 
organizations will not reveal that their aspirations are higher than the minimum level of 
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performance that should be aimed for. Experienced managers, who can set their own 
aspirations, are reluctant to show too much optimism when setting aspirations, because they 
know that high aspirations may boomerang when performance is used for evaluation. 
Similarly, when aspirations are set to evaluate others, optimism may also be mitigated in 
rounds of negotiation. During planning, subordinates will try to downplay their abilities to 
deliver targets and superiors will know that subordinates are trying to downplay. To correct 
for the information asymmetry, the top management uses its vertical power to stretch the 
targets without having information on what a natural target is. The final result of the 
negotiations on aspirations therefore depends on the information asymmetries (Hoskisson, 
Hitt & Hill, 1991) and on the bargaining power (Jensen, 2003). 
The behavioral differences between the different kinds of aspirations have to be borne 
in mind. One of the implications is that it is no longer common in organizational learning 
studies to aggregate the aspiration levels into a single index. Each performance signal is 
incorporated separately in regression models (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Greve, 1998; Miller & Chen, 2004). In this study, we also kept the aspiration levels 
apart. 
We constructed historical aspirations for the match scores of league matches and for 
the league ratings. We restricted ourselves to the scores of the league matches, because it is 
only relevant to construct historical aspirations when the same kind of information is 
produced on a regular basis over time. This condition is only satisfied in league matches 
where every team plays against each other. We followed the approach of Greve (2003c) who 
measures the historical aspirations as a weighted average of past performance and the 
unknown past aspiration level. 
 
EQUATION 3.1 HISTORICAL ASPIRATION 
11,, )1( −− −+= tthth PAALL  
Legend: 
Lh, t= Historical aspiration level(L) at time t 
Pt-1= Observed performance at time t-1 
A = a weight, ranging from 0 to 1, representing the speed of adaptation 
 
For truncated time series the historical aspiration level can then be approximated by Equation 
3.2. 
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EQUATION 3.2 APPROXIMATION OF HISTORICAL ASPIRATION 
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This formula relies on the recorded performance indicators (Pt-i) and the unknown parameter 
‘A’. We have followed a pragmatic approach suggested by Baum et al. (2005) who propose to 
use a scenario analysis of slow (75%), medium (50%) and high (25%) speed of adaptation, 
instead of trying to estimate the speed of adaptation. Throughout this study, the results will 
only be reported for an assumed speed of adaptation of 50%.  
For clubs that recently relegated or promoted, there were missing data for the past 
performance indicators. We decided to impute plausible match results. If only one club was 
playing in a lower level league, we imputed an expected loss for the club that was playing in 
the lower level league in that year. It is unrealistic to assume that a club in the premier league 
is expected to lose any points to a team from a lower level division. In the case that both clubs 
played in lower divisions, we retained a missing value even if the clubs actually played 
against one another. Similarly, we imputed a ranking of 19 when clubs relegated or promoted 
between 1990/1 and 2005/6. More precisely the measures for historical aspirations are 
explained in Equation 3.3. 
 
EQUATION 3.3 HISTORICAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOCCER CLUBS 
LPH= a weighted moving average of the scores of the last five fixtures between the two 
opponents in the KNVB league 
LRH= a weighted moving average of the ranking at the end of the last three years 
 
We also constructed social aspirations for the match scores. We did not calculate social 
aspirations for the ranking because we believe that clubs aspire to have tickets to European or 
national leagues. They do not aspire to have a ranking comparable to a reference club. We 
define the social aspiration level for a match score as the expected result based on the current 
strengths of the two opponents. The club with a higher rating just before the game is expected 
to win the game. To calculate the social aspiration level, we have rescaled the difference in 
rating into an interval of 0-3 points. We prefer to use the rating over the ranking because it 
better reflects the differences in strength at the beginning of the season and at the end of the 
season. At the beginning of the season the difference in ranking can already be high, even 
though differences in strength between the teams is not clear because only a few matches have 
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been played. It is just the other way around at the end of the season. Then differences in 
strength between teams may be salient (large differences in accumulated points), but the 
differences are not fully disclosed in the ranking. Since differences in average strength over 
the season are better displayed, the social aspiration level for matches is calculated as in 
Equation 3.4. 
 
EQUATION 3.4 SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOCCER CLUBS 
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We finally calculated direct aspiration levels for both the match scores and the ranking. The 
direct aspiration level for match scores reflect an unwritten law that soccer clubs should win 
or at least not lose their matches. For this particular measure, we have made a distinction 
between home and away matches. We assume that clubs ought to win the home match. They 
also ought to obtain a draw when they play away matches. 
Direct aspiration levels for the ranking are related to the admission to next year’s 
tournament. We assume that each club, regardless of its ranking, aspires a ranking that gives 
entrance to the national premier league and the European cup leagues next year. We defined 
three direct aspiration levels for the ranking. First, all clubs aspire a ranking that allows clubs 
to remain in the premier league. Second, all clubs aspire a ranking that allows clubs to play 
the next year’s qualifying rounds of the UEFA. Third, all clubs aspire a ranking that allows 
clubs to play the next year’s qualifying rounds of the CL. For the sake of consistency and 
simplicity, we will use the same measures for direct aspirations in the within- and the 
between-season analysis. As such, we will only take into account the number of places that 
are amendable for selection. We thus ignore information about true selection. In sum, the 
measures for direct aspirations are as in Equation 3.5. 
 
EQUATION 3.5 DIRECT ASPIRATIONS IN SOCCER CLUBS 
LPD     =  a win in a League home match, a draw in a League away match 
LRDN  = a ‘current’ ranking of at least 16 
LRDEC= a ‘current’ ranking of 1 to E with E = number of tickets for Europe Cup tournaments 
LRDCL= a ‘current’ ranking of 1 to E with E = number of placed for the CL 
 
We present some descriptive statistics for the aspiration levels and the performance signals. 
Table 3.8 shows that on average the first two (1.88) teams were able to qualify for the CL and 
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that six (5.56) teams went European each year. Table 3.8 furthermore illustrates the problem 
associated with historical aspirations. The lowest level percentiles indicate that teams can 
aspire to lose or to attain a ranking that will lead to relegation. For the 99th and 95th percentile, 
the measures suggest that a ranking of 18 is aspired. 
This problem does appear less for the social aspirations where the lowest percentiles is 
above 0 (0.67), which indicates that lower teams at least should try to get some points out of a 
match. Similarly, Table 3.8 shows that historical aspirations put the top teams more under 
pressure than social aspirations. A social aspiration level of 2.33 indicates that top teams 
really should win from lower ranked teams, but they also take into account that even top 
teams can have a bad day once and a while. Furthermore, Table 3.8 highlights that the speed 
of updating leads to different signs for especially run-of-the-mill clubs. The correlations 
between low and high-speed adaptation further indicate that the choices matter for the points, 
but not for the ranking. Probably, the most important conclusions is that historical, social and 
direct aspirations measure different dimensions of performance feedback because their 
correlations are rather low.  
Table 3.9 presents descriptive statistics of the performance signals. It shows that, on 
average clubs get strong signs of positive feedback in terms of relegation (5.06), and strong 
signs of negative feedback that they will not get a ticket for European cup leagues (-4.37 that 
an average club will attain a ticket for the UEFA league and -8.06 for a ticket to the CL). This 
is not surprising, as only a limited number of teams get relegated and get to go European. 
More interesting is that clubs seem to be able to attain a ranking that is in line with their past 
performance. Mean performance signals of 0.01 (for the ranking) and -0.02 (for the match 
results) clearly illustrate that historical aspirations are on the average good predictors for 
future performance. 
Still, there is suspense during the season. It appears that, on average, clubs experience 
difficulties delivering the expected result when performance is related to social or direct 
aspirations. A figure of -0.62 indicates that it is difficult for teams to systematically win home 
matches and to get a draw when they play away matches. In other words, the measures for the 
performance signals give a realistic view of the performance signals in soccer clubs. There 
may be some surprises in the short run, but on the average there will be few surprises in the 
long run. 
Finally, Table 3.9 shows that the two-by-two correlations are relatively high when the 
same performance indicator is put in different lights. Because this may lead to problems of 
multicollinearity, we will carefully select a number of performance signals for statistical 
analysis. The selection of performance signals is based on the theoretical focus of the 
  
TABLE 3.8 ASPIRATION LEVELS 
 
 
Historical 
(points, 
A=25%) 
Historical 
(points,  
A=50%) 
Historical 
(points,  
A=75%) 
Social 
(points) 
Direct 
(EC) 
Direct 
(CL) 
Historical 
(ranking,  
A=25%) 
Historical 
(ranking,  
A=50%) 
Historical 
(ranking,  
A=75%) 
Mean 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.50 5.56 1.88 9.84 9.92 9.99 
Standard Deviation 1.15 1.00 0.91 0.36 0.79 0.78 5.12 5.03 5.02 
Range 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.67 3.00 2.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 
First Percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 4.00 1.00 1.10 1.29 1.32 
Fifth Percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 4.00 1.00 1.62 1.71 1.68 
First Quartile 0.22 0.52 0.64 1.26 5.00 1.00 5.81 6.29 6.36 
Median 0.99 1.32 1.29 1.50 6.00 2.00 9.74 10.00 10.00 
Third Quartile 2.59 2.29 2.14 1.75 6.00 2.50 14.19 13.86 13.93 
95th Percentile 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.10 7.00 3.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
99th Percentile 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.33 7.00 3.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Historical (points A= 25%) 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
Historical (points A= 50%) 0.97 1.00 . . . . . . . 
Historical (points A= 75%) 0.87 0.96 1.00 . . . . . . 
Social (points) 0.22 0.25 0.25 1.00 . . . . . 
Direct UEFA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 . . . . 
Direct CL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.72 1.00 . . . 
Historical (ranking A= 25%) -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.48 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 . . 
Historical (ranking A= 50%) -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.48 -0.02 -0.01 0.99 1.00 . 
Historical (ranking A= 75%) -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.47 -0.02 -0.02 0.97 0.99 1.00 
N= 9,792 
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TABLE 3.9 PERFORMANCE SIGNALS 
 
Direct 
(points) 
Historical 
(points 
A= 50%) 
Social 
(points) 
Ticket 
to 
League 
Ticket 
to 
UEFA 
Ticket 
to 
CL 
Historical 
(ranking 
A= 50%) 
Mean -0.62 -0.02 -0.12 5.06 -4.37 -8.06 0.01 
Standard Deviation 1.47 1.48 1.24 5.25 5.30 5.30 4.24 
Direct Points 1.00 . . . . . . 
Historical (points A= 50%) 0.65 1.00 . . . . . 
Social (points) 0.70 0.76 1.00 . . . . 
Ticket to League 0.34 0.22 0.23 1.00 . . . 
Ticket to UEFA 0.34 0.22 0.23 0.99 1.00 . . 
Ticket to CL 0.34 0.22 0.23 0.99 0.99 1.00 . 
Historical (ranking A= 50%) -0.12 -0.17 -0.10 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 1.00 
N = 9,792 
subsequent empirical chapters. Each chapter will contain a non-technical definition of the 
chosen performance signals. 
 
3.5 Statistical methodology 
The last section of this chapter describes the statistical choices that underpin all models in the 
forthcoming chapters. We use Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) to address the 
problem of repeated measures in the sample. Then we describe two approaches to fit non-
linearity: interaction and piecewise linear models. 
 
3.5.1 Generalized Estimating Equations 
The soccer sample contains correlated observations due to the repeated measures on the same 
club. Clearly, there is serial correlation because one measurement for a club is informative of 
the other observations for the same clubs. For example, it is highly unlikely that a coach will 
be replaced after his first game. In general, the closer in time the data points on the same club 
are, the stronger the correlations between the observations will be. This serial correlation 
leads to complicated covariance structures that require special attention. There are several 
methods for analyzing repeated measures data, ranging from basic to very sophisticated.  
A basic approach is to do a separate analysis for each point in time or to constrain the 
analysis to specific points in time. The latter approach is used by Ter Weel (2006) and 
Balduck and Buelens (2007) who analyze trainer turnover for clubs facing performance dips. 
The advantage is that simple regression models can be used. The disadvantage is that a lot of 
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information is ignored by selecting information out. For research on the antecedents of change 
it is problematic to a priori reduce the information merely for statistical reasons. In our case, 
the loss of information would be substantial. Reducing the sample from 9,792 observations to 
142 observations (namely the trainer turnovers) is clearly not an optimal choice. 
This loss of information is also unnecessary since there are many standard statistical 
models to account for repeated measures. We have chosen for GEE for two reasons6. The first 
and most important advantage is that GEE are user friendly and robust statistical models for 
repeated measures. GEE belongs to the family of marginal models that relate covariates to the 
marginal expectations. Marginal models accommodate for autocorrelation by assuming a 
variance-covariance matrix Vy that is different from the identity matrix. 
 
EQUATION 3.6 VARIANCE-COVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF MARGINAL MODELS 
e ~ N (0, Vy) 
Vy ≠ σ2I 
 
The attractive feature of GEE is that it does not confront the user with tangling decisions 
about the theoretical variance-covariance matrix. The estimation procedure of GEE can give 
consistent estimates of β and of Vβ, i. e. the empirical estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of β, even if the researcher has misspecified the variance-covariance structure Vy. All 
that a GEE requires is that the variance-covariance matrix of Y is approximated, as good as 
possible, by a working covariance matrix. This implies that the user of GEE only has to 
specify the true theoretical distribution of Y and to specify a working correlation for the 
repeated measures. 
The attractive feature of GEE is that it corrects for misspecification of R(α) given that 
the number of independent clusters is sufficiently large (Diggle et al., 2002: 138-140). Stokes, 
Davis and Koch (2000: 479) have suggested that about 200 clusters are needed to have 
sufficient confidence in the results of GEE estimation. Bearing in mind that our sample 
consists of only 29 clubs, we decided to use the club year as an independent cluster from 
which is being sampled. We assume that club years are independent from each other because 
at the end of the season clubs turn a page by selling and attracting new players. This 
assumption leads to 16(years) x 18(clubs) = 288 club years with 34 repeated measures, which 
satisfies the minimum criterion of Stokes et al. (2000). 
 
                                                 
6
 See Diggle, Liang, and Zeger (2002), Hardin and Hilbe (2003), or Molenberghs and Verbeke (2005) for 
technical discussions of GEE. 
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EQUATION 3.7 VARIANCE-COVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF GEE MODELS 
Vy ≈ø T 2
1
i R(α) T
2
1
i  
Legend: 
Ti is a diagonal positive matrix representing the variance of the theoretical distribution of Y  
R(α) is the working correlation matrix for the repeated measurements 
Ø is a scalar. 
 
GEE requires that the specification of the theoretical distribution Ti is correct. But this choice 
is in most circumstances fairly straightforward. For binary data, it is for instance common to 
consider the binomial distribution, for count data the Poisson distribution. 
The second advantage is that GEE can be used for response variables Y that are 
discrete as well as response variables that are continuous. This is possible because the mean 
response E[(Yi)] is related to the linear predictor Xi’β, through a link function h(.). Thus, 
 
EQUATION 3.8 LINK FUNCTIONS AND LINEAR PREDICTORS 
h((E(Ykt)) = h(µkt) = Xkt’β 
 
Because the responses in this research are sometimes dichotomous (e.g., a trainer turnover), a 
count variable (e.g., the number of players bought) or an interval variable (e.g., the average 
number of goals scored per match), the common link functions in this research are a) the logit 
link for logistic regression, which rescales the range of possible outcomes between zero and 
one, b) the log link for Poisson regression to rescale the range to positive numbers, and c) the 
identity link for linear regression. The link functions we used are described in Equation 3.9. 
 
EQUATION 3.9 LINK FUNCTIONS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Ykt~ Bernoulli (Πi) with ln [Πi /(1- Πi)] = Xkt’β for logistic regression 
Ykt ~ Poisson(λi) with ln [λi] = Xkt’ β for Poisson regression 
Ykt ~ N(µi, σ) with µi = Xkt’ β for linear regression 
 
In this study, we have consistently used GEE methodology to handle the serial correlation in 
the sample. We thus estimated the interaction models and piecewise linear models by means 
of GEE. The technical details of these models are discussed in the following sections. 
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3.5.2 Interaction models 
Interaction models test whether the effect of a independent variable (X) on a dependent 
variable (Y) depends on the level of the other variable (Z). The null hypothesis of interaction 
effect is thus that the effect of X on Y is the same for all levels of Z. Interaction models are 
often used in social sciences (e.g., Aguinis, 1995) and increasingly in combination with 
piecewise linear models (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Shimizu, 2007). Consequently, the 
methodology to test and probe interactions have been described extensively (e.g., Aiken, West 
& Reno, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). The literature indicates that it is not 
straightforward to detect and interpret interaction effects correctly. Many of the common 
pitfalls are described extensively (e.g., Carte & Russell, 2003; Darlington, 1990). 
 
EQUATION 3.10 INTERACTION MODELS 
h(µ) = β0 + β1X + β2Z + β3 XZ  
Z
X
h
31)(
))(( ββµ +=
∂
∂
 
There is a change in sign at 
3
1
β
β
−=Z  
 
There exist various systematic approaches to interpret significant interactions carefully. We 
have chosen for a compact method applied by Boeker (1989) and Baum and Dahlin (2007). 
They take the first derivative of the linear predictor Xkt’ β on the independent variable X. As 
Equation 3.10 illustrates, the first derivative then shows how much the sign of X will change 
when there is a unit change in Z. As such, it reveals how much stronger or weaker the effect 
of X gets by the presence of Z. The method is particular useful to identify when a change in 
the sign of X occurs due to Z. Then the partial derivation needs to be set to 0 and the equation 
needs to be solved for Z. 
 
3.5.3 Piecewise linear models 
Piecewise linear models test whether a stimulus (X) triggers the same response (Y) in 
different areas of X. This is achieved by breaking up the relationship between X and Y into 
one or more pieces (along the horizontal axis). Subsequently, multiple regression techniques 
estimate different slopes between X and Y for each (broken) piece. Piecewise linear models 
are appropriate to test for the immediate reaction after a stimulus (Willett, Singer & Martin, 
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1998). Hence, they can be used to test the effect of decision making and change on new 
information (P-L). 
In Performance Feedback theory, Greve (2003c) re-estimated the slope between 
performance and a change variable at each side of an aspiration level (L), because aspirations 
are very good at triggering different feelings of success and failure. 
 
EQUATION 3.11 SPLITTING UP REGRESSORS INTO PIECES  
Sij = SijD(Pi≤Lij) + SijD (Pi>Lij)  
Legend: 
Sij = Pi –Lij 
DPi≤Lij  = 0 if Pi > Lij,  
= 1 if Pi ≤ Lij  
DPi >Lij  = 0 if Pi ≤ Lij,  
= 1 if Pi > Lij 
 
Piecewise linear models accommodate this by introducing dummy variables (D = 0,1) that 
demark regions where feelings of success or failure are likely to occur. The introduction of 
dummy variables is a purely technical manipulation, as indicated in Equation 3.11. The sum 
of the two variables does not result in more information than what was observed by the 
performance signal Sij because when D(Pi≤Lij) = 0, D (Pi>Lij) has to be 1, and vice versa. It is thus 
a redundant specification of information to separate the effects of above standard performance 
from substandard performance. The idea of a piecewise linear model is that when 
performance is above par, it will not instill reactions particular to disappointing performance. 
Although the signal Sij is positive, there is no influence of SijD(Pi≤Lij) on Y because DPi≤Lij is 0. 
However, since the signal is present, the models test whether superior performance will instill 
reactions. There is no restriction on this effect because DPi >Lij is 1. 
 
EQUATION 3.12 PIECEWISE LINEAR MODELS 
h(µijk)= ∑ β1ijk(Sij D(Pij≤Lij)) t+ ∑β2ijk(Sij D(Pij>Lij))t  
Legend: 
t = time indicator 
k = indicator of the club in the sample  
µijk =a linear predictor for club k given performance signal ij 
h = link function 
 
Thus, there are for each performance signal in a piecewise linear model two variables. 
Equation 3.12 describes how a piecewise linear model typically looks like. The model 
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specification should only be sustained if it leads to richer interpretation. Therefore, piecewise 
linear models become interesting when β1ijk and β2ijk are assumed to be different from each 
other. The testing of the slopes is typically done through Wald statistics, as presented in 
Equation 3.13. 
 
EQUATION 3.13 WALD STATISTICS FOR CONTRASTS IN PIECEWISE LINEAR MODELS 
H0: β1ijk = β2ijk 
or in matrix notation,  
H0: Cβ = 0 
Then,  
 the Wald statistic is [ ] 1ˆ ˆ( ) '[ ' ( )c cQ C CV C Cββ β−=  ∼ χ   
Legend: 
C = [1 – 1] 
β = [β1ijk β2ijk] 
Vβ = Variance-covariance matrix of β 
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Chapter 4 
Differences between within-season and between-season trainer 
turnover 
 
In this chapter we stick closely to the academic sports literature and try to find out what the 
antecedents are of different kinds of trainer turnover by means of piecewise linear models. 
Because we restrict our attention to the decisions made by the chair, not all recommendations 
of Chapter 2 are taken into consideration. The recommendation to simultaneously study the 
responses of different organizational agents, will be followed in Chapter 5. Our aim in this 
chapter is to understand better the ambiguous findings that have been found in the academic 
soccer literature. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the sports literature regarding the effect of performance 
feedback on within-season trainer turnover has left us with a mixed impression. While 
performance feedback from recent matches is an important explanatory variable for within-
season trainer turnover, many studies also show that the effect of the performance signals 
lingers on. Audas et al. (1999) have shown that disappointing results for matches played more 
than 12 weeks ago, and disappointing rankings are antecedents for within-season trainer 
turnover. Also, Tena and Forrest (2007) have shown that clubs are more likely to replace 
coaches later on in the season, and Hope (2003) suggested, using a simulation exercise, that 
within-season trainer turnover happens too late in the season. It thus remains unclear which 
piece of information exactly triggers within-season trainer turnover. 
 
4.1 Risks of trainer turnover decisions 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the link between information and actions is elusive when actions 
involve managerial risk-taking. A chair takes a huge risk when he replaces a coach. During 
the season it is difficult because there are few alternatives, little guarantee for success and 
large costs involved. Consequently, it may be that coaches are replaced rather late in the 
season because disappointing performance creates an uneasy situation for the club. On the one 
hand, disappointing performance feedback clearly indicates that something is wrong. A 
within-season trainer turnover is a serious option to consider after negative performance 
feedback since the stakes are high and the options for change are dim. On the other hand, the 
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chair may focus on the costs of replacing a coach and therefore tend to postpone it as long as 
possible. 
However, it may also be that a chair replaces the coach quickly within the season. 
Then clubs make use of an interim coach before they have found a full replacement. 
Replacing a coach with an interim coach allows clubs to break with the past but to postpone 
serious commitments for the future. The possibility to rely on interim coaches is valuable 
since clubs know that their discretionary power increases at the end of the season. 
Between seasons, the decision context is entirely different. There are many candidates 
to chose from. It is the ideal time for the club to scout the labor market and to find not only 
coaches but also players that better suit the needs of the club. Still between-season trainer 
turnover remains a risky decision because the coach has to fit in with many other 
contingencies like new players and the emerging possibilities to play in major European Cups. 
Another complexity is that not only clubs but also coaches have an incentive to reevaluate the 
engagement between seasons. Depending on the decisions of coaches, clubs may have to look 
for a new coach once the incumbent coach decides to move on.  
 
FIGURE 4.1 DIFFERENT VIEWS ON TRAINER TURNOVER  
 
 
each match clubs take the opportunity to review their commitment towards the current coach. 
As such, the horizontal axis describes the different decision moments during a club year, 
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leading to 35 decision moments. Therefore the order of the horizontal axis is descending, 
running from 34 to 0, to reflect the time that remains until the end of the season. The 
distinction between the within and between-season analysis is indicated by the dotted vertical 
lines. The left dotted vertical line indicates the start of the season. The right dotted line 
indicates the end of the season. 
The analysis of the within-season changes occurs within the dotted lines. The between-
season change explains the data points to the right of the right vertical line. The vertical axis 
indicates what happened to the coach after each match. Clubs can decide not to change the 
coach, they can decide to change the coach by a temporary replacement, or they can decide to 
replace the coach by a new coach. The 35 decisions in a club year are interpolated by means 
of the solid line. 
As an illustration, Figure 4.1 displays the decisions that were made by four clubs in our 
sample during the season 2003/4. The figure indicates that ADO Den Haag replaced the coach 
after 11 games within the season and replaced the new coach at the end of the season. This 
leads to the following measures for ADO Den Haag: within-season = 33 x no,1 x yes, 
between-season = yes, and the number of steps = 2. Feyenoord did not change its 
commitment within the season, but hired a new coach at the end of the season. Consequently, 
within-season = 34 x no, between-season = yes, and the number of steps = 0 for Feyenoord. 
Zwolle used an interim coach at the beginning of the season, who was quickly replaced by a 
new coach. Moreover, Zwolle and the coach agreed to renew the contract at the end of the 
season. Thus, within-season = 32 x no,2 x yes, between-season = yes, and the number of steps 
= 0 for FC Zwolle. Finally, PSV was pleased with its coach throughout the year and extended 
the contract in the next year. Therefore, within-season = 34 x no, between-season = no, and 
the number of steps = 0 for PSV. 
Figure 4.2 shows all the decisions in the sample in a single graph. The graph consists of 
16x18 = 288 lines7. It reveals some interesting general tendencies in the sample. First, the 
graph suggests that replacing a coach occurs less than sticking to the current coach, as the 
horizontal band in Figure 4.2 is always denser then the number of spikes. Still, trainer 
turnover happens frequently, both in the within and the between-season scenario. In addition 
there are some temporal variations during the season. At the beginning of the season, clubs 
hesitate to replace coaches, indicating that they wait until performance feedback becomes 
clearer. Then there is a surge of trainer turnover in the middle of the season. 
Figure 4.2 also indicates that it is worthwhile to make the distinction between 
temporary solutions and full replacements. It seems that when clubs have given up search for 
                                                 
7
 Some noise was added to the graph to avoid overlapping of lines. 
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full replacements, they keep on resorting to quick-fix solutions until late in the season. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 only describe what has happened in the sample, but does not explain why 
trainer turnover occurs. In the next section we will forward possible explanations for trainer 
turnover. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 COMPLETE SAMPLE 
 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
Because the academic sports literature is unclear about the effect of different performance 
signals, we will first test which information is important for trainer turnover decisions before 
we test how chairs respond to the information. We propose that chairs always choose clear 
signals. Given that there are differences between the within-season and between-season 
context, we propose a contingency in the use of performance feedback: within-season, when 
there are no selection effects, a chair makes use of backward-looking performance feedback, 
while between seasons he focuses on forward-looking performance signals like the attainment 
of tickets. 
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4.2.1 Within-season trainer turnover  
Negative performance feedback during the season indicates that some of the club’s goals may 
not be met. However, this situation does not necessarily correspond to a life threatening or 
urgent situation that requires immediate action by the chair. In general, a chair has enough 
comfort to postpone trainer turnover. Since a bad signal from the last match can be reversed 
in subsequent matches, signals which indicate that clubs might be missing out European 
tickets, are not reliable and should not attract too much attention. Consequently, a chair does 
not have to respond to signals immediately. 
Moreover, a chair can shift his attention to another reference point. Thus, as long as 
there are some signals which indicate that performance is still tolerable, there is no 
compelling need to act. Coexistence of different reference points leads to information 
ambiguity, which makes it easier to rubberstamp unmet goals as being formulated 
optimistically (e.g., Audia & Brion, 2007). Given the difficulties involved in replacing 
coaches during the season, we think that a chair will take the opportunity to shift attention 
before he comes into action. 
However, two kinds of performance feedback during the season can not easily be 
ignored. First, a club result that meets a historical low and second, a ranking indicating that 
the club is in the relegation zone, may be strong triggers for within-season trainer turnover. In 
the latter case, there is an urgent situation. Clubs face a real probability of being relegated. 
The proximity of selection effects makes it acceptable for the club to take risk and to incur the 
costs of a trainer turnover (Tena & Forrest, 2007). 
When the club result meets a historical low, there is not necessarily a real danger but 
the situation is clear. The historical aspiration is in most cases a reliable predictor of future 
performance (Greve, 2003c; Mezias et al., 2002). Disappointing performance relative to 
historical performance forces all stakeholders of the club to agree that performance is 
disappointing. A chair will need to consider trainer turnover because there are no more 
possibilities to explain away disappointing results. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1. A chair will replace coaches during the season when historical 
aspiration levels are not met. 
And 
Hypothesis 2. A chair will replace coaches during the season when the club’s ranking 
glides into the relegation zone.  
Until now we have only indicated which performance signals will be selected by a chair. The 
next step is to indicate how the chair will react to these performance signals. We will take into 
account that a chair can respond according to Threat Rigidity Theory (TRT) or according to A 
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Behavioral Theory of the Firm (ABTF). The differences between the two theories are outlined 
in Chapter 2. In TRT of Staw et al. (1981), disappointing signals are so powerful that a chair 
feels the need to take over control. Therefore a chair will replace coaches shortly after the first 
signs of disappointing performance, not at later time points because it only matters that the 
old coach is fired as soon as possible. 
Following Cyert’s and March’s (1992) ABTF, there is no urging pressure to dissolve 
the weakest link in the organization. Rather, the signals have made it clear that something 
needs to be done, but the chair still considers a within-season trainer turnover to be difficult. 
A chair is therefore prepared to wait until they have spotted a new coach, who is believed to 
be able to turn around the situation and to attain the aspired performance. They wait because 
they need to find an acceptable solution to the problem. Given the fact that there are not many 
coaches available within the season, the odds that a chair waits some time becomes real. 
Consequently, it becomes possible to make the distinction between the two theories by 
taking into account the extra time clubs take to respond once performance drops below a 
reference point. If most coaches are fired just after performance has dropped below the 
reference point, then there is evidence of threat-rigid response. Conversely, when most 
coaches are fired when performance is already far away from aspirations, then there is 
evidence of a bounded rational response. Thus, according to Cyert and March (1992) we have  
Hypothesis 3. The more negative performance feedback is, the higher are the odds of 
within-season trainer turnover. 
But according to Staw et al. (1981) we have 
Hypothesis 4. As soon as negative performance feedback occurs, the odds of within-
season trainer turnover increases. The more negative performance feedback gets, the 
lower are the odds of within-season trainer turnover, because coaches will already 
have been replaced. 
While the academic sports literature has indicated that performance feedback is an important 
organizational antecedent of within-season trainer turnover, we argue that other factors may 
moderate the relationship between performance feedback and within-season trainer turnover. 
For example, Salomo and Teichmann (2002) have found a positive effect of changes in the 
chair on trainer turnover, but an insignificant effect of player turnover. This last result 
contrasts the findings of Ter Weel (2006), who has found a significant effect of the number of 
players bought on the likelihood of trainer turnover. 
We are not willing to assume a main effect because that would imply that many 
organizational changes automatically increase the odds of within-season trainer turnover. We 
rather argue that earlier organizational changes will increase the propensity to change. 
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Organizations, which are already unstable, will effectively replace coaches faster when 
performance is disappointing. Therefore, we expect that the interaction effect between 
performance and organizational changes is significant and that the main effect of 
organizational change is insignificant. We thus have 
Hypothesis 5. In combination with low performance, coaches have higher odds of 
being replaced in unstable organizations. Trainer turnover is more likely when the 
club has attracted a lot of players to the team or when there was a recent change in 
the chair.  
 
4.2.2 Between-season trainer turnover 
In this section we analyze the antecedents of between-season trainer turnover. A between-
season trainer turnover can be a more strategically decision than a within-season trainer 
turnover. We think that the role of performance feedback in explaining between-season 
trainer turnover changes. First, we test if performance feedback will become less important in 
explaining between-season trainer turnover vis-à-vis other between-season organizational 
changes. Second, we test if a chair shifts to performance signals that tell more about the 
future. Third, we think that not only signs of failure but also signs of success will draw the 
attention of the club. 
Because the uncertainty has largely resolved at the end of the season and the selection 
effects have come into play, performance feedback does not matter that much anymore. It is 
possible that other club related antecedents trigger between-season trainer turnover. For 
instance, a lot of players may leave because the coach has left. Another possibility is that a 
new coach is only willing to come over if the club increases the quality of the talent pool. We 
find it hard to make precise predictions about the sign of the relationship because we are also 
unaware of studies that relate between-season trainer turnover to other organizational 
changes, like coach transfers or changes in the chair. We thus have 
Hypothesis 6. The recent number of players transferred has a direct effect on between- 
season trainer turnover.  
And 
Hypothesis 7. Recent changes in the chair of the club have a direct effect on between-
season trainer turnover. 
We have an expectation about the sign of the relationship in one case only. It is more likely 
that within-season trainer turnover leads to between-season trainer turnover. If we assume a 
direct effect, then we assume that the substitution happens because it was planned in advance. 
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This implies that substitutions occur irregardless of the final organizational performance. 
However, it is also possible that an interim coach is able to stay when he was able to restore 
the performance to acceptable levels. Then, organizational performance at the end of the 
season moderates the relationship. Therefore, we expect that the interaction between 
performance feedback and interim coaches explains the between-season trainer turnover. We 
therefore hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 8. Within-season trainer turnover increases the odds of between-season 
trainer turnover.  
And 
Hypothesis 9. There is an interaction effect between performance feedback and within-
season trainer turnover on between-season trainer turnover. 
Interaction is also possible for the other organizational changes. While a new chair has a clear 
mandate to act because many different stakeholders will be watching what the new chair’s 
vision is, it is likely that he will critically assess the performance of players and coaches first 
before reversing past commitments. Therefore, changes in the chair also interact with 
performance feedback at the end of the season. Similarly, the relationship between the 
number of transfers and between-season trainer turnover might be moderated by 
organizational performance feedback. Hence we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 10. There is a significant interaction effect between changes at the top and 
performance signals on between-season trainer turnover. 
And 
Hypothesis 11. There is a significant interaction effect between earlier investments in 
players and performance signals on between-season trainer turnover. 
Finally, we argue that the kind of performance information used for decisions about between-
season trainer turnover differs from the within-season situation. We think that performance 
signals referring to historical aspirations and information on how long clubs have played in 
the national and European cups, play less a role in the decision making process of between-
season trainer turnovers. Instead, a chair will attach more importance to the attainment of 
tickets to future European tournaments because this information reveals best how the near 
future will be. Information about the attainment of European tickets is a strong argument in 
renegotiating contracts. 
Hypothesis 12. A chair will use information about the attainment of tickets for the 
national league and for the European cups to replace the coach between-season, 
instead of historical performance information.  
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Between seasons, clear signs of success will have an effect on risk-taking. It is however 
difficult to assess the impact of success on between-season trainer turnover because 
successful coaches may be offered better positions and change clubs. Consequently, clubs that 
have performed extremely well may be forced to find a new coach. Since, in general, it will 
be relatively easy to find a new coach when there is a possibility to play European, success 
may increase the odds of between-season trainer turnover. However, success may also lower 
the odds of between-season turnover because the incumbent coach may have more bargaining 
power and be able to extend his contract with the existing club. 
These considerations have led us to oppose the Variable Risk Preference Model 
(VRPM) of March and Shapira (1992) and ABTF (Cyert & March, 1992) for trainer turnover 
between seasons. March and Shapira (1992) argue that success can lead to change. When 
performance is better than expected, decision makers will opportunistically decide to venture 
out. Since March and Shapira (1992) assume that decision makers will feel the need that 
something needs to be done when performance is worse than expected, a V-shaped 
relationship between performance and between-season trainer turnover should, on average, be 
found. In contrast, Cyert and March (1992) argue that positive information increasingly leads 
to pressures not to make any fundamental changes, while negative information increasingly 
leads to pressures to makes changes. Thus, both slopes are expected to be negative, reflecting 
a general tendency to stall change unless organizational performance is substandard. 
According to Cyert and March (1992) positive performance signals will trigger clubs to make 
efforts to retain successful coaches. On the contrary, when there is negative performance 
feedback, clubs have no special incentive to retain the coach and may be on the outlook for a 
new one. Hence according to the March and Shapira (1992) we have  
Hypothesis 13. Negative performance feedback and positive performance feedback 
have strong effects on the odds of a between-season trainer turnover.  
But according to the Cyert and March (1992) we have 
Hypothesis 14. The more negative performance feedback is, the higher the odds of a 
between-season trainer turnover.  
 
4.3 Statistical analysis 
For both the between-season and the within-season scenario four kinds of models will be 
presented. The first model is a baseline model that takes into account important contextual 
factors. The second model adds to the baseline model the main explanatory variables. These 
are the performance signals and the organizational change variables. The third model presents 
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the results of the piecewise linear models to indicate whether failure or success has a different 
impact on trainer turnover. Piecewise linear models re-estimate the effect of performance on 
trainer turnover for different zones of good and bad performance. They are also useful to 
indicate whether performance feedback starts change processes (e.g., Greve, 2003c). The 
analytical form of the piecewise linear models for between and within-season trainer turnover 
is given in Equation 4.1. 
 
EQUATION 4.1 PIECEWISE LINEAR MODELS FOR TRAINER TRUNOVER 
h(µ) = β0 +∑ β1ij (Sijk D(Pijk≤Lijk))t+ ∑β2ij (Sijk D(Pijk>Lijk))t + Zt 
Legend: 
h = logit function  
µ = linear predictor  
i = indicator of the information (i = 1 ranking,2 points,3 presence in cup tournament) 
j = indicator of the aspiration (j = 1 historical,2 social,3 direct) 
k = indicator of the independent clusters  
t = repeated measures indicator per cluster  
S = performance signal 
DPi≤Lij   = 0 if Pi > Lij,  
 = 1 if Pi ≤ Lij  
DPi >Lij   = 0 if Pi ≤ Lij,  
 = 1 if Pi > Lij 
P = observed value of a performance indicator 
L = aspired value of a performance indicator 
Z = confounding variables 
 
The fourth model incorporates interactions between performance and the change variables. 
The interaction models thus test whether trainer turnover occurs more frequently in stable or 
in changing organizations. The analytical form of interaction models is given in Equation 4.2. 
We do not expect that all 14 hypotheses will hold because several hypotheses challenge 
each other. The contradiction occurs at the theoretical level, between Hypotheses 3 and 4 and 
between 13 and 14, as well as at the methodological level, between the piecewise linear 
models and the interaction models. The piecewise linear and interaction models are 
considered competing techniques to test for non-linear relationships (e.g., Aiken et al., 1991: 
92-93; Darlington, 1990: 321-322). Piecewise linear model introduce non-linearity because 
the performance effect on trainer turnover may differ for feelings of success versus failure. 
Interaction models introduce non-linearity because the response to performance feedback 
depends on whether changes have occurred in the organization. 
An organizational learning perspective on change   103 
 
EQUATION 4.2 INTERACTION MODELS FOR TRAINER TRUNOVER 
h(µ) = β0 + ∑ β1ij(Pijk)t +∑ β2l Chlk)t +∑ β3ijl(Pijk)t*(Chkl)t +Zt 
Additional legend (continued): 
Ch = organizational change variable  
l = indicator of the organizational elements (Change at top, Within-season trainer turnover, 
Number of players bought) 
 
4.4 Measures 
The measures for the main variables are 
Change at top. This is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if there was a change 
in the chair of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Players added. This variable counts the number of new active players in the team at the start 
of the season. 
Players added (end). This variable counts the number of new active players in the team at 
the end of the season. 
Within-season trainer turnover. This variable measures whether there was a within-season 
trainer turnover. It takes the value of 1 if there was a within-season trainer turnover during the 
season, and 0 otherwise. 
Short-term performance. This variable relates the current match result to the weighted 
moving average of the last five match results. In the piecewise linear models, this variable is 
split up into Short-term performance (-), retaining information on disappointing signals and 
Short-term performance (+), retaining information on satisficing signals. 
Long-term performance. This variable indicates where the current ranking of the club stands 
compared to a weighted moving average of the final ranking for the last three years. In the 
piecewise linear models, this variable is split up into Long-term performance (-), retaining 
information on disappointing signals and Long-term performance (+), retaining information 
on satisficing signals. 
Ticket to CL. It measures if the club is able to play in the qualifying rounds of the CL next 
year. It is a signal that compares the current ranking of the club with the minimum ranking 
that is necessary to attain next year’s CL ticket. In the piecewise linear models, this variable is 
split up into Ticket to CL (-), retaining information on disappointing signals and Ticket to 
CL (+), retaining information on satisficing signals. 
Ticket to UEFA. It measures if the club is able to play in the qualifying rounds of the UEFA 
cup next year. It is a signal that compares the current ranking of the club with the minimum 
ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s UEFA cup ticket. In the piecewise linear 
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models, this variable is split up into Ticket to UEFA (-), retaining information on 
disappointing signals and Ticket to UEFA (+), retaining information on satisficing signals. 
Ticket to premier league. It measures if the club is able to play in the premier league next 
year. It is a signal that compares the current ranking of the club with the minimum ranking 
that is necessary to attain next year’s premier league. In the piecewise linear models, this 
variable is split up into Ticket to premier league (-), retaining information on disappointing 
signals and Ticket to premier league (+), retaining information on satisficing signals. 
Still in National cup. This variable indicates if the club is still participating in the national 
cup league. It takes the value of 1 if it still has to play a cup game, and 0 otherwise. 
Still in UEFA. This variable indicates if the club is still participating in one of the European 
cups (UEFA and Champions League [CL]) league. It takes the value of 1 if it still has to play 
a European cup game, and 0 otherwise. 
Last UEFA match. This variable counts the number of weeks the club has played in the 
European cup (UEFA and CL) since the beginning of the league. For clubs that did not 
participate at the beginning of the season, the time was set to 0. The longer the club managed 
to stay in the European league, the better the performance. 
Last cup match. It counts the number of weeks the club has played in the national cup 
matches since the beginning of the premier league competition. The longer the club managed 
to stay in the national cup, the better the performance. 
Finally, the measures for the baseline variables are 
Season (linear). We include this variable to control for trends of increasing globalization and 
commercialization of soccer which may have an impact on trainer turnover. The measure 
corresponds with the calendar year in which the tournament starts. 
Change in the incentive. We include this variable to reflect the change in the incentive for 
wins versus losses. After season 1994/5 winning lead to bigger gains for the clubs (e.g., 
Correia Geudes & Machado, 2002). Therefore, coaches that are unable to win after 1994/5 are 
subdue to more pressure from 1995 onwards. The measure takes a value of 1 since 1995/6, 
and 0 for the years before. 
Age of club. This is a popular measure for reputation (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The 
variable is measured as the date of incorporation minus the start date of the league (in years). 
Years in European cups. This is a measure for the international reputation. The variable 
counts the number of years a club has attended in a European cup from 1956 until the start of 
the season. In the between-season analysis the distinction is made between the UEFA and the 
CL, leading to the variables Years in UEFA and Years in CL. 
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Years in premier league. This is a measure for the national reputation. More experienced 
clubs may be able to attract better coaches lowering the need to replace coaches within the 
season. The variable is measured as the number of years in the premier league since 1956, i.e., 
0, 1, 2, …., 49. 
Reputation index. This variable is proposed by Janssens and Késenne (1987). It measures the 
performance of the clubs over the last six years. The formula that we used is 
6
1
4
1
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Rkj
j
J x N
JP
=
=
  +∑
∑
, 
with  J = the number of years before, 
N = the number of clubs in the league,  
PRkj = observed ranking (R) of club (K), j years ago. 
Games to be played. This is a measure for urgency. The faster the end of the season is 
approaching, the quicker selection effects come to play. It is measured as the number of 
games left after the game. 
Cooling down. This variable takes the value of 1 for the last 10 matches of a club, and 0 for 
the 24 first matches in a season. At the end of the season, a chair may prefer waiting till the 
season finishes instead of replacing the coach within the season. 
Starting up. This variable is measured as 1 for the first 5 matches of a club, and 0 for the 29 
last matches in a season. A chair tends to hesitate at the beginning of the season to replace 
coaches (Hope, 2003). It may be too early to form an opinion about the coach and the coach 
may not have full grip on the team at the beginning of the season. 
Consecutive losses. This is a threat measure that indicates how many matches a team has lost 
in a row. It is a count variable. 
Ranking in league. The ranking measures the current status of the club. The range of the 
variable is 0 to 18. A low value means that the team is performing well. 
Venue. We include this variable because supporters are more numerous and more demanding 
in home matches. There may thus be a home effect on trainer turnover. The variable takes a 
value of 1 for a home match, and 0 for an out match. 
Tenure of coach in club. This variable was included because coaches who have just started 
working for a club, have lower odds of being replaced. Coaches with a longer tenure may 
make less strategic shifts and have higher odds of being replaced. The variable is measured as 
the number of weeks a coach is operational in the club. 
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4.5 Description of the results 
 
4.5.1 Within-season analysis 
We present two analyses of the within-season trainer turnover. First, a logistic regression was 
performed assuming that a chair has two options: does the club stick to the current coach of 
does it replace the coach. The measure for the dependent variable is thus dichotomous, with 
value 1 if the chair replaces a coach after a match, and 0 if the chair decides to keep the coach. 
We will present models for the odds that the coach actually is replaced within the season. 
We also have fitted the Kuss and McLerran (2007) multinomial logistic regression 
model for correlated responses to make the distinction between temporary replacements and 
full replacements. Again models will be presented for the odds that the coach is replaced 
within the season. 
 
4.5.1.1 Results from simple logistic regression 
Table 4.1 contains the results of the baseline model, the model with the main effects of the 
important explanatory variables, the piecewise linear model and two interaction models for 
the odds of within-season trainer turnover. 
Two inferences can be made from the baseline model. The first conclusion is that time 
plays an important role. Four time factors significantly explain within-season trainer turnover. 
A small linear trend over the years suggests that the odds of replacing coaches decreases by a 
factor of 0.91 (= e-0.09) each year. However, the impact of introducing the new incentive 
structure on trainer turnover was much stronger. The odds of replacing coaches has 
significantly increased since the shift in reward systems for match results. They are almost 
2.75 (≈ e1.00) times higher than prior to 1994. The baseline model further shows that time also 
plays an important role in the season as there are significant and strong cooling-down and 
starting-up effects. In the starting-up period (the first five games) and the cooling-down 
period (the last 10 games), the odds of a trainer turnover is about 0.25 (≈ e-1.31 and e-1.53) less 
than in the middle of the season. 
The second conclusion is that the current status of the club explains within-season 
turnover more than indicators that measure the long-term reputation of the club. None of the 
four reputation measures explain meaningfully within-season trainer turnover. Conversely, 
the odds of a within-season trainer turnover increase by 1.3 (≈ e0.29) every time a club loses a 
match. Also, the current ranking and the club tenure of the coach in the club are statistically 
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significant, but the effects are so small that they do not really explain the occurrence of trainer 
turnover. 
In the main effects model various performance signals, an indicator variable to assess 
whether changes occurred at the top of the club, and a count variable for the number of new 
players were added to the baseline model to test Hypotheses 1 to 5. To find out which pieces 
of information are used for within-season trainer turnover, six performance signals were 
added. We included signals from the match results, signals from the ranking compared to 
historical aspirations, signals about the ranking to attain European and national tickets and 
signals indicating whether the club is still active in the national or in the European cup 
tournaments. 
The main effects model shows that performance feedback is the most significant 
organizational parameter for within-season trainer turnover. Since neither changes in the top 
of the club nor the number of new players has a significant main effect, it seems that within-
season trainer turnover happens as much in stable as in unstable clubs. Three performance 
signals had a significant impact on the odds of within-season trainer turnover, namely short-
term performance (-0.33), long-term performance (0.17) and presence in the National cup (-
0.74). The first significant performance effect reveals that if a club manages to get a score that 
is better than the average of the last five fixtures between the teams, then the chair has less 
incentive to replace the coach. The second significant performance effect indicates that there 
is a positive effect of signals from ranking, indicating that teams with a higher ranking than in 
the years before, have higher odds of replacing the coach within the season. Similar 
relationships between short and long-term performance were found by Ter Weel (2006). 
These effects are important to get support for Hypothesis 1 which argues that historical 
relative performance matters more than information about the entrance to the next year’s 
cups. 
Because there is also a non-significant effect of ‘Ticket to UEFA’ in the main effects 
model, we find extra support for Hypothesis 1. The main effects model thus reveals that a 
chair only draws importance to historical performance for within-season trainer turnover. 
They are during the season on average not preoccupied with the attainment of European 
tickets. This conclusion is further reinforced when we take the third significant performance 
signal into account. The preoccupation with the national tournaments is also clear from the 
fact that a chair is less inclined to replace coaches as long as they are in the running for the 
KNVB cup.  
In Hypothesis 2, we stated that a chair will replace coaches during the season when the 
club’s ranking glides into the relegation zone. The main effects model does not lend support
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TABLE 4.1 WITHIN-SEASON TRAINER TURNOVER (ALL DECISIONS TOGETHER) 
 Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise 
Inter- 
actions 
Inter- 
action 
 
Intercept 183.0  226.2  227.3  236.8  227.2   
Season (linear) -0.09 (.01) -0.12 (.04) -0.12 (.04) -0.12 (.03) -0.12 (.04)  
Change in the incentive  1.00 (.01) 1.32 (.00) 1.32 (.00) 1.43 (.00) 1.28 (.00)  
Cooling down -1.31 (.00) -1.76 (.00) -1.76 (.00) -1.90 (.00) -1.79 (.00)  
Starting up -1.53 (.00) -2.07 (.01) -2.06 (.01) -2.07 (.01) -2.06 (.01)  
Years in premier league -0.00 (.73) 0.01 (.62) 0.01 (.69) 0.01 (.58) 0.04 (.39)  
Age of club 0.00 (.88) -0.00 (.34) -0.00 (.37) -0.01 (.29) -0.10 (.44)  
Years in European cups 0.06 (.04) 0.04 (.39) 0.05 (.32) 0.04 (.37) 0.02 (.46)  
Reputation index -0.04 (.70) -0.10 (.46) -0.10 (.43) -0.14 (.28) 0.01 (.64)  
Games to be played 0.00 (.94) 0.02 (.41) 0.02 (.39) 0.02 (.47) -0.00 (.33)  
Consecutive losses 0.29 (.00) 0.34 (.00) 0.34 (.00) 0.34 (.00) 0.34 (.00)  
Venue -0.09 (.64) -0.44 (.05) -0.45 (.05) -0.47 (.04) -0.47 (.04)  
Tenure of coach in club -0.01 (.05) -0.00 (.06) -0.00 (.06) -0.00 (.06) -0.00 (.06)  
Ranking in league 0.12 (.00) .  .  .  .   
Change at top .  0.04 (.90) 0.06 (.86) -8.40 (.09) -1.24 (.11)  
Players added .  0.03 (.39) 0.03 (.40) -0.49 (.30) 0.03 (.34)  
Short-term performance .  -0.33 (.00) .  -0.39 (.19) -0.26 (.01)  
Short-term performance (-) .  .  -0.37 (.01) .  .   
Short-term performance (+) .  .  -0.22 (.38) .  .   
Short-term performance * 
Change at top 
.  .  .  -0.98 (.01) -0.95 (.01)  
Short-term performance * 
Players added 
.  .  .  0.01 (.64) .   
Long-term performance .  0.17 (.00) .  0.14 (.30) 0.17 (.00)  
Long-term performance (-) .  .  0.23 (.05) .  .   
Long-term performance (+) .  .  0.15 (.01) .  .   
Long-term performance * 
Change at top 
.  .  .  -0.09 (.41) .   
Long-term performance * 
Players added 
.  .  .  0.01 (.67) .   
Ticket to UEFA .  -0.17 (.37) .  0.46 (.39) -0.17 (.37)  
Ticket to UEFA (-) .  .  -0.15 (.40) .  .   
Ticket to UEFA (+) .  .  -0.28 (.29) .  .   
Ticket to UEFA * Change at top .  .  .  -0.78 (.15) .   
Ticket to UEFA * Players added .  .  .  -0.06 (.24) .   
Still in UEFA .  -0.95 (.08) -0.98 (.08) 0.20 (.84) -0.93 (.09)  
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 Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise 
Inter- 
actions 
Inter- 
action 
 
Still in UEFA * Players added .  .  .  -0.14 (.22) .   
Ticket to premier league .  0.21 (.24) .  -0.46 (.38) 0.21 (.24)  
Ticket to premier league (-) .  .  0.16 (.46) .  .   
Ticket to premier league (+) .  .  0.21 (.25) .  .   
Ticket to premier league * 
Change at top 
.  .  .  0.69 (.19) .   
Ticket to premier league * 
Players added 
.  .  .  0.07 (.19) .   
Still in National cup .  -0.74 (.03) -0.74 (.03) 0.55 (.51) -0.72 (.04)  
Still in National cup * Change 
at top 
.  .  .  0.37 (.71) .   
Still in National cup * Players 
added 
.  .  .  -0.14 (.07) .   
Wald tests of contrasts (success 
≠ failure) 
        .   
Short-term performance .  .  -0.14 (.67) .  .   
Long-term performance .  .  0.09 (.54) .  .   
Ticket to UEFA .  .  0.12 (.48) .  .   
Ticket to premier league .  .  -0.05 (.81) .     
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
 Number of clusters = 288, maximum cluster size = 34. 
 
for Hypothesis 2 because information about the attainment of tickets to the next years premier 
league competition does not influence the odds of within-season trainer turnover. 
In the piecewise linear models, the same performance variables remain important for a 
chair to decide performance feedback. There is some statistical evidence that the short-term 
performance signal is treated different during failure versus success. Only negative 
performance feedback has a significant impact of -0.37 on the odds of trainer turnover. But 
the effect of positive performance feedback is no longer significantly different from zero. The 
two effects together suggest that the more match results are lower than expected, the more 
clubs are inclined to replace coaches. The Wald statistics however fail to find statistical 
differences between failure and success. 
We use the piecewise linear models to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Whereas Hypothesis 3 
tests for increasing problemistic search, Hypothesis 4 tests for quick replacements of coaches 
after first signs of threat. Since these hypotheses only make predictions about within-season 
trainer turnover after negative performance feedback, we will only concentrate on the 
significant negative effect of -0.37 for short-term performance and the significant effect of 
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0.23 for long-term performance. The combined results suggest that a chair responds in line 
with TRT and ABTF, depending on the kind of information they take into consideration. 
There is support for Hypothesis 3 when a chair is confronted with negative signs from short-
term performance. A chair will start considering trainer turnover when the short-term 
performance is relatively low but will not immediately replace the coach. There is also 
support for Hypothesis 4 when the chair is confronted with negative signs from long-term 
performance. Then, a chair will not hesitate to replace the coach immediately. 
Finally, the interactions model was fit to test Hypothesis 5, where we suggested that 
performance feedback triggers within-season trainer turnover in unstable clubs more than in 
stable clubs. The interactions model indicates that one interaction effect was significant, 
namely the interaction between short-term performance and change at the top of the 
organization. To facilitate the interpretation, we dropped all non-significant interaction effects 
from the model. The results of this interaction model are presented in the last column of Table 
4.1. We interpret the interaction by taking the partial derivative of the logits with respect to 
short-term performance. The partial derivative is ∂(logits)/ ∂(short-term performance) = -0.26 
-0.95 (Change at top). Given that a change at the top is coded as 1, the partial derivative of -
1.21 (= -0.26 -0.95(1)) indicates that when there is a change at the top, the relationship 
between performance and the odds of within-season trainer turnover becomes more negative. 
Thus clubs which have experienced a change at the top will react more strongly to short-term 
performance soon afterwards. Hence, unstable clubs are more likely to replace coaches during 
the season. There is therefore support for Hypothesis 5. 
 
4.5.1.2 Results from multinomial logistic regression 
To examine if the within-season analysis differs between temporary solutions and full 
replacements, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was done. As indicated in Table 4.2, 
we find in the baseline model, that the same effects have a significant effect on within-season 
trainer turnover, namely the time-variables and variables related to the current status of the 
club. We also find that the reputation of the club has no effect on within-season trainer 
turnover. A small linear trend over the years suggests that the odds of replacing coaches 
decreases by a factor of 0.91 (= e-0.09) each year. In order to make a distinction between 
temporary replacements and full replacements, Wald statistics were calculated for the 
significant effects. The Wald statistics show that temporary solutions have higher odds in 
clubs with higher number of consecutive losses. The odds of an interim trainer turnover 
increase with 1.5 (= e0.37) for each consecutive loss.  
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TABLE 4.2 WITHIN-SEASON TRAINER TURNOVER BY TYPE OF REPLACEMENT 
  Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise Interaction 
Intercept  . (.01) . (.05) . (.05) . (.05) 
 Full 247.1  304.7  315.3  304.4  
 Temporary 121.8  151.2  137.0  156.9  
Season (linear)  . (.00) . (.04) . (.04) . (.04) 
 Full -0.13  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  
 Temporary -0.06  -0.08  -0.07  -0.08  
Change in the incentive  . (.01) . (.01) . (.01) . (.01) 
 Full 1.03  1.31  1.29  1.28  
 Temporary 0.92  1.10  1.10  1.13  
Cooling down  . (.01) . (.01) . (.01) . (.01) 
 Full -1.07  -1.35  -1.36  -1.38  
 Temporary -1.51  -2.24  -2.25  -2.25  
Starting up  . (.01) . (.03) . (.03) . (.03) 
 Full -1.99  -1.93  -1.85  -1.94  
 Temporary -1.13  -2.16  -2.22  -2.15  
Years in European cups  . (.03) . (.49) . (.44) . (.48) 
 Full 0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  
 Temporary 0.06  0.03  0.04  0.03  
Reputation index  . (.77) . (.48) . (.44) . (.44) 
 Full -0.06  -0.19  -0.19  -0.20  
 Temporary -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  -0.04  
Games to be played  . (.33) . (.51) . (.47) . (.56) 
 Full 0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  
 Temporary -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02  
Years in premier league  . (.46) . (.57) . (.60) . (.56) 
 Full -0.02  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  
 Temporary 0.01  0.03  0.03  0.03  
Age of club  . (.88) . (.47) . (.50) . (.47) 
 Full 0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
 Temporary -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
Consecutive losses  . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) 
 Full 0.14  0.19  0.19  0.16  
 Temporary 0.37  0.41  0.41  0.42  
Ranking in league  . (.00) .  .  .  
 Full 0.09  .  .  .  
 Temporary 0.14  .  .  .  
112                                Differences between within-season and between-season trainer turnover 
 
 
  Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise Interaction 
Venue  . (.87) . (.12) . (.11) . (.10) 
 Full -0.14  -0.75  -0.74  -0.81  
 Temporary -0.07  -0.18  -0.19  -0.19  
Tenure of coach in club  . (.12) . (.30) . (.29) . (.29) 
 Full -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  
 Temporary 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Change at top  .  . (.88) . (.85) . (.02) 
 Full .  -0.23  -0.27  -2.47  
 Temporary .  -0.02  -0.02  0.34  
Players added  .  . (.71) . (.72) . (.65) 
 Full .  0.02  0.02  0.03  
 Temporary .  0.03  0.03  0.03  
Short-term performance  .  . (.00) .  . (.01) 
 Full .  -0.29  .  -0.17  
 Temporary .  -0.39  .  -0.46  
Short-term performance (-)  .  .  . (.02) .  
 Full .  .  -0.25  .  
 Temporary .  .  -0.46  .  
 Short-term performance (+)  .  .  . (.56) .  
 Full .  .  -0.35  .  
 Temporary .  .  -0.15  .  
Short-term performance * 
Change at top 
 .  .  .  . (.00) 
 Full .  .  .  -1.58  
 Temporary .  .  .  0.42  
Long-term performance  .  . (.00) .  . (.00) 
 Full .  0.17  .  0.17  
 Temporary .  0.15  .  0.15  
Long-term performance (-)  .  .  . (.10) .  
 Full .  .  0.32  .  
 Temporary .  .  0.16  .  
Long-term performance (+)  .  .  . (.05) .  
 Full .  .  0.11  .  
 Temporary .  .  0.15  .  
Ticket to UEFA  .  . (.70) .  . (.71) 
 Full .  -0.06  .  -0.05  
 Temporary .  -0.21  .  -0.21  
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  Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise Interaction 
Ticket to UEFA (-)  .  .  . (.71) .  
 Full .  .  -0.05  .  
 Temporary .  .  -0.21  .  
Ticket to UEFA (+)  .  .  . (.35) .  
 Full .  .  -0.01  .  
 Temporary .  .  -0.50  .  
Still in UEFA  .  . (.18) . (.17) . (.18) 
 Full .  -1.16  -1.16  -1.12  
 Temporary .  -0.80  -0.88  -0.81  
Ticket to premier league  .  . (.61) .  . (.62) 
 Full .  0.14  .  0.13  
 Temporary .  0.21  .  0.21  
Ticket to premier league (-)  .  .  . (.77) .  
 Full .  .  0.21  .  
 Temporary .  .  0.08  .  
Ticket to premier league (+)  .  .  . (.56) .  
 Full .  .  0.11  .  
 Temporary .  .  0.25  .  
Still in National cup  .  . (.05) . (.06) . (.06) 
 Full .  -0.83  -0.81  -0.78  
 Temporary .  -0.65  -0.65  -0.67  
Wald Statistics for contrasts         
Intercept (full ≠ temporary) 125.3 (.33) 153.5 (.45) 178.3 (.39) 147.5 (.47) 
Season (linear) (full ≠ temporary) -0.06 (.33) -0.08 (.45) -0.09 (.39) -0.07 (.47) 
Change in the incentive(full ≠ temporary) 0.11 (.86) 0.21 (.78) 0.19 (.81) 0.15 (.85) 
Cooling down(full ≠ temporary) 0.44 (.61) 0.88 (.44) 0.89 (.44) 0.88 (.45) 
Starting up(full ≠ temporary) -0.86 (.41) 0.23 (.88) 0.38 (.81) 0.21 (.89) 
Consecutive losses(full ≠ temporary) -0.22 (.01) -0.23 (.17) -0.23 (.20) -0.27 (.13) 
Ranking(full ≠ temporary) -0.05 (.39) .  .  .  
Change at top(full ≠ temporary) .  -0.21 (.74) -0.25 (.70) -2.80 (.01) 
Players added(full ≠ temporary) .  -0.01 (.89) -0.01 (.90) 0.00 (.96) 
Short-term performance 
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  0.11 (.60) .  0.29 (.15) 
Short-term performance(-) 
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  .  0.21 (.44) .  
Short-term performance (Full)  
(success ≠ failure) 
.  .  0.11 (.83) .  
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  Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
wise Interaction 
Short-term performance (Temporary)  
(success ≠ failure) 
.  .  -0.31 (.55) .  
Short-term performance * Change at top 
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  .  .  -2.00 (.00) 
Long-term performance 
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  0.02 (.82) .  0.02 (.80) 
Long-term performance (-) 
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  .  0.17 (.48) .  
Long-term performance  
(success ≠ failure) 
.  .  0.21 (.29) .  
Long-term performance (temporary)  
(success ≠ failure) 
.  .  0.01 (.97) .  
Ticket to UEFA(full ≠ temporary) .  0.16 (.66) .  0.16 (.66) 
Ticket to UEFA (-)(full ≠ temporary) .  .  0.16 (.64) .  
Ticket to premier league  
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  -0.07 (.84) .  -0.07 (.84) 
Ticket to premier league (-)  
(full ≠ temporary) 
.  .  0.13 (.77) .  
Still in national cup(full ≠ temporary) .  -0.18 (.78) -0.16 (.80) -0.10 (.87) 
Still in UEFA(full ≠ temporary) .  -0.36 (.74) -0.28 (.80) -0.31 (.77) 
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
 Number of clusters = 576, maximum cluster size = 34. 
 
The results of the main effects model in the multinomial logistic regression do not alter the 
main conclusions of the simple logistic regression. There is again support for Hypothesis 1 
that performance feedback from historical aspirations and not the attainment of European 
tickets influences the odds of within-season trainer turnover. Similarly, no significant effect is 
found of the threat of relegation, ruling out Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the Wald tests indicate 
that there are no fundamental changes between full and temporary replacements. The 
piecewise linear model finally shows again that within-season trainer turnover occurs as much 
in stable clubs as in clubs with a lot of new players or changes in the chair. The results thus 
holds for full and temporary replacements. 
 There is again support for problemistic search and Hypothesis 3 in the piecewise 
linear model of Table 4.2. After disappointing match results, a chair is increasingly 
considering to replace the coach. The insignificant Wald contrast for differences between 
temporary and full replacements indicates that problemistic search does not influence the odds 
of replacing the old coach by an interim coach versus a fully qualified coach. In addition, the 
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piecewise linear model fails to find statistical support for differences between success and 
failure. This model thus again indicates that a chair does not behave differently when faced 
with disappointing or satisfactory rankings. Since none of the contrasts related to long-term 
performance is significant, there is no support for threat-rigidity as indicated in Hypothesis 4. 
In the interaction model, we test for interactions between performance signals and 
other change interventions. Only the interaction between short-term performance and changes 
at the top was significant, as in the ordinary logistic regression model. For the interpretation, 
we re-estimated the model including only this interaction effect. The results of this model are 
presented in the last column of Table 4.2. The interaction model indicates that changes at the 
top, short-term performance and the interaction are significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, since the Wald statistics indicate that the estimates of ‘changes at the top’ and the 
interaction effect are significantly different for full versus temporary replacement, the results 
will be interpreted separately. 
There are strong and negative effects of changes at the top on the odds of full 
replacements. The main effect indicates that when there is a change at the top, clubs only have 
odds of about 0.08 (= e-2.47) to replace the coach by a coach that stays on in the next season. 
The partial derivative for full replacements is ∂(logits)/ ∂(Change at top) = -2.47 -1.58 (short-
term performance), indicating that as performance becomes better, the relationship between 
changes at the top and odds of a full replacement becomes more negative. Akin to Hypothesis 
5, the model suggests that only when short-term performance disappoints strongly, a new 
chair might be more inclined to consider full replacements. The value of ∂(logits)/ ∂ (Change 
at top) is 0 when the signal is -1.56 (= -2.47/1.58), which suggests that a new chair will only 
consider full replacement once the club starts losing matches it has won in the years before. 
Taking the partial derivative of the performance signal reveals that the relationship between 
performance and odds of full replacement becomes more negative when there is a change at 
the top. The partial derivative is then ∂(logits)/ ∂(short-term performance) = -0.17 -1.58 
(Change at top). This shows that the more stable the top of the club is, the less likely it will 
engage itself in finding a full replacement. 
 The effect of changes at the top on temporary replacements is much weaker. A main 
effect of 0.34 indicates that the odds of a temporary replacement increases by 1.4 (= e0.34). 
The partial derivative for temporary replacements is ∂(logits)/ ∂(Change at top) = 0.34 +0.42 
(short-term performance), indicating that as performance becomes better, the relationship 
between changes at the top and odds of a temporary replacements becomes more positive. 
Thus, again the model suggests that a new chair will only consider full replacements when 
negative performance signals urges him to do so. There is thus clear support for Hypothesis 5. 
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Taking the partial derivative of the performance signal reveals that the relationship between 
performance and odds of a temporary trainer turnover almost disappears when there is a 
change at the top. The partial derivative is then ∂(logits)/ ∂(short-term performance) = -0.46 
+0.42 (1). 
In sum, the results of the binomial and multinomial logistic regression analyses 
overlap considerably. Because in all models performance feedback from historical aspiration 
explains within-season trainer turnover, we conclude that a chair is more inclined to look 
backwards and to rely on constructed performance signals than to rely on signals about the 
future. The threat of relegation does not lead to strong responses during the season. This result 
contradicts with Tena and Forrest (2007), but it does not necessarily mean that there is an 
inconsistency. The VRPM, introduced in Chapter 2, clearly shows that at extremely low 
levels of performance, some managers decline to take risk, while others take strong risk in 
order to survive. This pattern has also been found in the business literature. Hambrick and 
D’aveni (1988), for example, found spirals of activity and inactivity for firms on the verge of 
bankruptcy. 
The analyses also show that when short-term performance turns out badly, there is 
evidence of problemistic search. The stronger the signal the higher the odds that a chair will 
replace coaches. The analyses further reveal that the turnover process largely depends on the 
stability in the top of the club. We retain from the multinomial logistic regression model that 
when there is change at the top, clubs will search for full replacement after negative short-
term performance feedback. 
The binomial and multinomial logistic analyses disagree on the effect of long-term 
performance feedback. In the binomial logistic regression model only do we find some 
support for threat-rigid responses when long-term performance disappoints. However this 
result is weak because it is not corroborated by Wald statistics and not repeated in the 
multinomial logistic regression model. The weaker effects of long-term performance on 
within-season trainer turnover are in line with Audas et al. (1999). 
 
    
TABLE 4.3 BETWEEN-SEASON TRAINER TURNOVER  
 Baseline 
Main 
effects 
Within-season 
Trainer 
Turnover  
Change 
at top 
(End of season) 
Players 
added 
(End of season) 
Piece 
Wise 
Intercept -17.6  -20.1  -32.5  -21.3  7.97  3.75  
Season (linear) 0.01 (.79) 0.01 (.89) 0.02 (.86) 0.01 (.88) -0.00 (.98) -0.00 (.99) 
Age of club -0.00 (.89) -0.00 (.81) -0.00 (.88) -0.00 (.84) -0.00 (.95) -0.00 (.91) 
Years in premier league 0.02 (.33) 0.03 (.30) 0.03 (.35) 0.03 (.24) 0.03 (.19) 0.03 (.28) 
Years in UEFA -0.03 (.41) -0.06 (.10) -0.06 (.11) -0.06 (.12) -0.06 (.08) -0.07 (.09) 
Years in CL 0.10 (.34) 0.13 (.29) 0.13 (.31) 0.13 (.37) 0.15 (.22) 0.23 (.12) 
Reputation index 0.17 (.00) 0.16 (.02) 0.16 (.02) 0.19 (.01) 0.16 (.03) 0.18 (.02) 
Tenure of coach in club 0.00 (.20) 0.00 (.08) 0.00 (.09) 0.00 (.07) 0.00 (.14) 0.00 (.10) 
Ranking in league 0.14 (.00) .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket to UEFA .  0.21 (.60) -0.26 (.63) 0.34 (.41) -1.68 (.05) .  
Ticket to CL .  -0.05 (.82) 0.26 (.42) -0.03 (.92) 1.69 (.16) .  
Long-term performance .  0.04 (.59) 0.07 (.40) 0.11 (.29) 0.11 (.58) .  
Ticket to premier league .  -0.23 (.63) -0.06 (.91) -0.35 (.48) -0.33 (.72) .  
Last cup match .  -0.00 (.80) -0.00 (.86) -0.00 (.27) 0.00 (.51) -0.00 (.88) 
Last UEFA match .  0.00 (.95) -0.00 (.85) -0.00 (.80) 0.01 (.46) 0.00 (.89) 
Within-season trainer turnover .  0.85 (.02) 0.96 (.90) 0.80 (.03) 0.83 (.03) 0.91 (.02) 
Last cup match * trainer turnover .  .  -0.00 (.80) .  .  .  
Last UEFA match * trainer turnover .  .  0.00 (.74) .  .  .  
Long-term performance * trainer turnover .  .  -0.07 (.52) .  .  .  
Ticket to premier league * trainer turnover .  .  -0.33 (.59) .  .  .  
Ticket to CL * trainer turnover .  .  -0.91 (.24) .  .  .  
                                
 
 
 Baseline 
Main 
effects 
Within-season 
Trainer 
Turnover  
Change 
at top 
(End of season) 
Players 
added 
(End of season) 
Piece 
Wise 
Ticket to UEFA * trainer turnover .  .  1.22 (.09) .  .  .  
Change at top .  0.62 (.30) 0.72 (.28) -20.6 (.09) 0.83 (.17) 0.79 (.20) 
Last cup match * change at top .  .  .  0.02 (.05) .  .  
Last UEFA match * change at top .  .  .  0.01 (.32) .  .  
Long-term performance * change at top .  .  .  -0.57 (.02) .  .  
Ticket to premier league * change at top .  .  .  1.62 (.06) .  .  
Ticket to CL * change at top .  .  .  0.27 (.78) .  .  
Ticket to UEFA * change at top .  .  .  -2.38 (.05) .  .  
Players added (end) .  0.01 (.83) 0.02 (.73) 0.02 (.78) -0.46 (.67) -0.00 (.97) 
Last cup match* players added(end) .  .  .  .  -0.00 (.40) .  
Last UEFA match* players added (end) .  .  .  .  -0.00 (.42) .  
Long-term performance * players added (end) .  .  .  .  -0.01 (.67) .  
Ticket to premier league * players added (end) .  .  .  .  0.01 (.88) .  
Ticket to CL * players added (end) .  .  .  .  -0.17 (.15) .  
Ticket to UEFA * players added (end) .  .  .  .  0.18 (.04) .  
Long-term performance (-) .  .  .  .  .  0.09 (.48) 
Long-term performance (+) .  .  .  .  .  -0.04 (.67) 
Ticket to premier league (-) .  .  .  .  .  -0.11 (.84) 
Ticket to premier league (+) .  .  .  .  .  -0.36 (.49) 
Ticket to CL (-) .  .  .  .  .  0.03 (.92) 
Ticket to CL (+) .  .  .  .  .  -1.91 (.01) 
Ticket to UEFA (-) .  .  .  .  .  0.23 (.59) 
Ticket to UEFA (+) .  .  .  .  .  0.37 (.38) 
    
 Baseline 
Main 
effects 
Within-season 
Trainer 
Turnover  
Change 
at top 
(End of season) 
Players 
added 
(End of season) 
Piece 
Wise 
Wald tests of contrasts (success ≠ failure) .  .  .  .  .    
Ticket to UEFA .  .  .  .  .  -0.14 (.44) 
Long-term performance .  .  .  .  .  0.13 (.40) 
Ticket to CL .  .  .  .  .  1.93 (.00) 
Ticket to premier league .  .  .  .  .  0.25 (.44) 
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
  Number of clusters = 29, Maximum cluster size = 16. 
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4.5.2 Between-season analysis 
The between-season analysis relies on a logistic regression for correlated responses. The 
measure for the dependent variable is dichotomous, with value 1 if the chair replaces a coach 
between seasons, and 0 if the chair decides to keep the coach. We will present models for the 
odds that the coach is replaced between seasons. The results for the between-season analysis 
are presented in Table 4.3. The baseline model suggests that clubs with a high score on the 
reputation index, and clubs with a high ranking in the last season have higher odds of 
changing coaches between seasons. Apart from that, trainer turnover is evenly distributed 
among clubs between seasons. 
The main effects model did not result in support for the direct effects of organizational 
changes assumed in Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7. Counter to Hypothesis 6, we did not find 
that the recent number of players transferred has a direct effect on between-season trainer 
turnover. Nor did we find that recent changes in the chair of the club have a direct effect on 
between-season trainer turnover. There is support for Hypothesis 8 which states that a within-
season trainer turnover precedes a between-season trainer turnover. The odds of a between- 
season trainer turnover is 2.35 (= e 0.85) times higher when there was a within-season trainer 
turnover in the season before. Since Hypothesis 8 is supported and Hypotheses 6 and 7 are 
not, there is no evidence in the main effects model that a between-season trainer turnover is 
part of a larger plan to turnaround the club. 
We estimated four interaction models to test for moderation between organizational 
changes and performance feedback. The Within-season trainer turnover model tests whether 
the substitution of a temporary coach between seasons was only decided upon at the end of 
the season, as indicated by Hypothesis 9. The interaction model indicates that one interaction 
effect is significant at a 10% level. We are inclined to conclude that a temporary coach is 
taken as a serious candidate for the next year’s season. When a type 1 error of 10 % is 
tolerated, there is still no evidence that a temporary coach is taken as a serious candidate in 
clubs that managed to get tickets for the UEFA cup. The partial derivative for between-season 
trainer turnover is ∂(logits)/∂(Within-season trainer turnover) = 0.96+1.22 (Ticket to UEFA), 
indicating that the odds of a between-season turnover increases when clubs are able to attain a 
Ticket to the UEFA. This means that the good performance at the end of the season does not 
lead to new opportunities for the coach. The results rather suggest that temporary coaches 
know in advance that their contract ends at the end of the season. There is thus no support for 
Hypothesis 9. 
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Hypothesis 10 states that there is interaction between performance and changes at the 
top. The Change at top model leads to three significant interactions between changes at the 
top and performance feedback. There is thus support for Hypothesis 10. The partial derivative 
with respect to changes at the top reveals is -20.6 + 0.02 (Last cup match) - 0.57 (Long-term 
performance) - 2.38 (Ticket to UEFA), indicating that between-season trainer turnover 
becomes more likely in clubs that have failed to get hold on a ticket for the UEFA and in 
clubs where the ranking is historically low. 
Because of Hypothesis 11, the Players added (End of season) model tests for 
interactions between the numbers of players added at the end of the season and performance 
feedback. Only the interaction between the attainment of tickets to the UEFA and the number 
of players added is significant. In this model the main effect of ticket to UEFA also becomes 
significant, indicating that the odds are only 0.19 (= e-1.68) that a between-season trainer 
turnover occurs when the club got hold on to a ticket for the UEFA cup. The partial derivative 
with respect to performance feedback is -1.68 + 0.18 (players added (end)), indicating that 
between-season trainer turnover becomes more likely the more new players are added. The 
value of ∂(logits)/∂ (Ticket to UEFA) is 0 when the number of new players is 9.3 (= 1.68/ 
0.18). This means that the odds of a between-season trainer turnover becomes real only when 
a club with a ticket for the UEFA buys in more then 9 new players. There is support for 
Hypothesis 11. 
Thus in all interaction models the attainment of tickets to the UEFA is the most 
significant performance effect for between-season trainer turnover. In none of the models is 
historical performance feedback significant for between-season trainer turnover. All results 
point out that between seasons, clubs have turned the page and are looking towards the future. 
There is thus support for Hypothesis 12. 
Finally, the piecewise linear model tests whether there are different attributions for 
success and for failure between seasons. Only one Wald contrast is significantly different 
from zero. It makes a difference whether or not clubs are playing the qualifying rounds of the 
CL. A comparison of the parameter coefficients reveals that clubs that are able to attain a 
ticket to the CL, make an effort to retain the current coach. Success lowers the odds of 
between-season trainer turnover to 0.14 = (e-1.91). This implies support for Hypothesis 13. 
Overall, the analysis shows that between-season trainer turnover is not a step in a 
larger strategic reorientation. There is however strong evidence that a between-season trainer 
turnover follows a within-season trainer turnover. There is also evidence that a chair pays 
importance to the attainment of European cup tickets between seasons. Also coaches of clubs 
that are able to play the qualifying rounds of the UEFA have great chance of staying on unless 
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more than half of the players leaves the team. The results indicate that in unstable clubs, 
feedback on the attainment of UEFA tickets can make the difference for deciding to turnover 
the coach between seasons. We also found strong attribution for success when tickets to the 
CL were attained. Clubs try to retain successful coaches to the club. 
 
TABLE 4.4 POISSON REGRESSION WITH MATCH RESULTS COMPARED TO HISTORICAL ASPIRATIONS 
 Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
Wise 
Inter- 
Action 
Intercept -20.6  -52.0  -64.1  -43.4  
Season (linear) 0.01 (.34) 0.03 (.32) 0.03 (.18) 0.02 (.39) 
Years In premier league 0.01 (.31) 0.01 (.26) 0.02 (.24) 0.01 (.23) 
Age of club 0.00 (.72) -0.00 (.74) -0.00 (.58) -0.00 (.85) 
Years in European cups -0.01 (.45) -0.01 (.11) -0.02 (.16) -0.01 (.19) 
Reputation index 0.06 (.02) 0.05 (.06) 0.04 (.20) 0.04 (.09) 
Games to be played 0.01 (.67) 0.01 (.55) 0.01 (.53) 0.01 (.41) 
Cooling down -1.38 (.00) -1.50 (.00) -1.50 (.00) -1.50 (.00) 
Starting up -0.20 (.41) -0.56 (.07) -0.65 (.04) -0.44 (.03) 
Consecutive losses 0.00 (.95) -0.07 (.17) -0.08 (.11) -0.07 (.18) 
Venue 0.04 (.75) 0.03 (.78) 0.02 (.90) 0.02 (.84) 
Tenure of coach in club 0.00 (.16) 0.00 (.23) 0.00 (.27) 0.00 (.17) 
Ranking in league 0.05 (.00) .  .  .  
Change at top .  0.12 (.58) 0.09 (.68) 0.31 (.16) 
Players added .  0.01 (.52) 0.01 (.62) 0.00 (.90) 
Short-term performance .  -0.13 (.02) .  -0.19 (.00) 
Short-term performance (-) .  .  -0.20 (.07) .  
Short-term performance (+) .  .  -0.00 (.97) .  
Short-term performance * change at top .  .  .  0.26 (.01) 
Long-term performance .  0.03 (.18) .  0.02 (.32) 
Long-term performance (-) .  .  0.07 (.18) .  
Long-term performance (+) .  .  0.03 (.39) .  
Ticket to UEFA .  -0.01 (.91) .  0.00 (.99) 
Ticket to UEFA (-) .  .  -0.03 (.82) .  
Ticket to UEFA (+) .  .  -0.08 (.51) .  
Still in UEFA .  0.37 (.16) 0.38 (.22) 0.36 (.16) 
Ticket to premier league .  0.00 (1.0) .  -0.02 (.88) 
Ticket to premier league (-) .  .  -0.08 (.59) .  
Ticket to premier league (+) .  .  0.04 (.76) .  
Still in national cup .  -0.12 (.54) -0.18 (.39) -0.21 (.31) 
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 Baseline 
Main 
Effects 
Piece 
Wise 
Inter- 
Action 
Wald tests of contrasts  
(success ≠ failure) 
        
Short-term performance .  .  -0.20 (.36) .  
Ticket to UEFA .  .  0.05 (.48) .  
Long-term performance .  .  0.04 (.50) .  
Ticket to premier league .  .  -0.12 (.24) .  
      Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
        Number of clusters = 29, maximum cluster size = 16. 
 
4.5.3 The relation between within and between-season trainer turnover 
The between-season analysis clearly indicates that between and within-season trainer turnover 
are positively related. We tried to replicate the findings by means of an analysis of the number 
of steps that have been taken by the club to obtain a new coach. In our sample, the observed 
steps range from 0 to 3. If clubs stick throughout the season with the same coach, then no 
steps were taken. If clubs replace the coach once, whether it is within or between-season, then 
the number of steps is one. Finally, when a within-season change is complemented by another 
trainer turnover in the season, the number of steps increases by at least one.  
The baseline model in Table 4.4 suggests that only the number of steps at the end of 
the season is significantly lower than the period before, as indicated by the significant 
cooling-down period. The baseline model differs substantially from the baseline model in the 
logistic regression analysis. There is no longer evidence of year effects. Neither do we find in 
the baseline model that the number of consecutive losses explains how many steps will be 
taken before the replacement of the coach is completed. Finally the baseline model suggest 
that the number of steps that are taken to come to a new coach does not differ in the starting-
up period over the rest of the season. This result is however contradicted in the other models. 
In the main effects model for instance, a significant effect of -0.67 suggests that more full 
replacements are considered during starting-up periods. 
The main effects model provides again support for Hypothesis 1 and no support for 
Hypothesis 2. That is, the number of steps can be explained by historical performance 
feedback, not by information on the attainment of European tickets. Wald contrasts fail to 
indicate that the number of steps differ due to attributions of success or failure. If a type I 
error of 10% is tolerated, then we find that a chair is considering temporary replacements 
more quickly when the match results severely disappoint. When the match results disappoint 
slightly, a chair will only consider replacing a coach once they have a serious candidate. 
Differences between within-season and between-season trainer turnover 
 
124 
There is thus again weak support for problemistic search and Hypothesis 3. There is again no 
statistical evidence that a chair resorts to threat-rigid responses. 
Finally, the interaction model indicates that the relationship between changes at the top 
and the number of steps is moderated by information on match results. The interaction is 
∂(log(Number of Steps)/ ∂(short-term performance) = -0.19 +0.24 (Change at top), indicating 
that clubs with changes in the chair are more likely to look for temporary solutions when 
match results are disappointing. The analysis thus confirms our prior conclusions. A chair, 
especially in clubs with unstable tops, monitors short-term performance and is willing to 
replace the coach before the end of the season, even if there is not a serious candidate 
available. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
We have shown that piecewise linear models lead to similar conclusions to the ones found in 
the academic sports literature. We both find a strong effect of short-term performance 
feedback on trainer turnover decisions. The count regression also repeats the finding that 
performance effects linger on. We believe that the implications of the study goes further 
because insights from psychological theories and organizational learning theories have 
substantially increased our understanding of trainer turnover decisions. 
Most studies using the performance feedback methodology have assumed that the non-
linear relationship between performance feedback and change is stable. We find in the soccer 
setting, that the nature of the relationship changes when the season comes to an end. We have 
strong evidence that a chair attaches more importance to backward-looking performance 
signals during the season and to forward-looking performance signals between seasons. No 
matter which measure was used for the dependent variable and irregardless of whether we 
tested for interaction or for attributions to success and failure, we consistently find that 
historical performance feedback determines within-season trainer turnover, and that the 
attainment of direct aspirations determines between-season trainer turnover much more than 
within-season trainer turnover. Our results come close to the March and Shapira (1992) 
models where shifts in attention are modeled. 
We also offer some insights into the behavioral responses of a chair. There is ample 
evidence of a bounded rational behavior of the chair. First we find problemistic search after 
short-term performance feedback. Second, we find clear signs of satisfaction with the coach 
when the club is able to play the qualifying rounds of the CL. 
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From the results of Chapter 4, balanced inferences with respect to organizational change 
should be made. On the one hand, the fact that we find a shift in attention between the within 
and between-season situation endorses our proposition that not all organizational changes are 
logically connected to each other. Since decisions about similar change interventions are 
substantiated by different pieces of information over time, it is hard to assume that past 
interventions reveal something about the future change interventions. This result is thus inline 
with Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) who argue that each decision moment is unique. On the 
other hand, the results systematically show that once a decision to replace the coach is made 
during the season, the odds increase that a between-season trainer turnover will follow. The 
result suggests that chairs devise tactical plans and may think two steps ahead. These plans 
are evidence of widening problemistic search. As such trainer turnover decisions can be 
considered small changes which do not affect the dominant strategic orientation of the firm.
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Chapter 5∗ 
Differences in within-season responses of coaches and chairs 
to performance feedback 
 
In Chapter 4 we have studied the decision to turnover coaches. The analysis has increased our 
understanding of organizational behavior only to a limited extent because our research focus 
was restricted to just one agent, namely the chair. In order to study organizational behavior 
more thoroughly, we will no longer disregard the reaction of the coach. Consequently, we 
increase in this chapter the number of organizational decision makers to two. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, we can assume that a decision maker may respond differently 
to performance information than fellow decision makers. Moreover we will take into account 
that decision makers have different opinions about the organizational performance, given the 
fact that performance information is in general fuzzy. Differences in opinion and differences 
in risk-taking propensity may lead to disagreement between the two agents. We believe that 
disagreement is an interesting context for studying small change because it becomes unlikely 
that actions of one decision maker will be followed by the actions of another decision maker. 
In this chapter, we explore the extent to which coaches and chairs disagree during the 
season in order to find out whether or not a within-season trainer turnover is part of a larger 
organizational change program. In the first section of this chapter, we describe two features of 
disagreement that occur regularly in organizations, namely a lack of coordination and 
information ambiguity. In the second section, we describe which kind of behavior could be 
expected from theory under three conditions. First, we use A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(ABTF) introduced by Cyert and March (1992), Threat Rigidity Theory (TRT) introduced by 
Staw et al. (1981) to describe expected organizational behavior when there is no information 
ambiguity and strong coordination between the agents. Second, we draw on the Variable Risk 
Preference Model (VRPM) introduced by March and Shapira (1992) to describe expected 
organizational behavior when there is no information ambiguity and weak coordination 
between the agents. Third, we explore the possibility of information ambiguity and weak 
coordination. In the third section, we compare observed organizational behavior in soccer 
clubs with our expectations. In the last section, we conclude and make recommendations for 
future research. 
                                                 
∗
 An earlier version of this chapter can be found in De Schryver, Eisinga, Teelken, and Poutsma (2008).  
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5.1 Two sources of disagreement 
 
5.1.1 Coordination of action 
When decision makers agree upon the state of the organizational performance, they may still 
disagree upon the actions that need to be taken after, because it remains unclear what can be 
learnt for the future from signals from the past. Strong signs of performance feedback can for 
example result in strategy implementation efforts or in efforts to change the strategy. 
Moreover, actions to implement strategies can mean a lot of different things. Actions to 
implement strategies happen because it is believed that strategies are poorly understood, 
because performance feedback highlights principal-agent problems, or because of single loop 
learning. Strategy implementation can thus have different meanings for different 
organizational decision makers. Similarly, when new performance information is used to 
discuss future strategic orientations, disagreement may arise because some decision makers 
champion alternatives and take actions that are deliberately different from the common 
organizational orientation. Clear signs can appeal differently to different decision makers in 
the organization. 
 
5.1.2 Information ambiguity 
The second source of disagreement is the performance signal itself. Disagreement about the 
organizational performance will typically happen in the case of multiple performance signals. 
In general, it has become popular to monitor organizations using different pieces of 
overlapping performance information, because it is believed that single performance 
indicators can not fully reflect organizational performance. It remains to be tested whether 
multiple performance measures are really leading to better decision making. Multiple pieces 
of information introduce a new problem, namely that of inconsistent performance feedback. 
Inconsistent performance feedback occurs when performance information simultaneously 
indicates that there are signs of failure and signs of success. This situation is problematic, 
because the performance information no longer guides the organization towards action 
straightforwardly. Rather, decision makers themselves have to filter the competing pieces of 
information, because they can only scrutinize limited pieces of information at a time. 
Inconsistent performance feedback makes that the decision maker can choose to act upon the 
piece of information that suits best. 
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If the two decision makers disagree about which piece of information to follow, it can lead to 
delays in organizational decision making because the different points of views need to be 
reconciled first. Alternatively, it is possible that no attempts will be made to streamline the 
competing views on the organizational performance and that the decision makers rely on their 
own selected piece of information justify their action. Thus, as inconsistent feedback 
increases the possibilities for framing and filtering information, it may facilitate fragmented 
decision making to occur in organizations in which latent conflicts just scratch the surface. 
We will explore to what extent information ambiguity has an effect on decisions of coaches 
and chairs. 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
We draw on organizational learning theories to describe how concerted action between 
decision makers may occur. In Chapter 2, we showed that different organizational learning 
theories rely on different coordination mechanisms. Constriction of control, restriction in 
information and a focus on strategy implementation are the principal mechanisms in TRT. In 
ABTF consensus seeking is the principal mechanism for coordination.  
When these coordination mechanisms apply, the possibilities for decision making are 
severely constrained. For instance in TRT, no organizational member should consider trying 
out new solutions when the organization is trying to impose the old view. This kind of 
behavior would rule out an organizational threat-rigid response. Similarly, when a decision 
maker unnecessarily takes an action that jeopardizes the consensus among the dominant 
coalition, there can not be evidence of ABTF.  
In order to highlight concerted action in organizations, we will try to explain the 
decision making of all agents by means of TRT and ABTF. To account for the possibility of 
weak coordination between decision makers, we draw on the VRPM because of the model 
assumption that managers always have the choice whether they will take risks or not. We in 
particular make use of the high degree of managerial discretion in the VRPM by assuming 
that when one agent decides to take risk the other will not. 
ABTF, TRT, and VRPM have in common that they focus on clear signals like threats, 
failure and success to explain organizational decision making. Recently there have been 
important new contributions that have addressed the impact of inconsistent performance 
feedback on organizational behavior (e.g., Audia & Brion, 2007; Johns, 1999). In this chapter, 
we will follow the same chronology and first focus on clear signs of feedback and then on 
inconsistent performance feedback. 
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5.2.1 Disagreement about the actions after clear performance signals 
We use ABTF and TRT to describe coordinated actions after clear performance signals and 
VRPM to describe a lack of coordination. As described in Chapter 2, the organizational 
learning theories rely on different coordination mechanisms. Whereas TRT relies 
predominantly on enforced confidence in the chosen strategy to coordinate behavior, ABTF 
focuses on satisfaction to align the actions of organizational members. As such, the 
coordination in TRT leads to clear behavioral responses after threats and the coordination in 
ABTF is clear after satisfying performance. 
 
5.2.1.1 Threat Rigidity Theory 
TRT assumes that an organization will implement the current strategy more thoroughly after a 
threat. In TRT, the top of the organization imposes a feeling of confidence in the current 
strategy or at least confidence in the own capabilities. This enforced coordination results in a 
restriction in information processing, a constriction in control and a focus on efficiency (Staw 
et al., 1981). These three mechanisms have clear implications for the decision makers. A 
restriction in information processing affects both top and middle managers. It implies that all 
decision makers increasingly ignore signals that indicate a threat. A constriction of control 
implies increased centralization or a strengthening of tightly coupled links and dissolution of 
weak links. This part of the organizational response has different implications for top and 
middle management, because top managers will restrict the managerial discretion of their 
middle managers, not the other way around. In the extreme, it is even possible that top 
managers will replace middle managers. Finally, TRT assumes that the best solution to put a 
halt to the threat is to better implement the strategy and to focus on efficiency. For example, 
various sorts of cost cutting can be a remedy to level off repeated signs of negative 
performance feedback. This is a response that applies to both the middle manager and the top 
manager. 
Conversely, TRT is open-ended after signs of success. TRT does not predict precisely 
what organizations do when there is no longer evidence of a threat. The theory at best 
suggests that successful organizations will loosen the information restrictions and control 
mechanisms and no longer single out efficiency as the main strategic orientation. Since the 
top manager does not place himself to the foreground, there may be possibilities for 
experimentation and strategy changes that deviate from the strict commitment to efficiency. 
However, this TRT reasoning should not be stretched too far. The managerial discretion that 
An organizational learning perspective on change                                                                          131 
   
is given to the middle managers does not imply that they will start challenging the current 
strategy in extreme degrees. 
 
5.2.1.2 A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
ABTF is open-ended during signs of failure and more precise during success. In the case of an 
ABTF response, we know that the organization will ward off any change that endangers the 
fragile coalition. Especially after signs of success, there is no incentive to take risks. Because 
organizational decision makers are aware of the boundaries that make it difficult to resolve 
conflicts, success is appreciated and leads to satisfaction and coordination. In such a setting, 
there will be strong arguments not to make fundamental changes. In ABTF, positive 
performance feedback gives a feeling of satisfaction to all stakeholders. Consequently, the 
stakeholders will be willing to continue the organizational coalition and are unlikely to 
propose changes that might endanger the coalition. It is an accelerating mechanism: the more 
positive performance feedback, the less likely it becomes that proposals for change that 
endanger the current distribution of power will be considered. As a result, ABTF predicts that 
when performance is beyond aspirations, organizations become more complacent. 
The assumption that successful organizations become complacent does not imply that 
successful organizations will never change. After all, there still can be slack search. 
Successful firms can change as long as the change does not hamper the current dominant 
coalition. ABTF thus argues that successful organizations may want to duplicate their 
successes and make the investments grow, and grow faster in the future (as long as everybody 
in the current dominant organization agrees upon the satisfaction). The theory only predicts 
that success wards off any change alternatives that might endanger the current coalition, 
because success makes the power coalition stronger. 
Conversely, when organizations act according to ABTF, we do not know precisely 
what will be decided after signs of failure. Different members will look for solutions after 
signs of failure but we do not know whether they will be able to implement any of them. 
ABTF is thus open-ended after failure. Negative performance feedback creates dissatisfaction, 
resulting in problemistic search, opening up conflict between stakeholders and 
experimentation to find new solutions and coalitions. The result of the search is unclear. On 
the one hand, problemistic search can result in inertia when the lack of satisfaction with the 
current performance bumps into other organizational boundaries (which is called 
organizational learning). On the other hand, problemistic search can lead to organizational 
change that is possibly fundamental, if enough organizational momentum among the decision 
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makers is found for breaking up the coalition. It is also unclear which decision makers will be 
engaged in the problemistic search and who is able to impose a new solution. 
 
5.2.1.3 Variable Risk Preference Model 
When there is no coordination between the two decision makers, we rely on the VRPM. The 
VRPM assumes that managers simultaneously pay attention to two performance signals: one 
signal that measures the propensity of bankruptcy and one signal that measures the degree of 
attainment discrepancy. Because the relationship between risk-taking and signals failure is 
positive and the relationship between attainment discrepancy and risk-taking is negative, it is 
always possible that one group of decision makers decides to take risk while the other group 
does not. Even in the simple model of two decision makers, we find it hard to make precise 
predictions about who will take risk. Instead we assume that only one of the two decision 
makers will resort to risk-taking at a particular point in time. The difference between VRPM, 
ABTF and TRT becomes clear in Table 5.1 where the expected response of the decision 
makers respond to signs of failure and signs of success are displayed. 
 
TABLE 5.1 IDEAL TYPE RESPONSES BY TWO ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS AFTER CLEAR SIGNALS 
Signal ABTF TRT VRPM 
Clear 
sign of  
success 
Everybody satisfies The top loosens control 
The rest may 
experiment 
Some, not everybody, 
may reap 
opportunities 
Clear 
sign of  
failure 
Somebody may tackle the 
problem. It is possible that 
nobody responds 
The top enforces a 
solution to the problem 
Some, not everybody, 
may tackle problems 
 
Table 5.1 does not report actual behavior, but ideal types of behaviors that explain best what 
is happening according to the theory. The ideal type of organizational behavior in ABTF is 
that there is a shared response following success. Everybody agrees to make changes only if 
they are beneficial to everybody in the coalition. During periods of success, everybody is 
willing to accept the status quo. In a TRT, both decision makers shift to threat-rigid response 
after signs of low performance. When there are no indications of a threat, the top manager 
seems to loosen control and middle managers may shift focus again. We assume as ideal type 
of organizational behavior for VRPM that the feelings of satisfaction and confidence are 
distributed uniformly over the different decision makers. It results in moderated risk-taking in 
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which one decision maker functions as a gate keeper for the initiatives introduced by the other 
decision maker. 
 
5.2.2 Disagreement about performance signals 
This section focuses on disagreement about the state of the organizational performance. This 
situation can be fed by inconsistent feedback, because each decision maker can then decide 
what to think of the organizational performance before taking action. It has been shown there 
is not a natural pecking order by which problems are attended first. First, Baum et al. (2005) 
found that when inconsistent feedback leads to non-local network extensions in the relational 
banking industry, the effect was stronger than the increases in the network extensions after 
consistent performance feedback. Second, Audia and Brion (2007) found that new product 
launches in the hard drive disk sector were stalled, because the manufacturers appealed to less 
important performance indicators when they generated feelings of success to counter feelings 
of failure from primary performance indicators. Basically, Audia and Brion (2007) found that 
satisfaction may already creep into the organization before performance appraisal uniformly 
indicates that the organization is successful. 
While these two studies suggest that inconsistent performance feedback can have 
strong idiosyncratic behavioral effects, they disagree if it will lead to action or to inertia. 
Consequently, more theoretical and empirical research is needed to assess the precise effects 
of inconsistent performance feedback on organizational behavior. This chapter will try to 
come to a better understanding of decision making after inconsistent feedback by looking at 
the individual reactions of different decision makers on inconsistent performance feedback. 
We try to discriminate between actions of top managers and of middle managers. On 
the one hand, top managers are likely to reveal a stronger bias towards success because top 
managers are representatives of the chosen strategic orientation. Consequently, they will 
choose positive performance indicators as long as they are available and ignore negative 
information as long as possible. We therefore assume that changes at the top will be 
postponed as long as possible, save for cases of extreme success or failure in which the top 
resorts to an ABTF or TRT response. On the other hand, middle managers are likely to 
institute plenty of changes, even if there is partial information that the organization is 
successful. They take action to show their mastery in many domains or to ensure that their 
targets are being met. When there are clear threats, they may expect leadership and action 
from the top, akin to a TRT response. Also, when there are strong signs of successes, there 
will be no time to respond to opportunities, leading to “satisfaction”, as defined by ABTF. 
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These thoughts, however, are only thought experiments with little theoretical grounds and no 
empirical backup. 
 
5.3 The Dutch premier soccer league (1990-2005) 
This section uses the ideal types described above to interpret the actions of the two main 
decision makers in soccer clubs. There is a lot of empirical research but it is biased towards 
only one decision maker: the chair. Studies typically concentrate on how long the coach stays 
in a club. In this within-season analysis, we introduce the coach because he decides most 
strategic actions during the season. Coaches decide how to motivate players, organize 
trainings, and select players for the upcoming matches. This can be achieved in numerous 
ways. Defender, prospector or analyzer strategies have all been successfully tried out 
(ExpertFootball.com, n.d.). Accordingly, there must be possibilities to make changes by the 
coach. While there are some studies that studied opportunistic shifts during matches 
(Garicano & Palacios-Huerta, 2005; Grund & Gürtler, 2005), the possibilities to shift the 
long-term strategic orientation has to our knowledge not been investigated before. 
 
5.3.1 Hypotheses 
In this section, we tailor the predictions of the different organizational learning theories to the 
context of the soccer setting. TRT is an organizational learning theory that clearly explains 
what to expect when performance becomes threatening to the organization and glides away. 
TRT expects that first coaches respond to negative performance feedback and that chairs then 
take over and determine what the organization should do. The decision making of the chair 
reveals rigidity because he will curtail initiatives of middle managers that were not previously 
related towards efficiency. We therefore assume that initiatives of the coach that are curtailed 
by the chair
 
are positively related to performance when performance feedback is negative. 
The chair, in contrast, will tolerate and even encourage shifts towards efficiency after 
his threat-rigid intervention. Since the initiatives towards efficiency may last and increase 
during the complete threat, we assume that initiatives towards efficiency are positively related 
to performance when performance feedback is negative. Finally, because of the constriction in 
control, chairs are likely to dissolve weak links. We therefore expect higher odds that coaches 
will be replaced after first signs of negative performance feedback. Hence we assume that 
within-season trainer turnover is positively related to performance, when performance 
feedback is negative. In TRT, the chair responds to positive performance feedback by 
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lowering the control. We therefore, expect that the slopes are weaker when there is positive 
performance feedback. 
A threat-rigid response of organizations puts a lot of emphasis on the active role of the 
chair when things turn out badly. The idea that the chair comes to the foreground to overrule 
initiatives from the coach can be tested empirically. We should expect a direct effect of trainer 
turnover on changes in the playing tactics. New coaches should focus more on strategy 
implementation and efficiency. They will not experiment by changing to tactics that have not 
been tried out before. In sum, the ideal type of a TRT organizational response leads to four 
hypotheses for soccer clubs, that ideally all should be supported. For the chair we hypothesize 
that 
Hypothesis 1. Chairs replace coaches quickly after performance has dropped below 
aspiration. 
For the incumbent coach we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 2. Because of an increased focus on efficiency, incumbent coaches only 
shift to other strategies quickly after performance has dropped below aspiration.  
And 
Hypothesis 3. Because of an increased focus on efficiency, incumbent coaches will 
increasingly shift to strategy implementation as long as there is negative performance 
feedback. 
And for the new coach we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 4. More than incumbent coaches, new coaches will focus on efficiency.  
In ABTF, dissatisfaction prevails over confidence in the current strategy when performance is 
too low. Dissatisfaction has unclear effects on organizational behavior because it sparks latent 
conflicts and problemistic search. Therefore ABTF is open-ended after negative performance 
feedback. When performance is much better than aspired, ABTF gives clear indications what 
will happen. Since positive performance feedback fuels all stakeholders with satisfaction, the 
stakeholders are unlikely to suggest any decisions that might endanger the current 
constellation of power. Consequently, for ABTF we assume that within-season trainer 
turnover is negatively related to performance when performance feedback is positive and that 
changes in the playing tactics are negatively related to performance when performance 
feedback is positive. 
We also expect that, when performance feedback is negative, within-season trainer 
turnover is negatively related to performance and that changes in the playing tactics is 
negatively related to performance. However, since it is difficult to find a replacement and 
since it is difficult to successfully implement a new tactical plan, we expect that the negative 
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relationship between performance and changes will not be as strong when performance 
feedback is negative as it is when performance feedback is positive. 
We let the possibility to ignore disappointing performance depend on the club’s 
situation. In some cases it will be more difficult to do nothing after clear signs of failure. 
Clubs with ambitions will tolerate less easily disappointing performance signals. For example, 
Ter Weel (2006) found that clubs who have heavily invested in the beginning of the season in 
new players, may be tempted to fire the coach more quickly. Recent organizational changes 
can be interpreted as indications that there is more willingness to search for solutions. Not 
only clubs which added many players, but also clubs that have recently changed their board 
might need to show that they are in control. Problemistic search could also prevail from the 
behavioral responses of the coach. For instance, a recent investment in the talent pool can 
trigger coaches to shift towards more attacking or defending styles depending on the kind of 
new players that have been attracted. Similarly, coaches may shift to more attacking or 
defending strategies to satisfy new chairs, because the shift makes sense from an internal 
point of view. In sum, the ideal type of an ABTF organizational response leads to four 
hypotheses for the soccer club, that ideally all should be supported. For the chair we 
hypothesize that 
 Hypothesis 5. Chairs will not replace coaches as long as there is positive 
performance feedback. 
For the coach we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 6. Coaches will not adopt other strategies as long as there is positive 
performance feedback 
During signs of failure we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 7. In clubs with new chairs and in clubs that have invested in new players, 
chairs will be more eager to replace coaches when performance is disappointing than 
in clubs where no such changes have occurred. 
Another possibility is that 
Hypothesis 8. In clubs with new chairs and in clubs that have invested in new players, 
coaches will be more eager to make strategic shifts when performance is 
disappointing than in clubs where no such change have occurred. 
In our translation of the VRPM into a model of two organizational decision makers, we 
assume that exactly one decision maker will act upon performance feedback. For success, it is 
easy to assume that only coaches will act upon successes. During the season, because of 
institutional pressures, the chair has little other possibilities than to be satisfied. Coaches, in 
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contrast, may shift strategy because they are confident that the existing pool of players can 
deliver even better results. 
During failure, there occurs a shift. Disappointing performance of chairs pressures the 
chair to replace the coach. Similarly, we assume that during signs of failure, the coach sticks 
to the current strategy. In sum, the ideal type of a VRPM organizational response leads to two 
hypotheses for the soccer club, which all should be supported. For the chair we hypothesize 
that 
Hypothesis 9. Chairs will respond to signs of failure by replacing the coach. 
For the coach we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 10. Coaches will respond to signals of success by making strategic shifts. 
Finally we test for idiosyncratic effects of inconsistent performance feedback. We particularly 
assume that chairs will show signs of satisfaction as long as possible, whereas the coach will 
try to show mastery whenever he gets the chance. For the chair we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 11. Chairs will postpone within-season trainer turnover when there is 
inconsistent performance feedback. 
For the coach we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 12. Coaches will be making strategic shifts when there is inconsistent 
performance feedback. 
 
5.3.2 Data, methodology, and measures  
The data were collected from two internet sources: home.wanadoo.nl/ronald.zwiers and 
www.koningvoetbal.nl. The sample consists of all clubs in the Dutch premier league during 
the period 1990/1-2005/6. The sample has 34 repeated measures for (18×16=) 288 club years, 
giving 9,792 observations in total. Since the observations are correlated, Generalized 
Estimation Equations (Diggle et al., 2002) were used. Each model focuses on decision making 
chairs replacing coaches, coaches shifting to more offensive strategies, to more defensive or 
to more prospector strategies. 
We estimated the models separately from each other. In each model we retained the 
same explanatory variables to take into account that both chairs and coaches rely on the same 
pieces of information. Conform the academic sports literature, we assume that clubs monitor 
both short-term performance and long-term performance. Based on different kinds of 
aspirations, different measures for short-term performance were examined. As in Cyert and 
March (1992), performance was compared against historical, social and direct aspiration 
levels. Because of problems of multicollinearity, the number of performance signals had to be 
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trimmed. Here the results of social performance feedback for match results will be presented. 
In addition, to line up with the VRPM, we added signs of relegation to the model. The 
measures of the independent variables are as follows. 
The short-term performance monitors the performance of a single match. The match result 
is compared with the score that could be expected from the current ranking. In particular, we 
expect clubs to win games from opponents having 4 points less in the current ranking. 
Otherwise clubs should expect to obtain a draw. This can lead to positive performance signals 
when clubs beat higher ranked teams, and to negative performance signals when clubs loose 
or when clubs obtain a draw against lower ranked teams. In the models, this variable is split 
up into Short-term performance (-), retaining only information on disappointing signals and 
Short-term performance (+), retaining only information on satisficing signals. 
The long-term performance monitors the ranking. It signals whether the club is going to 
attain a ranking similar to the average ranking for the past three years. This performance 
signal was constructed by subtracting the current ranking by a weighted moving average of 
the ranking for the last three years. This signal is substantially different from the short-term 
performance because even when teams have lost a game, it is possible to get positive 
performance feedback if the match result does not affect the ranking. In the models, this 
variable is split up into Long-term performance (-), retaining only information on 
disappointing signals and Long-term performance (+), retaining only information on 
satisficing signals. 
Threat of relegation? monitors severe failure. It occurs when there are indications that a club 
will not be able to play in the premier league next year. The signals therefore compare the 
current ranking of the club with the minimum ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s 
premier league. In the models, this variable is split up into Threat of relegation, retaining 
only information on disappointing signals and No Threat of relegation, retaining only 
information on satisficing signals. 
Top is a dichotomous variable measure, with value 1 if there was a change in the chair of the 
club between seasons or within the current season, and 0 otherwise. 
Players added counts the number of active players that were added to the team at the 
beginning of the season. 
 The dependent variables are measured as follows.  
Trainer turnover is a dichotomous variable, with value 1 if the chair replaces a coach after a 
match, and 0 if the chair decides to keep the coach. 
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Offensive shift. Coaches can shift their selection, training and motivation to move towards a 
prospector strategy. An offensive shift towards a prospector strategy is measured by the 
realized increase after 4 weeks in the number of goals scored per match. 
Defensive shift. Coaches can shift their selection, training and motivation to move towards a 
defender strategy. A successful shift towards a defensive strategy is measured by the realized 
decrease after 4 weeks in the number of goals taken per match. 
Efficiency shift. Coaches can shift their selection, training and motivation to move towards 
an analyzer strategy. A successful shift towards efficiency is measured by the decrease of 
difference between goals scored and goals conceded after 4 weeks. 
Some baseline or confounding variables were also considered. They were measured as 
follows. 
Years in premier league since 1956. This variable was included because clubs with more 
experience in the premier league may be able to attract better coaches who are able to make 
strategic shifts. The variable is measured as the number of years in the premier league since 
the onset of the league in 1956, i.e., 0, 1, 2, …., 49. 
Age (club) is sometimes considered as a measure for reputation (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 
1984). Therefore, clubs with a longer age may be able to attract better coaches who are able to 
make strategic shifts. This variable is measured as the date of incorporation minus the start 
date of the league (in years). 
Cooling down. This variable was included because it may be more attractive for chairs of an 
average club to wait and to replace coaches between seasons. This is measured as 1 for the 
last 10 matches, and 0 otherwise. 
Starting up. This variable was included because it may be too early to form an opinion about 
the coach and the coach may not have full grip on the team at the beginning of the season. 
This is measured as 1 for the first 5 matches, and 0 otherwise. 
Change in incentive. This indicator variable was included to reflect the change in the 
incentive for wins versus losses. After 1994 winning lead to bigger gains for the clubs. 
Consequently, performance information may lead to different behavioral reactions. 
Season (linear). This variable was included to control for trends of increasing globalization 
and commercialization of soccer. 
Ranking in league. The ranking measures the current status of the firm. The range of the 
variable is from 1 to 18. A low value means that the team is performing well. This variable is 
only used for the baseline models. 
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Consecutive losses. This is a threat measure that indicates how many matches a team has lost 
in a row. 
Tenure of coach in club. This variable was included because coaches who have just started 
working for a club, have lower odds of being replaced. Coaches with a longer tenure may 
make less strategic shifts and have higher odds of being replaced. The variable is measured as 
the number of weeks a coach is operational in the club. 
Prospector strategy. This variable describes one dimension of the main strategic orientation 
of the club, namely the extent to which attractive soccer is pursued. It may result in path 
dependency and inertia by the coach. It is measured as the average number of goals per 
match. 
Defender strategy. This variable describes another dimension of the main strategic 
orientation of the club, namely the extent to which defensive soccer is pursued. It is measured 
as the average number of goals conceded per game. It may result in path dependency and 
inertia by the coach. 
Analyzer strategy This variable describes yet another dimension of the main strategic 
orientation of the club, namely the extent to which efficiency is pursued. It may result in path 
dependency and inertia by the coach. It is measured as the differences between the goals 
scored and the number of goals conceded in the current season. 
 
5.3.3 Results 
The presentation of the results is divided in three subsections. The first subsection describes 
the baseline models for each strategic decision. The second subsection presents the models 
without consistent performance feedback. The third subsection describes models with 
inconsistent performance feedback. 
 
5.3.3.1 Baseline models 
Table 5.2 contains the Quasi-likelihood Information Criterion (QIC) goodness-of-fit statistic, 
the parameter estimates and the corresponding p-values for the Wald test of the baseline 
models. The first column of Table 5.2 reports the chair’s decision to replace the coach. A very 
similar model has already been presented in Chapter 4. The conclusions remain the same: the 
most important antecedents are the strong cooling-down and starting-up effects, indicating 
that at the beginning and at the end of the season, chairs are unlikely to change coaches. The 
number of consecutive losses is also an important antecedent of trainer turnover. It also seems 
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that replacing coaches within the season has changed since the incentive system rewards more 
offensive strategies.  
The second, third and fourth columns of Table 5.2 describe the decision making 
context for coaches. The results clearly show that shifts towards more offensive, defensive, or 
efficient strategies are largely determined by the current strategic orientation. Table 5.2 
indicates that coaches are not likely to make a more offensive shift when they have followed a 
prospector strategy. Nor are defenders likely to make offensive shifts. Offensive shifts are 
considered by analyzers, although the effect is small. It seems that a defensive shift will be 
increasingly considered by defenders, but it may also be considered by prospectors. 
Efficiency shifts are unlikely to be realized by coaches following a defender strategy, but may 
be considered by a coach with a prospector strategy. Overall, the baseline model suggests that 
defenders seem to be increasingly good at defending, but loose out their attacking abilities. 
And prospectors, on average, seem to be unable to improve their offensive skills. 
 
TABLE 5.2 BASELINE MODELS 
 
Trainer 
Turnover 
Offensive 
Shift 
Defensive 
Shift 
Efficiency 
Shift 
Season (linear) -0.07 (.04) 0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.23) 
Change in the incentive 0.88 (.01) 0.10 (.43) -0.10 (.43) -0.01 (.96) 
Years in premier league 0.02 (.09) 0.02 (.00) 0.02 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 
Age (club) -0.00 (.92) 0.01 (.01) -0.00 (.27) 0.00 (.19) 
Cooling down -1.36 (.00) 0.40 (.00) -0.37 (.01) 0.02 (.93) 
Starting up -1.43 (.00) 0.16 (.31) -0.21 (.15) 0.05 (.85) 
Consecutive losses 0.29 (.00) 0.02 (.58) 0.03 (.52) -0.19 (.00) 
Ranking in league 0.07 (.00) 0.08 (.00) -0.02 (.36) -0.10 (.00) 
Tenure of coach in club -0.01 (.03) 0.00 (.15) 0.00 (.06) 0.00 (.06) 
Analyzer strategy .  0.03 (.00) -0.00 (.53) 0.04 (.00) 
Defender strategy .  -0.67 (.00) 2.45 (.00) -0.82 (.00) 
Prospector strategy .  -2.19 (.00) 0.56 (.00) 1.05 (.00) 
QIC 1047  8395  8395  8395  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
   Number of clusters =288, maximum cluster size =29 
 
5.3.3.2 Clear performance signals 
Table 5.3 adds the main explanatory variables to the baseline models for hypothesis testing. 
Compared to the baseline, the QIC decreases for all models indicating that the goodness-of-fit 
has increased. This means that the inclusion of performance signals and recent changes in the 
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organization aids in explaining the decision making by chairs and coaches in Dutch soccer 
clubs. We will use the results to test whether the reactions of coaches and chairs to new 
information corresponds to any of the three ideal types of organizational behavior. 
To find a TRT organizational response, we formulated four hypotheses that are 
indicative for the top-down response after threats. In Hypothesis 1, we expected that chairs 
would replace coaches quickly after performance has dropped below aspiration. Since none of 
the coefficients for the performance signals in the trainer turnover model are significantly 
positive, there is no support for Hypothesis 1. 
In Hypothesis 2, we argued that incumbent coaches only shift to other strategies 
quickly after performance has dropped below aspiration. There is substantial support for a 
threat-rigid response in terms of strategy shifts. When the ranking is lower than historically 
expected, we find a significant effect positive effect for offensive, defensive and efficiency 
shifts (Table 5.3, Offensive shift, β= 0.16; Defensive shift, β= 0.13; Efficiency shift, β= 0.34). 
There is thus evidence for Hypothesis 2. Also the positive effect of 0.62 after disappointing 
short-term performance indicates that coaches quickly resort to strategy changes. 
Unfortunately, the Wald contrasts could not provide extra statistical evidence that the positive 
slopes are particular for periods of failure. 
In Hypothesis 3, we argued that coaches will increasingly try to implement the current 
strategy better when there is negative performance feedback. We test this hypothesis by 
means of interactions between negative performance feedback and the current strategic 
orientation. Since negative performance feedback should lead to improvements of the current 
strategic orientations, offensive clubs should increasingly institute more offensive shifts. 
Similarly defensive clubs should institute more defensive shifts and analyzer clubs should 
focus more on efficiency. In the offensive shift (TRT) model no interaction between 
performance signals and the analyzer strategy is significant. In the defensive shift (TRT) 
model, one interaction effect with a defender strategy was significant. Since the variable 
Threat of relegation can only take non-positive values, the partial derivative, ∂(defensive 
shift)/ ∂(Defender strategy) = 2.51 -0.3 (Threat of relegation), clearly suggests that clubs 
facing the threat of being relegated increasingly shift to more defensive shifts. There is thus 
support for Hypothesis 3. Finally in the efficiency shift (TRT) model, one interaction effect 
with a an analyzer strategy was significant. There is no support for Hypothesis 3 because the 
partial derivative, ∂(efficiency shift)/ ∂(Analyzer strategy) = 0.04 +0.94 (Threat of relegation), 
suggests that clubs with an analyzer strategy find it increasingly difficult to make more 
efficiency shifts when the performance becomes more threatening. Overall, the support for 
Hypothesis 3 is mixed. 
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Because there are 7 significant interactions between negative performance feedback and the 
current strategic orientation, the interaction models disclose additional information about 
strategic shifts. Especially the 5 interactions that have not been used to test strategy 
implementation reveal more information about the timing of strategic shifts. In the Offensive 
shift (TRT) model, we find a significant interaction effect between the threat of being 
relegated and a Defender strategy. The partial derivative is ∂(Offensive shift)/ ∂(Threat of 
relegation) = 0.46 -0.47 (Defender strategy) suggesting that coaches shift to more offensive 
approaches after threats of relegation unless they have a strong defender strategy. Similarly, 
the partial derivative ∂(Offensive shift)/ ∂(Defender strategy) = -0.61 -0.47 (Threat of 
relegation) suggests that coaches following a defender strategy will not follow offensive shifts 
unless there is a threat of relegation. This is thus extra support for Hypothesis 2. 
Furthermore, there is one very small interaction effect between an Analyzer strategy 
and disappointing short-term performance (Table 5.3, Defensive shift (TRT), β= 0.02). 
Because of small main effects and the interaction effect, we do not attach meaningful 
interpretation to it. The other significant interaction effect in the Defensive shift (TRT) model 
suggests that clubs that have been following a prospector strategy will increasingly shift to 
defensive shifts unless there are strong signs of relegation, because the partial derivative is 
∂(defensive shift)/ ∂(Prospector strategy) = 0.51 +0.58 (Threat of relegation). 
Finally, the two significant interaction effects in the efficiency shift (TRT) model 
deserve attention. The partial derivative, ∂(efficiency shift)/ ∂(Defender strategy) = -0.8 -0.18 
(Long-term performance(-) - 0.71(Threat of relegation), suggests that coaches following a 
defender strategy do not shift to efficiency unless the long-term performance disappoints or 
unless there is a threat of relegation. The result thus suggest that coaches will increasingly 
consider efficiency shifts in times of adversity. There is again evidence of strategic shifts but 
these interaction effects challenge a TRT response of the coach because they show signs of 
continued experimentation by the coach after signs of low performance. 
In Hypothesis 4, we stated that new coaches will focus more on efficiency than on 
offensive and defensive shifts. We find a significant negative effect of -0.75 for within-season 
trainer turnover in the offensive shift model. This result clearly indicates that new coaches 
have more difficulties in achieving offensive shifts. Given the fact that there is no significant 
effect of within-season trainer turnover in the efficiency shift model, we find no support for 
Hypothesis 4. 
 
  
TABLE 5.3 THREAT RIGIDITY IN DUTCH SOCCER CLUBS 
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Offensive 
 Shift 
Offensive 
 Shift  
(TRT) 
Defensive  
Shift 
Defensive 
Shift  
(TRT) 
Efficiency  
Shift 
Efficiency 
Shift 
 (TRT) 
Season (linear) -0.12 (.00) 0.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.02) 
Change in the incentive 1.03 (.01) -0.18 (.26) -0.19 (.24) 0.21 (.23) 0.22 (.22) -0.02 (.96) -0.01 (.98) 
Years in premier league 0.03 (.04) 0.01 (.17) 0.01 (.26) 0.01 (.28) 0.01 (.42) 0.03 (.02) 0.02 (.04) 
Age (club) -0.01 (.04) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.10) -0.00 (.13) -0.00 (.13) 0.00 (.93) 0.00 (.99) 
Cooling down -1.87 (.00) 0.32 (.05) 0.34 (.03) -0.37 (.04) -0.36 (.05) -0.15 (.55) -0.18 (.46) 
Starting up -2.07 (.01) 0.17 (.40) 0.12 (.57) -0.01 (.97) -0.07 (.68) 0.39 (.13) 0.36 (.18) 
Consecutive losses 0.26 (.00) 0.07 (.24) 0.04 (.50) 0.10 (.19) 0.06 (.48) 0.15 (.09) 0.06 (.52) 
Tenure of coach in club -0.00 (.06) 0.00 (.48) 0.00 (.63) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.12) 0.00 (.08) 0.00 (.12) 
Analyzer strategy .  0.03 (.01) 0.03 (.03) -0.02 (.03) -0.01 (.48) 0.03 (.02) 0.04 (.03) 
Defender strategy .  -0.39 (.01) -0.61 (.01) 2.62 (.00) 2.51 (.00) -0.31 (.18) -0.80 (.02) 
Prospector strategy .  -2.44 (.00) -2.29 (.00) 0.54 (.00) 0.51 (.00) 0.82 (.00) 1.09 (.00) 
Top -0.18 (.56) -0.26 (.13) -0.24 (.15) -0.03 (.88) -0.00 (.99) -0.29 (.36) -0.22 (.45) 
Players added 0.03 (.42) -0.02 (.45) -0.01 (.51) -0.06 (.00) -0.06 (.00) -0.07 (.02) -0.07 (.02) 
Trainer turnover .  -0.75 (.03) -0.77 (.03) 0.20 (.63) 0.15 (.72) -0.60 (.22) -0.67 (.17) 
Short-term performance (-) -0.65 (.04) 0.11 (.33) 0.08 (.78) 0.04 (.71) -0.09 (.77) 0.62 (.00) 0.32 (.36) 
Short-term performance (+) -0.36 (.32) -0.07 (.42) -0.05 (.61) -0.03 (.78) 0.01 (.89) 0.12 (.33) 0.20 (.11) 
Long-term performance (-) 0.22 (.08) 0.16 (.00) 0.12 (.12) 0.13 (.00) 0.26 (.01) 0.34 (.00) 0.44 (.00) 
Long-term performance (+) 0.12 (.01) 0.14 (.00) 0.15 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.25 (.00) 0.26 (.00) 
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.90) 0.00 (.98) 0.46 (.05) 0.05 (.63) 0.06 (.84) 0.14 (.28) 0.75 (.05) 
No threat of relegation 0.00 (1.0) 0.05 (.12) 0.04 (.21) 0.11 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 0.30 (.00) 
    
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Offensive 
 Shift 
Offensive 
 Shift  
(TRT) 
Defensive  
Shift 
Defensive 
Shift  
(TRT) 
Efficiency  
Shift 
Efficiency 
Shift 
 (TRT) 
Analyzer strategy *  
Short-term performance (-) 
.  .  0.01 (.17) .  0.02 (.01) .  0.01 (.35) 
Analyzer strategy * Threat of relegation .  .  -0.00 (.69) .  0.00 (.97) .  0.02 (.42) 
Analyzer strategy *  
Long-term performance (-) 
.  .  -0.00 (.94) .  0.00 (.78) .  -0.00 (.81) 
Defender strategy *  
Short-term performance (-) 
.  .  0.06 (.71) .  0.13 (.43) .  -0.11 (.60) 
Defender strategy *  
Threat of relegation 
.  .  -0.47 (.00) .  -0.30 (.05) .  -0.71 (.00) 
Defender strategy *  
Long-term performance (-) 
.  .  -0.08 (.07) .  -0.07 (.16) .  -0.18 (.01) 
Prospector strategy * Short-term performance 
(-) 
.  .  -0.09 (.58) .  -0.12 (.42) .  0.15 (.41) 
Prospector strategy*Threat of relegation .  .  0.35 (.09) .  0.58 (.00) .  0.94 (.00) 
Prospector strategy * 
 Long-term performance (-) 
.  .  0.08 (.06) .  -0.02 (.62) .  0.08 (.16) 
Wald tests of contrasts (success ≠ failure)               
Short-term performance -0.29 (.63) 0.18 (.31) .  0.07 (.72) .  0.50 (.04) .  
Long-term performance 0.10 (.48) 0.01 (.81) .  0.03 (.52) .  0.09 (.18) .  
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.91) -0.05 (.61) .  -0.06 (.56) .  -0.19 (.18) .  
QIC 668.7  5827  5843  5827  5846  5854  5874  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)   
 Number of clusters =288, maximum cluster size =29 
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Overall, the regression analyses failed to produce a consistent picture of a threat-rigid 
response to negative performance feedback. Although there are clear signs of shifts after first 
signs of threats by coaches, there is substantial deviation from the ideal type of TRT. There is 
no evidence that chairs will quickly turnover coaches. Nor is there evidence of sustained 
efforts to improve the efficiency of clubs after trainer turnover. Finally, in the face of 
relegation, coaches are persistently trying out different strategic actions. These shifts are 
observable at the start of the threat but also long thereafter. 
When we turn to the typical response of ABTF, we at least need to find support for 
that satisfying principle in Hypotheses 5 an 6. First, we need to find out that akin to 
Hypothesis 5, chairs will not replace coaches as long as there is positive performance 
feedback. In the trainer turnover model there is no evidence for Hypothesis 5, because none of 
the coefficients in the models in Table 5.4 are negative and significantly different from zero 
when performance is good. As postulated in Hypothesis 6, we also need to find that coaches 
will not adopt other strategies as long as there is positive performance feedback. There is 
again no evidence in Table 5.4 of satisfaction by the coach, since none of the coefficients is 
negative and significantly different from zero when performance is good.  
ABTF furthermore assumes that problemistic search will lead to risk-taking by some 
of the decision makers. As discussed in Chapter 4, we find that coaches resort to problemistic 
search after disappointing short-term performance (Table 5.4, Trainer turnover, β = -0.65). In 
the other models of Table 5.4, there is no evidence that coaches resort to problemistic search 
as well. Because ABTF is open-ended, this result does not necessarily go against the theory. 
To get more fine-grained insights, we test in Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 whether 
problemistic search leads faster to risk-taking in clubs with new chairs and in clubs that have 
invested a lot in new players. In Hypothesis 7, we focus on strategic shifts by the coach. Since 
the interactions between disappointing performance and the number of players added and the 
interactions between disappointing performance and changes at the top were not significant, 
we conclude that the propensity to experiment by coaches does not depend on earlier 
commitments. Nor do we find support for Hypothesis 8, where we argue that chairs of clubs 
that have invested substantially in new players, will be more determined to replace coaches 
when performance is disappointing, than chairs of clubs where no such investments took 
place. Again none of the interactions is significant in the Trainer turnover (ABTF) model.  
Overall, the regression analyses failed to produce a consistent picture of ABTF to 
positive performance feedback. Neither in the models for trainer turnover, nor in the models 
of playing tactics do we find clear signs of satisfaction. This is strong evidence against a 
    
TABLE 5.4 SATISFICING BEHAVIOR IN DUTCH SOCCER CLUBS 
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Trainer 
turnover 
(ABTF) 
Offensive 
Shift 
Offensive 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Defensive 
Shift 
Defensive 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Efficiency 
Shift 
Efficiency 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Season (linear) -0.12 (.00) -0.12 (.00) 0.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) 
Change in the incentive 1.03 (.01) 1.04 (.01) -0.18 (.26) -0.20 (.22) 0.21 (.23) 0.23 (.20) -0.02 (.96) -0.01 (.97) 
Years in premier league 0.03 (.04) 0.02 (.07) 0.01 (.17) 0.01 (.15) 0.01 (.28) 0.01 (.28) 0.03 (.02) 0.03 (.01) 
Age (club) -0.01 (.04) -0.01 (.04) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.16) -0.00 (.13) -0.00 (.16) 0.00 (.93) 0.00 (.97) 
Cooling down -1.87 (.00) -1.65 (.00) 0.32 (.05) 0.31 (.05) -0.37 (.04) -0.36 (.04) -0.15 (.55) -0.15 (.55) 
Starting up -2.07 (.01) -2.31 (.00) 0.17 (.40) 0.18 (.36) -0.01 (.97) -0.02 (.91) 0.39 (.13) 0.39 (.13) 
Consecutive losses 0.26 (.00) 0.27 (.00) 0.07 (.24) 0.07 (.24) 0.10 (.19) 0.10 (.18) 0.15 (.09) 0.16 (.08) 
Tenure of coach in club -0.00 (.06) -0.00 (.05) 0.00 (.48) 0.00 (.39) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.12) 0.00 (.08) 0.00 (.08) 
Analyzer strategy .  .  0.03 (.01) 0.03 (.01) -0.02 (.03) -0.02 (.02) 0.03 (.02) 0.03 (.02) 
Defender strategy .  .  -0.39 (.01) -0.40 (.01) 2.62 (.00) 2.63 (.00) -0.31 (.18) -0.31 (.18) 
Prospector strategy .  .  -2.44 (.00) -2.43 (.00) 0.54 (.00) 0.53 (.00) 0.82 (.00) 0.81 (.00) 
Top -0.18 (.56) -0.20 (.53) -0.26 (.13) -0.23 (.32) -0.03 (.88) -0.10 (.72) -0.29 (.36) -0.35 (.41) 
Players added 0.03 (.42) 0.06 (.39) -0.02 (.45) 0.01 (.75) -0.06 (.00) -0.08 (.00) -0.07 (.02) -0.07 (.10) 
Trainer turnover .  .  -0.75 (.03) -0.76 (.03) 0.20 (.63) 0.19 (.64) -0.60 (.22) -0.61 (.21) 
Short-term performance (-) -0.65 (.04) -0.82 (.19) 0.11 (.33) 0.01 (.96) 0.04 (.71) 0.09 (.65) 0.62 (.00) 0.53 (.08) 
Short-term performance (+) -0.36 (.32) -0.36 (.32) -0.07 (.42) -0.07 (.43) -0.03 (.78) -0.03 (.77) 0.12 (.33) 0.12 (.32) 
Long-term performance (-) 0.22 (.08) 0.26 (.48) 0.16 (.00) 0.05 (.48) 0.13 (.00) 0.22 (.02) 0.34 (.00) 0.38 (.00) 
Long-term performance (+) 0.12 (.01) 0.11 (.00) 0.14 (.00) 0.14 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.25 (.00) 0.25 (.00) 
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.90) -0.38 (.37) 0.00 (.98) 0.13 (.63) 0.05 (.63) -0.01 (.97) 0.14 (.28) 0.20 (.58) 
No threat of relegation 0.00 (1.0) -0.01 (.86) 0.05 (.12) 0.05 (.11) 0.11 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 
Top * Short-term performance (-) .  .  .  -0.23 (.17) .  -0.11 (.51) .  -0.28 (.17) 
Top * Threat of relegation .  .  .  -0.03 (.86) .  0.12 (.57) .  0.04 (.87) 
  
 
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Trainer 
turnover 
(ABTF) 
Offensive 
Shift 
Offensive 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Defensive 
Shift 
Defensive 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Efficiency 
Shift 
Efficiency 
Shift 
(ABTF) 
Top * Long-term performance (-) .  .  .  0.14 (.12) .  -0.03 (.72) .  0.09 (.46) 
Players added * Short-term performance (-) .  0.02 (.73) .  0.01 (.50) .  -0.00 (.81) .  0.01 (.61) 
Players added * Threat of relegation .  0.04 (.35) .  -0.01 (.67) .  0.00 (.92) .  -0.01 (.87) 
Players added * Long-term performance (-) .  -0.00 (.91) .  0.01 (.17) .  -0.01 (.33) .  -0.01 (.61) 
Wald tests of contrasts (success ≠ failure)                 
Short-term performance -0.29 (.63) .  0.18 (.31) .  0.07 (.72) .  0.50 (.04) .  
Long-term performance 0.10 (.48) .  0.01 (.81) .  0.03 (.52) .  0.09 (.18) .  
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.91) .  -0.05 (.61) .  -0.06 (.56) .  -0.19 (.18) .  
QIC 668.7  673.2  5827  5835  5827  5841  5854  5866  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
   Number of clusters =288, maximum cluster size =29 
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typical ABTF response. However, because there is evidence of problemistic search after 
disappointing short-term performance, chairs may respond in bounded rational ways. 
In Hypothesis 9 and 10 we test for low coordination between the chair and the coach 
by polarizing the degree of risk-taking between coaches and chairs. We thus assume that 
always one decision maker would like to take risk, while the other declines to take risk. In 
particular, we argue in Hypothesis 9 that only chairs will respond to disappointing 
performance by replacing the coach. We already know from Table 5.4 that the odds of a 
within-season trainer turnover are increasingly higher when there is disappointing short-term 
performance. We also find that coaches do respond to performance feedback by turning to 
efficiency shifts (Table 5.4, Trainer turnover Efficiency Shift, β = 0.62). Also the Wald test 
that test for differences between success and failure indicate, that coaches resort to efficiency 
shifts after disappointing short-term performance (Table 5.4, Efficiency Shift, β = 0.5). There 
is thus no support for Hypothesis 9. 
In the same manner we stated that only coaches respond to signs of success by making 
strategic shifts. In Table 5.4 we find quite systematically that coaches make tactical shifts 
after positive performance feedback (Table 5.4, Offensive Shift, β = 0.14; Table 5.4, 
Defensive Shift, β = 0.1 and β = 0.11; Table 5.4, Efficiency Shift, β = 0.25 and β = 0.33). The 
Wald tests show that these effects do not reflect sudden intensifications after feelings of 
success or failure. Because the contrasts between the effects of negative and positive 
performance feedback are not statistically different from each other, the Wald statistics 
indicate instead that coaches are more likely to implement strategic changes in a stepwise 
manner, as performance feedback gets better. Confidence thus creeps in only gradually. Once 
they have found a good modus operandi for coaching their teams, coaches keep on finding 
ways to gradually sharpen the skills of the team. This result would corroborate Hypothesis 10 
where managers are increasingly feeling confident that they are able to successfully 
implement new initiatives, if chairs would show signs of satisfaction. However, we find that 
clubs with a ranking that is better than the previous years have significant higher odds of 
replacing the coach (Table 5.4, Trainer turnover, β = 0,12). Since there is no evidence that the 
satisfaction of the chairs is affected by feedback from long-term performance, there is no 
support for Hypothesis 10. 
The lack of support for Hypotheses 9 and 10 is intriguing. It suggest that the actions of 
coaches and chairs are somehow coordinated. Coaches and chairs respond to the same signs 
of success and failure. Yet, we also know that there is no systematic support for either the 
TRT hypotheses or the ABTF hypotheses. Our results are in line with earlier empirical studies 
on performance appraisal (e.g., Ketchen & Palmer, 1999; Lant & Hurley, 1999), which 
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suggest that organizational behavior after performance feedback can reveal streaks of TRT 
and ABTF, rather than one uniform pattern. Our study has clearly indicated that during soccer 
seasons, chairs respond to problemistic search, akin to ABTF. Coaches, however, show signs 
of TRT. There is also evidence for managerial risk-taking as described in the VRPM, because 
successful long term performance will lead to contained, gradual shifts in tactical strategies. It 
are however only streaks because our analysis shows that the chairs are not satisfied and that 
coaches do not resort to better strategy implementation. 
 
5.3.3.3 Inconsistent performance feedback 
In this section, we assume that chairs and coaches make use of inconsistent performance 
feedback. Like Baum et al. (2005) and Audia and Brion (2007), we measured inconsistent 
performance feedback by means of interactions between short-term and long-term 
performance signals. 
In Hypothesis 11, we state that chairs will postpone within-season trainer turnover when 
there is inconsistent performance feedback. Since there is no significant effect of inconsistent 
performance feedback on trainer turnover in Table 5.5, there is no support for Hypothesis 11. 
In Hypothesis 12, we state that coaches will be making strategic shifts when there is 
inconsistent performance feedback. There are two significant effects of inconsistent 
performance feedback in the Defensive shift (inconsistent) model in Table 5.5. The first 
partial derivative, ∂(Defensive shift)/ ∂(Long-term performance(-)) = 0.11 + 0.05 (Short-term 
performance(+)), suggests that shifts to defensive approaches after disappointing long-term 
performance are instituted more often when the most resent match result is good. There is 
thus support for Hypothesis 12. The second partial derivative, ∂(Defensive shift)/ ∂(Long-
term performance(+)) = 0.06 - 0.06 (Short-term performance(-)), suggests that shifts to more 
defensive approaches when clubs have a good ranking occur more often when the last match 
result was disappointing. Again his result supports Hypothesis 12. In case of inconsistent 
performance feedback, coaches use positive signals to institute defensive shifts. 
 
5.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we applied the recommendations from Chapter 2 to tie piecewise linear models 
closer to a larger group of organizational learning theories. Three recommendations were 
followed. First, we made the distinction between strategic shifts and strategy implementation. 
Second, we selected specific conditions of organizational performance to better asses the fit 
    
TABLE 5.5 INCONSISTENT PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Trainer 
turnover 
(inconsistent) 
Offensive  
Shift 
Offensive 
 Shift  
(inconsistent) 
Defensive 
 Shift 
Defensive 
Shift 
(inconsistent) 
Efficiency 
 Shift 
Efficiency 
 Shift 
(inconsistent) 
Season (linear) -0.12 (.00) -0.12 (.00) 0.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) 
Change in the incentive 1.03 (.01) 1.03 (.01) -0.18 (.26) -0.18 (.27) 0.21 (.23) 0.22 (.22) -0.02 (.96) -0.01 (.98) 
Years in premier league 0.03 (.04) 0.02 (.05) 0.01 (.17) 0.01 (.17) 0.01 (.28) 0.01 (.29) 0.03 (.02) 0.03 (.02) 
Age (club) -0.01 (.04) -0.01 (.04) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.10) -0.00 (.13) -0.00 (.13) 0.00 (.93) 0.00 (.93) 
Cooling down -1.87 (.00) -1.63 (.00) 0.32 (.05) 0.31 (.05) -0.37 (.04) -0.37 (.04) -0.15 (.55) -0.16 (.53) 
Starting up -2.07 (.01) -2.29 (.00) 0.17 (.40) 0.17 (.38) -0.01 (.97) -0.02 (.91) 0.39 (.13) 0.40 (.12) 
Consecutive losses 0.26 (.00) 0.26 (.00) 0.07 (.24) 0.08 (.19) 0.10 (.19) 0.09 (.25) 0.15 (.09) 0.17 (.07) 
Tenure of coach in club -0.00 (.06) -0.01 (.05) 0.00 (.48) 0.00 (.49) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.10) 0.00 (.08) 0.00 (.09) 
Analyzer strategy .  .  0.03 (.01) 0.03 (.01) -0.02 (.03) -0.02 (.02) 0.03 (.02) 0.03 (.02) 
Defender strategy .  .  -0.39 (.01) -0.39 (.01) 2.62 (.00) 2.63 (.00) -0.31 (.18) -0.31 (.17) 
Prospector strategy .  .  -2.44 (.00) -2.43 (.00) 0.54 (.00) 0.53 (.00) 0.82 (.00) 0.82 (.00) 
Top -0.18 (.56) -0.18 (.56) -0.26 (.13) -0.26 (.13) -0.03 (.88) -0.03 (.88) -0.29 (.36) -0.28 (.36) 
Players added 0.03 (.42) 0.03 (.45) -0.02 (.45) -0.02 (.45) -0.06 (.00) -0.06 (.00) -0.07 (.02) -0.07 (.02) 
Trainer turnover .  .  -0.75 (.03) -0.73 (.04) 0.20 (.63) 0.18 (.66) -0.60 (.22) -0.58 (.24) 
Short-term performance (-) -0.65 (.04) -0.57 (.10) 0.11 (.33) 0.08 (.49) 0.04 (.71) 0.14 (.24) 0.62 (.00) 0.63 (.00) 
Short-term performance (+) -0.36 (.32) -0.48 (.23) -0.07 (.42) -0.06 (.53) -0.03 (.78) 0.05 (.64) 0.12 (.33) 0.19 (.17) 
Long-term performance (-) 0.22 (.08) 0.26 (.06) 0.16 (.00) 0.15 (.00) 0.13 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.34 (.00) 0.31 (.00) 
Long-term performance (+) 0.12 (.01) 0.08 (.38) 0.14 (.00) 0.16 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.06 (.09) 0.25 (.00) 0.26 (.00) 
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.90) -0.01 (.96) 0.00 (.98) -0.00 (.98) 0.05 (.63) 0.05 (.60) 0.14 (.28) 0.13 (.30) 
No threat of relegation 0.00 (1.0) -0.01 (.85) 0.05 (.12) 0.05 (.11) 0.11 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 0.33 (.00) 
  
 
 
Trainer 
turnover 
Trainer 
turnover 
(inconsistent) 
Offensive  
Shift 
Offensive 
 Shift  
(inconsistent) 
Defensive 
 Shift 
Defensive 
Shift 
(inconsistent) 
Efficiency 
 Shift 
Efficiency 
 Shift 
(inconsistent) 
Short-term performance (-) *  
Long-term performance (+) 
.  -0.03 (.66) .  0.02 (.41) .  -0.06 (.01) .  0.01 (.74) 
Short-term performance (+) * 
Long-term performance (-) 
.  -0.13 (.43) .  0.01 (.76) .  0.05 (.07) .  0.05 (.12) 
Wald tests of contrasts (success ≠ failure)                 
Short-term performance -0.29 (.63) .  0.18 (.31) .  0.07 (.72) .  0.50 (.04) .  
Long-term performance 0.10 (.48) .  0.01 (.81) .  0.03 (.52) .  0.09 (.18) .  
Threat of relegation -0.02 (.91) .  -0.05 (.61) .  -0.06 (.56) .  -0.19 (.18) .  
QIC 668.7  671.4  5827  5829  5827  5829  5854  5855  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
   Number of clusters =288, maximum cluster size =29 
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TABLE 5.6 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
 Chair Coach 
 
 
 
TRT 
 
 
 
H1. Quick trainer turnover 
No support 
H2. Quick strategic shifts 
Support 
 
H3. Persistent strategy 
implementation 
Support for defenders facing relegation 
No support for analyzers facing 
relegation 
 
H4. New coach focuses on efficiency. 
No support 
 
 
 
 
ABTF 
H5. Chairs satisfy. 
No support 
 
H7. Risk-taking after problemistic 
search depends on earlier changes in 
the club. 
No support  
There is general evidence of trainer 
turnover after problemistic search. 
 
H6. Coaches satisfy. 
No support 
 
H8. Risk-taking after problemistic 
search depends on earlier changes in 
the club. 
No support  
 
Low 
coordination 
H9. The chair takes risk when the 
coach does not take risk. 
No support 
 
H10. The coach takes risk when the 
chair does not take risk. 
No support 
Inconsistent 
Performance 
Feedback 
H11. The chair makes use of 
inconsistent feedback. 
No support 
H12. The coach makes use of 
inconsistent feedback. 
Support 
 
between the data and the theory. Third, we combined the responses of one organizational 
agent with the responses of the other agent in the organization. 
Table 5.6 summarizes our main results. It shows that it has become difficult to use only 
one theory for describing organizational behavior and change in soccer clubs. We rather 
found that chairs behave more in a problemistic way and coaches more in an opportunistic 
way. In addition we could not rule out that their actions are uncoordinated. Although the 
organizational behavior of clubs does not fit in perfectly with either ABTF, TRT or the 
VRPM, most actions make sense from an organizational point of view. Although the positive 
performance effects of trainer turnover are debated by academic scholars, it makes sense from 
a behavioral point of view to fire coaches after disappointing short-term performance. In the 
same vein, it makes sense that coaches shift to more efficient strategies after disappointing 
short-term performance. 
Given that there is some coordination between coaches and chairs, we are puzzled by 
the low fit between the data and the organizational learning theories. It may be that the soccer 
setting needs an alternative theoretical explanation. It is however also possible that we need 
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another kind of data to test the hypotheses of this chapter. One problem with our data is that it 
only captures scenario’s where coaches and chairs are able to align their actions. It may be 
that the coordination between coach and chair has failed. Suppose for instance that chairs 
have replaced the old coach and have given the new coach a clear mandate to implement the 
strategy better. When the coach fails to implement this strategy, a TRT response might have 
been present but unobservable from the data we collected. Since we only measured realized 
strategies and realized strategic shifts, it was difficult to rule this explanation out. 
Our results thus suggests that collecting data about intended changes and its 
implementation problems is an interesting area for further research. We can highlight that 
implementation problems may exist in soccer teams by means of the existing data. Table 5.3 
clearly indicates that with many new players in the team, it is more difficult to obtain 
efficiency shifts and defensive moves (Table 5.3, Defensive shift, β = -0.06; Table 5.3 
Efficiency shift, β = -0.07) Although the effects are small, the results indicate that coaches 
need time to build well-oiled teams that do not make a lot of costly mistakes. It seems that for 
clubs to improve their organizational strategy, it is good to have relative stable clubs. This 
result is in line with Grund and Gürtler (2005) who showed that coaches dislike changing the 
line-up of teams. 
There is thus reason from within the soccer setting to expand this analysis to intended 
but unrealized strategic shifts. This analysis will does not immediately alter our preference for 
organizational learning theories. After all ABTF assumes that imperfect solutions can be 
implemented. This means that a solution at one time, may constitute a problem in the period 
thereafter. Similarly, a threat-rigid response is based on an escalated belief in the current 
strategy. A threat-rigid response has the advantage that the organization acts swiftly when it 
faces threats, but the threat-rigid response may not be based on solid ground. Biases may 
make the implementation of the rigid response impossible. Then unrealized strategies, instead 
of unwillingness to coordinate action, may be the reason why the behavioral coordination 
between coaches and chairs breaks down. Thus, regardless whether it is due to unwillingness 
of incapacity, the results presented in this chapter show that soccer clubs do not coordinate 
responses. We argue that this lack of coordination endorses the main viewpoint of this study, 
namely that one change intervention does not automatically spill over to other change 
interventions.
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Chapter 6 
The transfer period as pacer for between-season changes 
 
Chapter 5 has focused on the interplay of coaches and chairs during the soccer season. It is a 
period when coaches, players and chairs unite to achieve the best possible organizational 
performance. This chapter will concentrate on the decision making of coaches, players, and 
chairs between seasons. A key difference with the within-season situation is that 
organizational goals have less potential between seasons to align the behavior of coaches, 
players, and chairs. One obvious reason is that coaches and players may be attracted to other 
clubs during the transfer period. Given that there is much more room for goal conflict, it is 
unclear if clubs are able to coordinate player transfers with between-season trainer turnover 
decisions. Because the academic sports literature has paid little attention to the relationship 
between player transfers and trainer turnover, we will look in this chapter at the interplay of 
between-season changes. 
To do this, we will use the entrainment perspective because it allows us to link the 
timing of internal organizational changes to regularly occurring external events (Ancona & 
Chong, 1996: 263-265). The underlying assumption of entrainment theory is that the timing 
of each organizational activity is set by means of pacers (Ancona & Chong, 1996; McGrath & 
Rotchford, 1983). Pacers are recurring events that determine when organizations are receptive 
to an activity and when they are not. An example of a pacer helps making the idea concrete. 
In entrainment theory, the transfer period is considered a pacer because it determines the 
periods of the year during which players can and cannot be transferred. Ancona and Chong 
(1996: 252) define entrainment as “the adjustment of the pace or cycle of an activity to match 
or synchronize with that of another activity.” While there are various sorts of entrainment 
(see Ancona & Chong, 1996: 258-259, for a classification), we will restrict ourselves to the 
possibilities of synchronic and a-synchronic entrainment. Synchronic entrainment implies that 
two activities systematically occur at the same time, whereas a-synchronic entrainment 
implies that when one activity occurs the other does not and vice versa. Synchronic 
entrainment may occur in successful soccer clubs because the club tries to keep their players 
and coaches together. Synchronic entrainment may also occur in unsuccessful clubs. Then 
there should be a lot of buying and selling activity of players and coaches because the transfer 
period is the ideal time to make a clean sweep. A-synchronic entrainment occurs in clubs that 
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have replaced the coach within the season and transferred a lot of players and stuck to the 
coach between seasons. 
The adjustment of an activity to a pacer that is not its own does not happen 
automatically. This adjustment in organizations requires human energy. Somebody must be 
willing to link an activity to the pacer of another activity (Farmer & Seers, 2004). 
Entrainment may be inspired by the benefits that coordination of activities in time brings 
along (e.g., Ancona & Chong, 1996; Standifer & Bluedorn, 2006). The benefits of 
coordination result in a better planning of organizational activity. A-synchronically entrained 
cycles level off peaks in organizational activity and synchronically entrained cycles result in 
periods in which organizations show high levels of activity and periods in which there is little 
activity. Entrainment has therefore an effect on the activity level and hence on the scale of 
change. In the next section we will argue that entrainment theory fundamentally reshapes the 
relationship between the tempo and scale of organizational change. 
 
6.1 Temporal theories of organizational change 
When theories concentrate on the tempo of change, it is common to make the distinction 
between discontinuous change and continuous change (e.g., Amis et al., 2004; Weick & 
Quinn, 1999). This polarization may give the impression that there is nothing in between 
these two poles. Entrainment theory however assumes a tempo of change that is between 
continuous and discontinuous change. The tempo of entrainment theory is cyclical. This 
means that activities and change do not occur continuously but only when the pacer allows 
them to. Nor is a cyclical tempo purely discontinuous because organizations know that there 
is steady repetition over time. 
We argue that the impact of a cyclical tempo of change on the scale of change is 
different from the impact of continuous and discontinuous tempos of change. We speculate 
that extreme levels of tempo of change correspond to large-scale radical change, but cyclical 
change does not. Chapter 1 shows that theories of discontinuous change state that large-scale 
change is a necessary condition for a successful implementation of a reorientation. Also 
theories of continuous change assume that the motors of change keep on running and that the 
organizations drift. We think that entrainment lowers the maximum possible scale of change. 
We therefore rely on Ancona and Chong (1996: 266-267) who note that change becomes a 
regular part of organizational life under entrained conditions. This means that organizations 
anticipate that there will be possibilities of change in the future. Consequently, when there is a 
trigger for change but the pacer indicates that the time is not ripe for change, organizations 
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will not respond to the trigger under entrained conditions. Organizations rather take the time 
to prepare themselves for the change that lies ahead of them. This prevents organizations and 
their members to respond in uncontrolled ways to triggers like emerging information or recent 
changes. Consequently, pacing of activities only leads to calculated and modest responses. 
This period of deliberation therefore marks a fundamental difference compared to the 
continuous perspective of change. In the latter perspective, change entails a quick adaptation 
to new situations. Therefore change interventions interact, cumulate and amplify into large-
scale change (e.g., Weick & Quinn, 1999). 
 
FIGURE 6.1 SCALE AND TEMPO OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE  
 
 
Figure 6.1 visualizes the U-shaped relationship between the tempo and the scale of 
organizational change. The bar on the left side of Figure 6.1 indicates that continuous change 
can lead to small-scale change or to large-scale change. The latter occurs when small steps 
cumulate and amplify into radical change. The bar on the right side shows that discontinuous 
change is intended to be large-scale, but it can be scaled back once the implementation is 
considered too difficult and the organizational inertia takes over (e.g., Amis et al., 2004). 
 
6.2 Entrainment in soccer clubs 
In this chapter, we will investigate whether soccer clubs pursue entrainment. In soccer clubs, 
the activity cycles are set by the umbrella organizations, like the KNVB and the UEFA. These 
institutions determine each year which clubs play in which tournaments. They additionally 
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stipulate that players can not change at any arbitrary point of time but that transfers are 
restricted to fixed transfer periods. These two cycles thus determine the tempo of the main 
recurring organizational activities in clubs. During the season, clubs play their matches with 
the same pool of players. Between seasons, the situation is reversed. Then clubs hardly play 
matches and concentrate on the transfer of players. Soccer clubs conform to these strong 
institutional cyclical pressures. 
There is no entrainment when trainer turnovers happen with no relation to the transfer 
period. Then the decision to turnover a coach follows its own pacer: it can be performance 
feedback, quarrels with the chair, career opportunities or something else. 
We expect that the ban on player transfer spills over to trainer turnover for two 
reasons. First, the descriptive statistics in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have shown that many 
trainer turnovers occur between-season. Because we see entrainment as an organizational 
phenomenon and the descriptive statistics pool the data onto the institutional level, these 
statistics do not provide strong evidence for synchronic entrainment. However, the descriptive 
statistics indicate that entrainment may occur in soccer clubs. Second, Carmichael et al. 
(1999) have shown that trainer turnover influences the odds of individual players to be 
transferred. Since Carmichael et al. (1999: 137) treated between- and within-season trainer 
turnover as one, their result does not show that the decision are actually synchronized in time. 
Still, the results of their study point towards entrainment. 
We therefore try to find out whether there is synchronic or a-synchronic entrainment 
in the soccer clubs. Synchronic entrainment makes sense from a club’s point of view. Clubs 
may want to hold off trainer turnover until the transfer period is due because clubs then have 
more options to chose from between seasons, because they can avoid the penalties of 
breaching the contract when they replace coaches during the season, or because they can 
achieve a better fit between the players pool and the coaches. We see two possibilities for 
synchronic entrainment in soccer clubs. First, clubs may look for a new between-season coach 
in order to secure that the investments in new player talent pay off. Therefore, when clubs 
invest a lot in new players, they may be willing to look for a coach that best fits the profile as 
well. Second, it is possible that new coaches demand new players to be bought before they 
commit themselves to the club. The two situations are different because coaches will be 
unable to influence the complete transfer policy of a club, but they may demand that certain 
players are added to the team. As indicated in Chapter 3, coaches take sportive responsibility, 
they do not have to take financial responsibility to make large investments. As such, coaches 
will be unable to decide upon many of the transfers, but possibly have a voice in some 
transfers. In both cases of synchronic entrainment, we expect that 
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Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between player transfer and between-
season trainer turnover. 
For a-synchronic entrainment we need to find that when clubs are transferring players, they 
are not replacing coaches. Therefore, a first condition for a-synchronic entrainment is that a 
within-season trainer turnover leads to a lot of between-season player transfers. A within-
season trainer turnover then signals that the organization is preparing itself for more changes 
in the players pool between seasons. The second condition is that there is no between-season 
trainer turnover after a within-season trainer turnover. When a within-season trainer turnover 
leads to between-season trainer turnover and a lot of player transfers, the transfer period does 
no longer serve as a pacer for trainer turnover. For a-synchronic entrainment, we expect that 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between within-season trainer turnover and 
player transfer is less positive when there is a between-season trainer turnover. 
In both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we assume that entrainment is a temporal 
manifestation of the club’s attempt to revitalize the organization. We however know that 
organizational performance, especially when it is defined in terms of promotion or relegation 
of a team, has an effect on the probability of players being transferred (e.g., Carmichael et al., 
1999: 137) and perhaps on trainer turnovers as well. As such, we think that entrainment 
becomes more visible under certain conditions. It is possible that certain performance signals 
are needed to synchronize trainer turnover and player transfers. Empirical studies of 
reorientations suggest that low performance may lead to increased activity to implement 
strategy better instead of triggering large-scale change (Gordon et al., 2000; Lant, Milliken & 
Batra, 1992). That is, between-season performance feedback may be an important moderator. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 3. Low performance of the club strengthens the positive relationship 
between player transfers and trainer turnover. 
It is however also possible that extremely good performance increases entrainment. When 
there are signs of success, managerial efforts, such as upgrading contracts or boosting transfer 
prices, may be needed to keep the team together. Because clubs will not be able to counter 
entrainment after success, we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 4. High performance of the club strengthens the positive relationship 
between the player transfers and trainer turnover. 
Another contingency that we consider is a change at the top. Recently appointed chairs may 
have few problems to reverse commitments from the past, because they have not brought in 
the players and the coach. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between player 
transfer, between-season changes and changes at the top. 
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Hypothesis 5. Recent changes at the top make the positive relationship between player 
transfers and between-season trainer turnover stronger. 
 
6.3 Data and measures 
Information on all active players that played at least one game during a season in the period 
1990/1 to 2005/6 was downloaded from the soccer fan websites www.footballsquads.co.uk, 
home.wanadoo.nl/ronald.zwiers, and www.vi.nl. As explained in Chapter 3, we discarded all 
non-active players because consistency checks showed that the reliability of the databases was 
poor for non-active players. After some data cleaning (see Chapter 3), we retained two 
different samples. The first sample contains the names of the active players of the clubs in the 
Dutch premier league from 1991/2 until 2005/6. The second sample contains the names, the 
playing records and date of birth for the active players from 2001/2 till 2005/6. By means of 
comparing adjacent seasons, we were able to construct the following measures for player 
transfers: 
Addition (player) is a dichotomous variable with value 1 if the club has added the player to 
the team between seasons, 0 if he was already active. 
Attrition (player) is a dichotomous variable with value 1 if the player has left between 
seasons, 0 if he is still active. 
Additions (counts) is a count variable indicating how many active players were added to the 
team between seasons. 
Attrition (counts) is a count variable indicating how many active players were dropped from 
the team between seasons. 
These measures only approximate player transfers because they reflect decisions of coaches to 
line up players, of chairs to add players to the team, as well as other influences like severe 
injuries or retirements. 
Information on coaches and chairs in the period 1990/1 until 2005/6 was downloaded 
from the soccer fan websites home.wanadoo.nl/ronald.zwiers and www.voetbalnederland.nl. 
Based on the last date of heading a team, we made the distinction between a within- and a 
between-season trainer turnover. For changes at the top, we copied the data from the Ronald 
Zwiers website. The measures for trainer turnover and changes at the top are: 
Top(B) is a dichotomous variable measure with value 1 if there was a change in the chair of 
the board between seasons and 0 otherwise. 
Top(W) is a dichotomous variable measure with value 1 if there was a change in the chair of 
the board in the season that just had ended and 0 otherwise. 
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Coach(B) is a dichotomous variable measure with value 1 if there was a between-season 
trainer turnover and 0 otherwise. 
Coach(W) is a dichotomous variable measure with value 1 if there was a within-season 
trainer turnover in the season that just has ended and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, information on the organizational performance of the clubs was collected from 
www.koningvoetbal.nl, home.wanadoo.nl/ronald.zwiers, www.soccerway.com, and 
www.voetbalstats.nl. From the match scores in different tournaments (the national league, the 
national cup and the European cups) we calculated various measures of organizational 
performance (for details see Chapter 3). We only retained performance signals that lowered 
the Quasi-likelihood under the independence Criterion, commonly abbreviated as QICu, which 
is the goodness-of-fit criterion for Generalized Estimating Equations [GEE] (Pan, 2001). The 
following measures were retained as explanatory variable in at least one of the analysis: 
No Ticket (premier) measures how many places the club missed in the ranking to be playing 
in the premier league next year. This signal compares the final ranking of the club with the 
minimum ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s premier league. It can only take on 
negative values. 
Ticket (premier) measures how many places the club had extra in the ranking before 
relegation would have occurred. This signal compares the final ranking of the club with the 
minimum ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s premier league. It can only take on 
positive values. 
No Ticket (UEFA) measures how many places the club missed in the ranking to start in the 
qualifying rounds of the UEFA league next year. It can only take on negative values.  
Ticket (UEFA) measures how many places the club had extra in the final ranking before it 
would miss out the qualifying rounds of the UEFA league. This signal compares the final 
ranking of the club with the minimum ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s premier 
league. It can only take on positive values. 
No Ticket (CL) measures how many places the club missed in the ranking to start in the 
qualifying rounds of the Champions League (CL) league next year. It can only take on 
negative values. 
Ticket (CL) measures how many places the club had extra in the final ranking before it 
would miss out the qualifying rounds of the CL league. This signal compares the final ranking 
of the club with the minimum ranking that is necessary to attain next year’s premier league. It 
can only take on positive values. 
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The websites also contain information to construct baseline variables. We copied the 
important explanatory variables included in the study of Carmichael et al. (1999). This study 
only examined a single season. We therefore also considered the possibility of temporal shifts 
and trends. The variables were selected by means of data-driven forward variable selection 
methods. This method was chosen so that only truly relevant confounding baseline variables 
would be retained. The baseline variables that were retained are the following: 
Bosman court ruling. This indicator variable was included to reflect the impact of the 
Bosman court ruling. This court ruling of 1995 led to the free movement of soccer players 
between clubs within and between EU countries, with no fee payable when players' contracts 
have expired. Prior to the Bosman case, soccer clubs had considerable control over their 
players. Players could not move freely between employers as and when they liked. It is 
expected that from 1995 onwards transfer has become more popular. The variable is 0 if the 
season starts before 1994, and 1 otherwise. 
Season (linear). This variable was included to control for trends of increasing globalization 
and commercialization of the transfer market. 
Experience (UEFA) Clubs with track records in the UEFA cup league may find it easier to 
attract players. This variable is measured as the number of participations in the UEFA since 
1956. 
Experience (CL) Clubs with track records in the Champions League (CL) may find it easier 
to attract players, but may find it harder to embark on reorientations. This variable is 
measured as the number of participations in the CL since 1991. 
Last year (CL) Clubs that have played in the CL the year before may find it easier to attract 
players because they have earned money and higher reputation. This variable becomes 1 if the 
club has participated in the CL last year, 0 otherwise. 
Reputation index of Janssens and Késenne (1987) is an index that measures how well the 
clubs have performed in the last six club tournaments. 
Age (player) is measured as the date of birth minus the start date of the league (in years). 
Games (player) is measured as the number of games a player has participated in the premier 
league and the play-offs in the last season. 
Position is measured as the position of the player according to the Ronald Zwiers website. It 
can be an attacker, midfielder, defender or goalkeeper. In the models, the midfielder is used as 
the baseline for effect coding. 
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6.4 Models and results 
Since player transfer consists of decisions about adding as well as decisions about dropping 
players from the team, we fitted models for additions and attritions separately. We analyzed 
both the number of players transferred and the odds that an individual player is being 
transferred. The effect of organizational performance, changes at the top and trainer turnover 
on the four measures of player transfer is therefore presented in four separate tables. Table 6.2 
gives a summary of all the models for the number of players added. Table 6.3 gives a 
summary of all the models for the number of players that left. Table 6.4 gives a summary of 
all the models for the odds of adding a new player. And Table 6.5 gives a summary of all the 
models for the odds that a player leaves. 
Since we used forward and backward variable selection procedures, the explanatory 
variables that were retained for analysis differ over the models. Especially, the role of 
organizational performance differs between the count and odds models. In the count models 
of player transfers, it was important to include forward-looking organizational performance 
indicators. Organizational performance was not utterly important for the odds of a single 
player being transferred however. In these models we only had to take into account feedback 
on the attainment of CL tickets. 
 
6.4.1 Results for hypotheses 
In Hypothesis 1, we test for synchronic entrainment between player transfer and trainer 
turnover. There must be a positive correlation between player transfers and between seasons 
trainer turnover to lend support to Hypothesis 1. For the number of player transfers, there are 
no significant effects of between-season trainer turnover on the number of players transferred 
(Table 6.2 main: β = 0.01, not significant; Table 6.3 main: β = 0.02, not significant). Neither 
is there support for Hypothesis 1 when we analyze the odds of being transferred (Table 6.4 
main: β = 0.05, not significant; Table 6.5 main: β = 0.02, not significant). Even though all 
effects are positive, we can not conclude that the decision to replace coaches between seasons 
is entrained to the transfer period, because we found no significant effects. 
Hypothesis 2 encloses two conditions for finding a-synchronic entrainment. There has 
to be a positive effect between within-season trainer turnover and player transfer and there has 
to be a significant interaction effect between within-season trainer turnover and between-
season trainer turnover. From a statistical point of view (see e.g., Aiken et al., 1991), we need 
to inspect the interaction first. In none of the main models is the interaction effect between 
within-season trainer turnover and between-season trainer turnover significant. Thus, the 
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relationship between within-season trainer turnover and player transfer does not depend on 
whether there is a between-season trainer turnover. This means that soccer clubs do not make 
use of the transfer period to level off changes in staff. Consequently, there is no evidence for 
a-synchronic entrainment as suggested in Hypothesis 2. 
There is also no support for the first condition of a-synchronic entrainment. In none of 
the main models has within-season trainer turnover a significant positive effect on player 
transfer. Only when we are willing to tolerate a type-I error of 10%, does the main model in 
Table 6.3 show that a within-season trainer turnover increases the number of players that 
leave the club by a factor of (e0.12 =) 1.13. This result indicates that chairs let more players go 
between seasons, when they already dismissed the coach during the season. This result on its 
own is however not strong enough to lend support to Hypothesis 2. 
Given that there is no a-synchronic entrainment and given that we already found in 
Chapter 4 that within-season trainer turnover leads to between-season trainer turnover, we 
should rather consider within-season trainer turnover as a step in a larger change process. 
Within-season trainer turnover not only leads to new coaches between seasons, but also to a 
significant reduction in the number of incumbent players. 
We thus conclude that organizations do not simply entrain trainer turnover decisions to 
transfer periods. The decision making process is more complex. Therefore, we test in the 
remaining hypotheses whether other pieces of information can bring about synchronization. 
Hypothesis 3 states that low performance makes the positive relationship between player 
transfers and trainer turnover stronger. There was no uniform evidence of interaction in the P-
*Coach (B) and P-*Coach (W) models in the four tables. In the models on the number of 
additions, there is evidence of a strong negative interaction between low performance and 
within-season trainer turnover. In order to test Hypothesis 3, we take the partial derivative 
∂(log (additions))/∂( Coach (W)), which is 0.06 - 0.21 (No Ticket (Premier)). This equation 
shows that the more the club is in the relegation zone, the more new players will be added 
when there was a trainer turnover. Since the interaction makes the correlation between within-
season trainer turnover and the number of players added positive, there is support for 
Hypothesis 3. We should however be careful because the partial derivative, which is ∂(log 
(additions))/∂(No Ticket (Premier)) is 0.20 - 0.21 (Coach (W)), suggests that clubs 
significantly increase the number of new active players after being relegated unless there has 
been a trainer turnover within the season. In that case, the tendency to add more new player is 
completely leveled off (i.e., 0.20 - 0.21(1) = -0.01). It may thus be that extremely low 
performance more than entrainment determines whether low-performing clubs add a lot of 
players. 
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In Table 6.3, the interaction effect between failing to get a CL ticket and between-season 
trainer turnover is significant for the number of players that leave. In order to test Hypothesis 
3, we take the partial derivative ∂(log (attrition)/∂(Coach (B)), which is -0.07 - 0.03 (No 
Ticket (CL)). This equation suggests that there is entrainment between trainer turnover and 
player attrition once the club performance does not come close to the performance necessary 
for attaining a ticket for the CL. Entrainment already starts once the performance signal is -
2.34 (= -0.07/0.03). Bearing in mind that for most clubs the signal from CL will be strongly 
negative, we find support for Hypothesis 3. In clubs where the CL is out of reach, there is a 
strong positive correlation between between-season trainer turnover and the number of 
players that leave the club. 
 For the odds of adding a player, we find in Table 6.4 a significant interaction effect 
between not having attained a ticket for the CL and between-season trainer turnover (Table 
6.4, P- *Coach (B): β = 0.01). In order to test Hypothesis 3, we take the partial derivative 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(Coach (B)), which is 0.16 + 0.01 (No Ticket (CL)). We thus find that a 
between-season trainer turnover increases the odds of a new player to be added unless the 
ranking is 16 (= -0.16/0.01) places lower than a ranking for qualification to the CL. We doubt 
whether much attention should be given to this result because clubs in the relegation zone are 
unlikely to take into account feedback from participation to the CL. The result rather seems to 
indicate that clubs who just failed to get a ticket for the CL, have high positive correlation 
between player transfer and between-season trainer turnover.  
We place reservations to this interpretation. When we take the partial derivative, 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(No Ticket (CL)) = -0.04 +0.01 (Coach (B)), we find that a between-
season trainer turnover increases the odds of adding a player, but does not offset the 
decreasing effect on the odds of not having attained the CL qualifying rounds. It may thus be 
that performance feedback, more than entrainment, determines whether clubs add new 
players. Finally, in the model for the odds that a particular player has to leave, we find no 
significant interaction in Table 6.5. There is thus no support for Hypothesis 3 for this variable. 
In Hypothesis 4 we assume that positive performance feedback makes the positive 
relationship between the player transfers and trainer turnover stronger. Table 6.2 contains 
three significant interaction effects in model P+*Coach (W). In order to test Hypothesis 4, we 
take the partial derivative ∂(log (additions))/∂(Coach (W)), which is - 0.23 - 0.11 (Ticket 
(UEFA)) + 0.27 (Ticket (CL)) + 0.04 (Ticket (Premier)). To interpret this equation, we have 
made a distinction between clubs that managed to stay in the Dutch premier league without 
attaining an European ticket and clubs which are in the running for an European tournament. 
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When clubs just managed to survive, the partial derivative reduces to - 0.23 + 0.04 (Ticket 
(Premier)) because (Ticket (UEFA) and (Ticket (CL) are zero. The value of ∂(log(additions) / 
∂(Coach (W)) is 0 when the ranking is 6 (= 0.23/0.04) places higher than the ranking in the 
relegation zone. Thus the correlation between the number of players added and within-season 
trainer turnover is positive for run-off-the-mill clubs. When these clubs do better and manage 
to qualify for the UEFA, the partial derivative turns negative again because - 0.11 (Ticket 
(UEFA)) needs to be added to the partial derivative. For clubs that are in the running of a CL 
ticket, the correlation between the number of players added and within-season trainer turnover 
will be positive again. The easiest way to illustrate this conclusion is by means of a 
hypothetical but realistic example. Suppose that the performance feedback for the CL is 1, 
then the performance feedback on attainment of a UEFA ticket will be about 4 and the 
performance feedback on the premier league will be about 15. The value of the partial 
derivative is then ∂(log(additions) / ∂(Coach (W)) = -0.23 - 0.11 (5) + 0.27 (1) + 0.04 (15)= 
0.09. Overall, the derivative suggests that the general tendency to add less new active players 
when there was a within-season replacement is dominant, but it depends on the specific kind 
of performance feedback. Since positive performance feedback has no persistent positive 
effect, there is no support of Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 was formulated to test whether entrainment between player 
transfer and trainer turnover is stronger when there is a change in the top of the club. There 
are no significant interaction effects between changes in the top and trainer turnover in the 
Top*Coach models of Table 6.2, Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. In the Top*Coach model of Table 
6.3, we find a significant and negative interaction effect of between-season trainer turnover 
and between-season changes at the top. The negative sign of the interaction is opposite to the 
sign expected in Hypothesis 5. The partial derivative ∂(log (attrition)) / ∂(Coach (B)) is 0.03 - 
0.24 (Top (B)). This suggests that less active players leave when there is a change in the 
board and a trainer turnover. There is thus no support for Hypothesis 5.  
 
6.4.2 Discussion 
In this section we discuss the implications of different temporal triggers for player transfer. 
Just as there are different notions of time in organizations (e.g., Butler, 1995; Orlikowski & 
Yates, 2002), we have considered entrainment, performance feedback, shift, trend and new 
chair as relevant temporal triggers for change. We have copied the most salient significant 
findings of all analyses to these temporal triggers in Table 6.1. The right column of Table 6.1 
shows that many different triggers are active. Some of the triggers interact. 
  
TABLE 6.1 A SELECTION OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS 
Model Effect Timeframe 
Number of new players 
(Taken from Table 6.2) 
∂(log (additions))/∂( Coach (W)) = 0.06 - 0.21 (No Ticket (Premier)) 
∂(log (additions))/∂(No Ticket (Premier))= 0.20 - 0.21 (Coach (W)) 
∂(log (additions))/∂(Coach (W))= -0.23 - 0.11 Ticket (UEFA) + 0.27 (Ticket (CL)) 
+ 0.04 (Ticket (Premier)) 
∂(log (additions))/∂(Bosman court ruling)= 0.26 
∂(log (additions))/∂(No Ticket (CL))= - 0.15 
∂(log (additions))/∂(Ticket (CL))= -0.23 
∂(log (additions))/∂(Ticket (Premier))= 0.11 
∂(log (additions))/∂(Ticket (CL))= -0.2 - 0.97 (Top (W)) 
 Entrainment 
 Negative performance feedback 
 - 
 
 Shift 
 Negative performance feedback 
 Positive performance feedback 
 Positive performance feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
Number of players left 
(Taken from Table 6.3) 
∂(log (attrition)/∂(Coach (B))= -0.07 - 0.03 (No Ticket (CL)) 
∂(log (attrition)) / ∂(Coach (B)) is 0.03 - 0.24 (Top (B)) 
∂(log (attrition))/∂(Bosman court ruling)= 0.22 
∂(log (attrition))/∂(Ticket (CL))= -0.13 
∂(log (attrition))/∂(Ticket (CL))= -0.13 + 0.71 (Top (B)) 
 Entrainment 
 Changes at top disturb entrainment 
 Shift 
 Positive performance feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
Odds that a player is 
added 
(Taken from Table 6.4) 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(No Ticket (CL)) = -0.04 +0.01 (Coach (B)) 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(season(linear))= 0.1 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(No Ticket (CL))= -0.03 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(Top (W))= 0.31 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(Attacker)= 0.47 + 0.43 (Top(W)) 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(No Ticket (CL))= -0.02 - 0.07 (Top (B)) 
 
∂(logits (addition))/∂(Ticket (CL))=0.6 -0.43 (Top (B)) 
 Negative performance feedback 
 Trend 
 Negative performance feedback 
 New chair 
 New chair 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
Odds that a player 
leaves 
(Taken from Table 6.5) 
∂(logits (attrition))/∂(season(linear))= 0.09 
∂(logits (attrition))/∂(No Ticket (CL))= -0.03 
∂(logits (attrition))/∂(No Ticket (CL)) = -0.03 -0.06 (Top(B)) 
 
∂(logits (attrition))/∂(No Ticket (CL)) = -0.03 -0.06 (Top(W)) 
 
∂(logits (attrition))/∂(Top (W)) is 0.25 - 0.35 (Ticket (CL)) 
 Trend 
 Negative performance feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
 New chair response to performance 
feedback 
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Despite the fact that we were unable to show that the transfer period is the dominant pacer for 
change in the sample, we find it hard to rule out the possibility of entrainment completely. 
One problem is set by the way entrainment was introduced in the empirical part of this study. 
Given the fact that we collected repeated measures on player transfers, between-season 
changes at the top and between-season trainer turnover, we use a pragmatic approach to test 
for entrainment. Since entrainment implies that activities are synchronized, we simply 
expected strong positive correlations between trainer turnover and player transfers. It should 
be acknowledged that this method measures indirectly the propositions of entrainment theory 
since we took player transfer as our dependent variable, instead of measuring synchronization 
directly. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter 3, we should bear in mind that player transfer was 
only approximated by means of mutations in the number of active players between adjacent 
soccer seasons. Players come and go for different reasons, a transfer is only one of them. 
Given the fact that social entrainment theory has been slow in advancing empirical evidence 
(e.g., Farmer & Seers, 2004: 267, 280), we consider our approach as a first attempt towards 
measuring entrainment. We do acknowledge that our imperfect approach is susceptible to 
improvements. 
Our results indicate that other temporal dynamics are present in the data. When 
discussing the results for the hypotheses, we were confronted two times with the possibility 
that low performance determines the tempo of personnel changes more than entrainment. 
Our analysis shows that there has been a shift in player transfer since the Bosman 
court ruling. In the baseline model of Table 6.2, we find clear evidence of a shift in the 
number of players added since the Bosman court ruling. It has led to an increase in the 
number of additions by a factor of (e0.26 =) 1.3. Similarly, in the baseline model in Table 6.3, 
we find that there is significantly more attrition after the Bosman court ruling (Table 6.3 
Baseline: β = 0.22). 
There is also evidence of an increasing linear trend. In the main model of Table 6.4, 
we find that there is a small annual increase in the odds that a new player will be added to a 
team (Table 6.4 effect: β = 0.10). In the main model of Table 6.5, we find that there is an 
annual increase in the odds that a player leaves the club (Table 6.5, effect: β = 0.09). 
Moreover, we find that performance feedback determines the timing of player 
transfers. Performance signals have a temporal effect on organizational activity by 
determining the agenda of the decision makers (e.g., Cyert & March, 1992; Staw et al., 1981). 
In the models of the number of players added, signals from extreme organizational 
performance indicators determine how many players are added. There are significant effects 
for ‘Ticket (Premier), ‘Ticket (CL)’ and ‘No Ticket (CL)’ in the model for player additions. 
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Since the Wald tests do not indicate that the parameter estimates for low versus high 
performance are not statistically different, we find a general tendency to add less players to 
the team when CL participation is within reach (Table 6.2 baseline β=-0.15 for negative 
performance feedback and β=-0.23 for positive performance feedback). The coefficients 
suggest that the best performing teams add the least number of active players. The picture is 
different when we turn to the impact of surviving the premier league. An effect of 0.11 for 
positive performance feedback suggests that teams that survive the premier league will 
increasingly add more new players to the team when their ranking gets better. While staying 
in the premier league has a positive effect on the number of new players added, relegation has 
no significant effect on the number of active players added (Table 6.2, piecewise: β = 0.08 not 
significant). 
The picture is similar for the number of players that leave the club. We find that 
attaining a ticket to the qualifying rounds of the CL significantly reduces the number of active 
players that leave the club (Table 6.3 Baseline: β = -0.13). Since having played in the 
qualifying rounds of the CL (Table 6.3 Baseline: β = -0.10) also lowers attrition, it seems that 
relatively more players are inclined to stay when they play in very successful teams. 
Finally, we analyze whether the institution of a new chair has an influence on the 
player transfer decisions thereafter. A new chair may be inclined to institute more changes, 
because he is less bound to commitments made by his predecessor. We find that a within-
season change at the top only increases the odds of an individual player to be added to the 
team by a factor of (e0.31=) 1.36 (Table 6.4 Baseline: β = 0.31). To find out which players 
were preferred by the newly appointed chair, we tested for interaction between trainer 
turnover and position of the player. The position model shows that the bias to add attackers to 
the team is stronger for recently appointed chairs than for chairs with longer tenure in the club 
(Table 6.4 Position). The partial derivative, which is ∂(logits (addition))/∂(Attacker)= 0.47 + 
0.43 (Top(W)), shows that the logits almost double when there is a within-season change at 
the top of the club. Overall, clubs do not really change their transfer policy when a new chair 
is instituted. There is however some evidence in the data that new chairs consider adding a 
new, and especially an attacking player. 
We also find that the reaction to performance feedback differs only modestly between 
recently appointed and tenured chairs. We first focus on the reaction of the top to negative 
performance feedback and then on the reaction to positive performance feedback. We find 
that low performance does not lead to more player transfers in clubs with newly appointed 
chairs, but it does have an effect on the odds of a single player to be transferred. There are 
thus only in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 significant interactions with low performance in the 
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models denoted as P-*top (B) and P-*top (W). The partial derivative ∂(logits (addition))/∂(No 
Ticket (CL))= - 0.02 - 0.07 Top (B) suggests that recently appointed chairs respond stronger 
to not having attained tickets for the CL. The odds that new players will be added are lower in 
clubs with new chairs. 
In Table 6.5, there are significant interactions of low performance with between- and 
within-season changes at the top. The coefficient for the interaction is in both cases -0.06, 
which is twice as large as the significant effect of performance feedback. Both in model P-
Top(B) and P-Top (W) we find that the partial derivative is ∂(logits (attrition)/∂(No Ticket 
(CL)) = -0.03 -0.06 (Top (W/B) = -0,09. This means that recently appointed coaches do more 
efforts to retain players. Overall, the results suggest that new boards try more than tenured 
boards to retain some active players after low performance. These efforts do however not 
result in significant differences in the number of players transferred after negative 
performance feedback. 
The newly appointed chairs also respond to positive performance feedback differently 
than more tenured chairs. In model P+ * Top(W) for the number of new players, we find in 
Table 6.2 a significant interaction between the attainment of CL tickets and within-season 
changes at the top. The partial derivative, which is ∂(log (additions))/∂(Ticket (CL)) is - 0.20 - 
0.97 (Top (W)), indicates that when successful clubs have experienced within-season changes 
at the top, the new board will increasingly try to add more active players in successful teams. 
In model P+ * top(B) for the number of players that left we find in Table 6.3 a significant 
interaction between the attainment of CL tickets and between-season changes at the top. The 
partial derivative, ∂(log (attrition))/∂(Ticket (CL)) is - 0.13 + 0.71 (Top (B)), indicates that 
when successful clubs change the chair between-season, the new board will not retain less 
active players than when there is no change in the chair. 
In model P+ *Top(B) for the odds that a player is added to the team, we find in Table 
6.4 a significant interaction between the attainment of a CL ticket and between-season 
changes at the top. The partial derivative, which is ∂(logits (addition))/∂(Ticket (CL)) is 0.06 - 
0.43 (Top (B)), indicates that when successful clubs have experienced between-season 
changes at the top, the new board will not be inclined to add more active players in successful 
teams. 
Finally, in model P+ * Top(W) for the odds that new players leave the club, we find in 
Table 6.5 a significant interaction between the attainment of a CL tickets and within-season 
changes at the top. The partial derivative is ∂(logits (attrition))/ ∂Ticket (CL)) is 0 - 0.35 
((Top (W)), indicating that the odds decrease that players leave when there is a within-season 
change at the top. 
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In general there are more differences in reaction between newly appointed chairs and 
tenured chairs after positive performance feedback than after negative performance feedback. 
Moreover and contrary to performance feedback, the differences are more pronounced. New 
chairs may take a different turn than tenured chairs after success. It is not clear why these 
differences in reaction between chairs are more pronounced after success than after failure. 
Attributions may explain the difference (e.g., Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Johns, 1999; 
Miller, 1994, 1999). Given that negative performance feedback triggers mainly external 
attributions and positive performance feedback mainly leads to internal attributions, negative 
performance ignites a search for similar solutions. A substitution of the chair does not get in 
the way of external attributions. On the contrary, a substitution of the chair makes it difficult 
to rely on internal attributions after success. It is hard for the new chair to attribute past 
successes to himself. 
 
6.4.3 Conclusions 
Besides entrainment in soccer clubs, we found that there is much more temporal variation in 
the data. Therefore, we conclude that entrainment will not persistently lead to perfect 
synchronization of activity cycles. At the end of the season soccer clubs have received many 
stimuli that can not be ignored. The information creates substantial variation in the way clubs 
set out the transfer policy. Changes in the institutional framework, trends, performance 
feedback, new chairs and their response to performance feedback make that clubs respond 
differently each year to transfers. This contextual information rules out that there is a one-to-
one relationship between player transfer and trainer turnover. 
Rather, the result of this study suggests that the tempo of change has an effect on the 
variance of the scale of change, as shown in Figure 6.1. Entrainment is unable to explain 
precisely what will happen, but it may shape the boundaries within which organizational 
change will occur. Entrainment may in particular lead to a smaller scale of change because 
there is time to think of change interventions and time to consider the benefits of 
synchronization. Still, in light of other information, organizations respond differently than 
what could be expected from entrained conditions. Therefore entrainment may go hand in 
hand with trends, performance feedback, and other triggers of change. 
 
  
TABLE 6.2 NUMBER OF NEW PLAYERS (1992-2005)  
 
Base- 
Line  Main  
P- * 
Coach(B) 
P-* 
Coach(W) 
P+ * 
Coach(B) 
P+ * 
Coach(W) 
Top * 
Coach 
P- * 
Top(B) 
P-*  
Top(W) 
P+ * 
Top(B) 
P+ *  
Top(W) 
Bosman Court Ruling 0.26 (.00) 0.27 (.00) 0.26 (.00) 0.28 (.00) 0.26 (.00) 0.27 (.00) 0.27 (.00) 0.29 (.00) 0.27 (.00) 0.28 (.00) 0.29 (.00) 
Reputation Index 0.01 (.21) 0.01 (.19) 0.01 (.37) 0.01 (.26) 0.01 (.39) 0.01 (.33) 0.01 (.15) 0.01 (.31) 0.01 (.17) 0.01 (.35) 0.01 (.26) 
Players Left (End) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 
Coach(W) .  -0.04 (.47) -0.05 (.36) 0.06 (.50) -0.05 (.35) -0.22 (.02) -0.04 (.45) -0.04 (.51) -0.04 (.50) -0.03 (.53) -0.05 (.37) 
Coach(B) .  0.01 (.59) 0.06 (.05) 0.02 (.45) -0.04 (.40) 0.01 (.73) 0.01 (.83) 0.02 (.37) 0.01 (.75) 0.02 (.37) 0.01 (.66) 
Coach(W)* Coach(B) .  -0.03 (.47) 0.00 (.99) -0.02 (.64) 0.00 (.99) -0.01 (.86) -0.03 (.41) -0.04 (.31) -0.03 (.50) -0.04 (.33) -0.03 (.51) 
Top(W) .  -0.01 (.90) 0.01 (.94) -0.03 (.76) 0.01 (.90) -0.00 (.97) -0.02 (.87) -0.01 (.92) -0.22 (.18) -0.01 (.91) 0.06 (.72) 
Top(B) .  0.09 (.47) 0.09 (.51) 0.09 (.46) 0.09 (.45) 0.08 (.52) 0.02 (.88) -0.03 (.84) 0.10 (.45) 0.34 (.11) 0.09 (.46) 
Top(B)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  0.10 (.27) .  .  .  .  
Coach(W)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  0.04 (.83)         
No Ticket (UEFA) 0.04 (.18) 0.04 (.19) 0.04 (.22) 0.01 (.74) 0.03 (.32) 0.03 (.24) 0.04 (.12) 0.05 (.08) 0.03 (.22) 0.04 (.12) 0.04 (.20) 
Ticket (UEFA) 0.05 (.22) 0.04 (.26) 0.04 (.28) 0.05 (.19) 0.03 (.46) 0.07 (.06) 0.05 (.18) 0.04 (.21) 0.04 (.24) 0.04 (.24) 0.05 (.23) 
No Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(B) .  .  -0.01 (.66) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(W) .  .  .  0.06 (.14) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  0.02 (.39) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  -0.11 (.00) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.10 (.40) .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.10 (.26) .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.09 (.48) .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.11 (.11) 
No Ticket (CL) -0.15 (.00) -0.15 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.15 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.15 (.00) -0.16 (.00) -0.16 (.00) 
Ticket (CL) -0.23 (.00) -0.22 (.00) -0.21 (.00) -0.24 (.00) -0.19 (.00) -0.28 (.00) -0.22 (.00) -0.22 (.00) -0.22 (.00) -0.21 (.00) -0.20 (.00) 
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(B) .  .  0.01 (.43) .  .  .  .  .  .   .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(W) .  .  .  -0.02 (.59) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  -0.08 (.17) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  0.27 (.00) .  .  .  .  .  
  
 
Base- 
Line  Main  
P- * 
Coach(B) 
P-* 
Coach(W) 
P+ * 
Coach(B) 
P+ * 
Coach(W) 
Top * 
Coach 
P- * 
Top(B) 
P-*  
Top(W) 
P+ * 
Top(B) 
P+ *  
Top(W) 
No Ticket (CL)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.05 (.55) .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.08 (.20) .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.24 (.40) .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.97 (.00) 
No Ticket (Premier) 0.08 (.28) 0.08 (.20) 0.06 (.31) 0.20 (.00) 0.08 (.24) 0.06 (.35) 0.08 (.20) 0.11 (.02) 0.08 (.19) 0.10 (.08) 0.09 (.16) 
Ticket (Premier)  0.11 (.01) 0.12 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.13 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.12 (.00) 0.13 (.00) 
No Ticket (Premier)*Coach(B)     0.01 (.77)                 
No Ticket (Premier)*Coach(W) .  .  .  -0.21 (.02) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  0.00 (.39) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  0.04 (.01) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (Premier)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.01 (.96) .  .  .  
No Ticket (Premier)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.06 (.71) .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.06 (.15) .  
Ticket (Premier)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.01 (.66) 
Wald test for success ≠ failure     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL) 0.07 (.26) 0.07 (.26) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA) -0.01 (.80) -0.00 (.84) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier) -0.04 (.59) -0.04 (.54) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
 P- = Did not Attain a Ticket, P+ = Attained a Ticket, W = Within-season, B = Between-season 
 Number of clusters =29, Max cluster size =14. 
  
  
TABLE 6.3 NUMBER OF PLAYERS LEFT (1992-2005) 
 
Base- 
Line  Main  
P- * 
Coach (B) 
P- * 
Coach (W) 
P+ * 
Coach(B) 
P+ * 
Coach(W) 
Top * 
Coach 
P- * 
Top(B) 
P- * 
Top(W) 
P+ * 
Top(B) 
P+ * 
Top(W) 
Bosman Court Ruling 0.22 (.00) 0.19 (.01) 0.18 (.02) 0.18 (.01) 0.19 (.01) 0.19 (.01) 0.18 (.01) 0.18 (.03) 0.20 (.01) 0.18 (.03) 0.22 (.01) 
Years In CL 0.06 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 0.05 (.00) 
Last Year In CL -0.10 (.04) -0.05 (.41) -0.05 (.45) -0.04 (.51) -0.05 (.43) -0.03 (.76) -0.05 (.35) -0.04 (.42) -0.04 (.46) -0.06 (.30) -0.05 (.42) 
Players Added (End) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.03 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 0.04 (.00) 
Coach(W) .  0.12 (.09) 0.14 (.04) 0.11 (.36) 0.13 (.06) 0.04 (.71) 0.11 (.09) 0.12 (.09) 0.11 (.12) 0.12 (.10) 0.11 (.14) 
Coach(B) .  0.02 (.63) -0.07 (.07) 0.01 (.69) 0.06 (.22) 0.02 (.67) 0.03 (.43) 0.01 (.67) 0.02 (.58) 0.02 (.64) 0.02 (.56) 
Coach(W)* Coach(B) .  -0.02 (.75) -0.06 (.40) -0.02 (.80) -0.05 (.48) -0.01 (.84) -0.01 (.90) -0.02 (.77) -0.02 (.83) -0.02 (.76) -0.01 (.84) 
Top(W) .  0.05 (.69) 0.02 (.85) 0.05 (.65) 0.02 (.83) 0.05 (.69) 0.05 (.75) 0.05 (.69) 0.21 (.00) 0.05 (.69) -0.24 (.00) 
Top(B) .  -0.23 (.07) -0.22 (.08) -0.22 (.06) -0.24 (.06) -0.23 (.06) -0.06 (.62) -0.25 (.41) -0.23 (.07) -0.30 (.25) -0.23 (.06) 
Top(B)*Coach(B) .            -0.24 (.00)         
Coach(W)*Top(W) .            -0.02 (.90)         
No Ticket (UEFA)  0.03 (.35) 0.04 (.15) 0.02 (.60) 0.04 (.34) 0.05 (.13) 0.04 (.15) 0.03 (.33) 0.04 (.16) 0.04 (.18) 0.04 (.11) 0.04 (.17) 
Ticket (UEFA) 0.03 (.40) 0.04 (.12) 0.03 (.27) 0.04 (.17) 0.05 (.05) 0.05 (.04) 0.03 (.30) 0.04 (.11) 0.04 (.10) 0.04 (.10) 0.04 (.12) 
No Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(B) .  .  0.03 (.14) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(W) .  .  .  0.02 (.72) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  -0.03 (.24) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  -0.07 (.22) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.04 (.76) .  .  .  
No Ticket (UEFA)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.06 (.48) .  .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.12 (.23) .  
Ticket (UEFA)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.05 (.77) 
No Ticket (CL) -0.05 (.30) -0.04 (.29) -0.02 (.68) -0.04 (.38) -0.05 (.26) -0.05 (.26) -0.04 (.44) -0.04 (.36) -0.05 (.24) -0.04 (.31) -0.05 (.20) 
Ticket (CL) -0.13 (.02) -0.12 (.05) -0.13 (.02) -0.12 (.06) -0.15 (.03) -0.14 (.08) -0.11 (.08) -0.12 (.05) -0.13 (.04) -0.13 (.03) -0.12 (.04) 
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(B) .  .  -0.03 (.05) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(W) .  .  .  -0.02 (.76) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  0.02 (.79) .  .  .  .  .  .  
  
 
Base- 
Line  Main  
P- * 
Coach (B) 
P- * 
Coach (W) 
P+ * 
Coach(B) 
P+ * 
Coach(W) 
Top * 
Coach 
P- * 
Top(B) 
P- * 
Top(W) 
P+ * 
Top(B) 
P+ * 
Top(W) 
Ticket (CL)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  0.08 (.58) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.03 (.78) .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.01 (.93) .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.71 (.00) .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.46 (.34) 
No Ticket (Premier) -0.01 (.86) -0.02 (.67) 0.03 (.35) -0.06 (.27) -0.02 (.71) -0.03 (.53) -0.01 (.82) -0.03 (.58) -0.01 (.77) -0.03 (.59) -0.01 (.85) 
Ticket (Premier)  0.00 (.95) -0.01 (.76) -0.02 (.63) -0.01 (.76) -0.01 (.75) -0.01 (.69) -0.01 (.81) -0.01 (.70) -0.01 (.81) -0.01 (.70) -0.00 (.94) 
No Ticket (Premier)*Coach(B) .  .  -0.04 (.18) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (Premier)*Coach(W) .  .  .  0.06 (.51) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Coach(B) .  .  .  .  -0.00 (.74) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Coach(W) .  .  .  .  .  0.02 (.28) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (Premier)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.06 (.83) .  .  .  
No Ticket (Premier)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.08 (.42) .  .  
Ticket (Premier)*Top(B) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.01 (.70) .  
Ticket (Premier)*Top(W) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.04 (.09) 
Wald Tests Of Contrasts 
(Success ≠ Failure) 
    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL) 0.08 (.27) 0.08 (.37) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (UEFA) 0.00 (.86) 0.00 (.82) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (Premier) -0.01 (.83) -0.01 (.83) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
  P- = Did not Attain a Ticket, P+ = Attained a Ticket, W = Within-season, B = Between-season 
 Number of clusters =29, Max cluster size =14. 
  
TABLE 6.4 ODDS THAT A PLAYER IS ADDED (2001-2005) 
 Main Position 
P- * Coach 
(B) 
P- * Coach 
(W) 
P+ * Coach 
(B) 
P+ * Coach 
(W) Top * Coach 
P- * Top 
(B) 
P- * Top 
(W) 
P+ * Top 
(B) 
P+ * Top 
(W) 
Intercept  -195  -196  -185  -194  -193  -196  -192  -211  -198  -196  -198  
Season (linear)  0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.11 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 0.10 (.00) 
Years in UEFA  -0.01 (.19) -0.01 (.20) -0.01 (.23) -0.01 (.19) -0.01 (.19) -0.01 (.21) -0.01 (.19) -0.01 (.12) -0.01 (.19) -0.01 (.24) -0.01 (.19) 
Age(Player)   -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) -0.09 (.00) 
Position  . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) 
Defender  -0.01  -0.07  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
Attacker  0.32  0.47  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.32  0.32  
Goalkeeper  0.49  0.54  0.50  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.50  0.49  0.49  0.49  
Games (player)  -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) -0.03 (.00) 
Coach(W)  -0.05 (.76) 0.01 (.99) -0.08 (.64) -0.06 (.70) -0.04 (.81) -0.07 (.74) -0.05 (.78) -0.04 (.83) -0.06 (.74) -0.07 (.71) -0.06 (.74) 
Coach(B)  0.07 (.11) 0.05 (.26) 0.16 (.01) 0.07 (.11) 0.06 (.20) 0.07 (.11) 0.07 (.10) 0.06 (.12) 0.06 (.13) 0.06 (.16) 0.06 (.13) 
Coach(W)*Coach(B)  -0.09 (.44) -0.09 (.45) -0.04 (.70) -0.09 (.44) -0.08 (.46) -0.08 (.48) -0.09 (.42) -0.08 (.47) -0.08 (.47) -0.08 (.51) -0.08 (.47) 
Top(B)*Coach(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.04 (.80) .  .  .  .  
Top(W)  0.31 (.01) 0.25 (.47) 0.33 (.00) 0.31 (.01) 0.33 (.00) 0.32 (.00) 0.31 (.01) 0.29 (.02) 0.17 (.08) 0.30 (.01) 0.38 (.01) 
Top(B)  -0.25 (.06) 0.07 (.04) -0.24 (.07) -0.25 (.06) -0.24 (.07) -0.25 (.06) -0.22 (.17) -0.85 (.00) -0.25 (.06) -0.20 (.17) -0.25 (.06) 
No Ticket (CL)  -0.03 (.02) -0.03 (.02) -0.04 (.00) -0.03 (.03) -0.03 (.02) -0.03 (.02) -0.03 (.02) -0.02 (.11) -0.03 (.02) -0.03 (.02) -0.03 (.02) 
Ticket (CL)  0.02 (.79) 0.01 (.92) 0.03 (.72) 0.03 (.77) -0.02 (.84) -0.01 (.95) 0.02 (.82) 0.06 (.45) 0.04 (.64) 0.06 (.47) 0.04 (.64) 
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(B)  .  .  0.01 (.04) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)* 
Coach(W) 
 .  .  .  -0.00 (.95) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(B)  .  .  .  .  0.10 (.14) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)* 
Coach(W) 
 .  .  .  .  .  0.07 (.64) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.07 (.00) .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(W)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.04 (.20) .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.43 (.01) .  
  
 Main Position 
P- * Coach 
(B) 
P- * Coach 
(W) 
P+ * Coach 
(B) 
P+ * Coach 
(W) Top * Coach 
P- * Top 
(B) 
P- * Top 
(W) 
P+ * Top 
(B) 
P+ * Top 
(W) 
Ticket (CL)*Top(W)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.21 (.20) 
Top(W)*Position  .  . (.00) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Defender  .  0.10  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Attacker  .   0.43  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Goalkeeper    -0.98                    
Coach(W)*Position  .  . (.90) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Top(B)*Position  .  . (.24) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Coach(B)*Position  .  . (.06) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Defender  .  0.18  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Attacker    -0.12                    
Goalkeeper    -0.03                    
Wald tests of contrasts  
(Success ≠ Failure) 
  
0.00 
 
(.97) 
 
0.01 
 
(.93) 
.  .  .  .   
-0.05 
 
(.62) 
.  .  .  .  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
 P- = Did not Attain a Ticket, P+ = Attained a Ticket, W = Within-season, B = Between-season 
 Number of clusters = 86, Max cluster size = 33. 
 
  
TABLE 6.5 ODDS THAT A PLAYER LEAVES (2001-2005) 
 Main  Position  
P- * Coach 
(B) 
P- * Coach 
(W) 
P+ * Coach 
(B) 
P+ * Coach 
(W) Top * Coach 
P- * Top 
(B) P- * Top (W) 
P+ * Top 
(B) 
P+ * Top 
(W) 
Intercept  -173  -172  -167  -173  -173  -176  -162  -185  -178  -174  -178  
Season (linear)  0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.08 (.01) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.08 (.01) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 
Years in UEFA  0.00 (.87) 0.00 (.87) 0.00 (.84) 0.00 (.87) 0.00 (.87) 0.00 (.84) 0.00 (.92) 0.00 (1.0) 0.00 (.88) 0.00 (.85) 0.00 (.88) 
Age (player)  0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 0.09 (.00) 
Position  . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) . (.00) 
Defender  -0.15  -0.25  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.14  -0.15      
Attacker  0.32  0.39  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.32  0.32  
Goalkeeper  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25  -0.25      
Games (player)  -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) -0.07 (.00) 
Coach(W)  0.02 (.92) 0.06 (.63) 0.00 (1.0) 0.02 (.92) 0.02 (.91) 0.00 (.99) 0.03 (.85) 0.03 (.84) 0.01 (.96) 0.01 (.94) 0.01 (.96) 
Coach(B)  0.05 (.37) 0.02 (.64) 0.09 (.23) 0.05 (.37) 0.04 (.43) 0.05 (.36) 0.07 (.24) 0.04 (.38) 0.04 (.42) 0.04 (.40) 0.04 (.42) 
Coach(W)* Coach(B)  -0.02 (.88) -0.02 (.90) 0.01 (.96) -0.02 (.88) -0.02 (.88) -0.01 (.91) -0.04 (.76) -0.02 (.90) -0.01 (.92) -0.02 (.90) -0.01 (.92) 
Top(B)*Coach(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.14 (.27) .  .  .  .  
Top(W)  0.13 (.31) 0.42 (.94) 0.15 (.25) 0.13 (.31) 0.14 (.30) 0.15 (.23) 0.14 (.24) 0.11 (.45) -0.10 (.23) 0.13 (.34) 0.25 (.06) 
Top(B)  -0.18 (.18) -0.30 (.25) -0.17 (.19) -0.18 (.18) -0.17 (.19) -0.17 (.19) -0.06 (.68) -0.72 (.00) -0.18 (.17) -0.16 (.28) -0.18 (.17) 
No Ticket (CL)  -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.04 (.00) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.05) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) -0.03 (.01) 
Ticket (CL)  -0.03 (.76) -0.03 (.69) -0.02 (.80) -0.03 (.75) -0.03 (.72) -0.07 (.48) -0.04 (.62) 0.01 (.89) 0.00 (.95) -0.01 (.86) 0.00 (.95) 
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(B)  .  .  0.01 (.37) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Coach(W)  .  .  .  0.00 (.99) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(B)  .  .  .  .  0.02 (.78) .  .  .  .  .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Coach(W)  .  .  .  .  .  0.10 (.41) .  .  .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.06 (.00) .  .  .  
No Ticket (CL)*Top(W)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.06 (.03) .  .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(B)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.12 (.48) .  
Ticket (CL)*Top(W)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.35 (.03) 
Top(W)*Position  .  . (.01) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
  
 Main  Position  
P- * Coach 
(B) 
P- * Coach 
(W) 
P+ * Coach 
(B) 
P+ * Coach 
(W) Top * Coach 
P- * Top 
(B) P- * Top (W) 
P+ * Top 
(B) 
P+ * Top 
(W) 
Defender  .  -0.25  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Attacker  .  -0.45  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Goalkeeper  .  -1.06  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Coach(W)*Position  .  . (.71) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Top(B)*Position  .  . (.93) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  
Coach(B)*Position  .  . (.28) .  .  .  .    .  .  .  .  
Wald tests of contrasts 
(Success ≠ Failure) 
  
0.00 
 
(.97) 
 
0.01 
 
(.93) 
.  .  .  .   
0.01 
 
(.93) 
.  .  .  .  
Legend: GEE parameter estimates (p-values of the Wald statistic)  
  P- = Did not Attain a Ticket, P+ = Attained a Ticket, W = Within-season, B = Between-season 
 Number of clusters =86, Max cluster size =33. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and conclusions 
 
We know that soccer coaches are frequently replaced; that coaches change playing tactics; 
and that players are intermittently transferred. If we would follow the dominant approach to 
organizational change, then we ought to find that these change interventions together 
constitute a larger change process (e.g., Weick & Quinn, 1999). This study shows the 
opposite: while there are many change interventions in a soccer club, they do not cumulate 
into radical change. Our study challenges two dominant notions in theory of organizational 
change, namely the bias towards emergent processes and the bias towards large-scale change. 
 
7.1 The research question hierarchy 
In Chapter 1, we used different strands of literature to question the almost taken for granted 
idea that one small change intervention will lead to more change interventions (see Beck et 
al., 2008 for a cognate approach). Inspired by Greve (2003c), we argue that organizations like 
to defend what they have and favor changes with low impact on the organization. 
This study has used organizational learning theories as theoretical foundation for small 
change. Regardless of salient differences between organizational learning theories (e.g., 
Ocasio, 1993; Shimizu, 2007) and given the confusion about the organizational learning 
concept (e.g., Cook & Yanow, 1993; ten Bos, 2006), all organizational learning theories that 
were covered in this study assume that decision makers select information carefully, seek 
control and look for acceptable decisions. In such an environment, even the smallest change 
intervention will be important to the organizational decision makers. Therefore changes will 
only be considered if they make sense to the important decision makers in the organization. 
As such, organizational learning theories may lay a solid basis for explaining small change 
and its frequent occurrence. 
As indicated in the top bar of Figure 7.1 the main research question of this study is 
whether organizations are able to take control over organizational change processes. We took 
a first step towards solving this question by deducting answers from organizational learning 
theories. In order to structure these responses, we decoupled the main research question into a 
content and process question, which is common in studies of organizational change 
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FIGURE 7.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS HIERARCHY 
A general research agenda 
 
Are organizations able to control the organizational change processes most of the 
time? 
       ↓ 
 Organizational learning questions 
 
Content: Where does organizational change start? 
 
Process: What is the impact of the first intervention on the change 
process?  
Which change interventions are related? 
                                                     ↓ 
 
  Empirical questions 
 
Content: Where does organizational change start in soccer clubs? 
 
Process: Which change interventions are  
Related in soccer clubs? 
  
 
(e.g., Barnett & Carroll, 1995). The content question is concerned with what changes and the 
process question is concerned with the sequence of the change interventions. 
As illustrated in the second bar of Figure 7.1, we first looked for answers to the 
content and process question in organizational learning theories. We thereby took into 
account the theoretical variation between organizational learning theories. Especially the 
differences between Threat Rigidity Theory (TRT) and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(ABTF) have been under academic scrutiny (e.g., Greve, 2003c; Ketchen & Palmer, 1999; 
Lant & Hurley, 1999; Ocasio, 1993; Shimizu, 2007). In Chapter 2, we have shown that the 
differences answers between ABTF and TRT are subtle and complex. Where TRT has a clear 
answer to the content question - i.e., no strategy changes after threats -, ABTF does not 
automatically refute the content answer of TRT. Instead it forwards a clear answer to the 
process question - i.e., widening search and organizational learning. Similarly, when ABTF 
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has a clear answer to the content question - i.e., no strategy changes after signs of success -, 
TRT does not automatically refute the content answer of TRT. Instead, it forwards a clear 
answer to the process question - i.e. no efforts to escalate. Given these subtleties between 
ABTF and TRT, it is challenging to find watertight proof for one of the theories in an 
empirical setting. 
We have taken this challenge by advancing a new research methodology which we 
tested in the context of Dutch soccer clubs. This is illustrated in the lowest bar of Figure 7.1. 
We essentially compare the actual responses to the content and process question in soccer 
clubs to the organizational learning responses to verify if only small change take place in 
soccer clubs and to find out if organizational learning theories can explain the observed 
changes. 
 
7.2 Summary of the main results 
Our study contributes in two ways to the field of organizational change. The first contribution 
is the new research methodology that attempts to link organizational learning theories better 
to small change. The second contribution consists of empirical results of organizational 
change in Dutch soccer clubs. 
 
7.2.1 A new research methodology 
We have used Greve’s (2003c) technique of piecewise linear models which is able to show 
when organizations are reluctant to make certain changes and when they are excited about 
certain changes. Since Greve’s (2003c) original model only accounted for responses that 
could be explained by ABTF, we have extended his methodology to TRT responses as well. 
For this adjustment we drew on insights from Lant and Hurley (1999) and Ocasio (1993), who 
state that escalation does not only occur when there is a threat of survival. It may also occur 
when there is a threat of not attaining aspiration level performance. 
The flipside of the adjustment is that ad hoc answers to the process and content 
questions can easily be made. We have therefore proposed three additional checks that need to 
be performed in conjunction with the piecewise linear models. These additional checks lower 
the odds that actual organizational behavior will perfectly fit with ABTF and TRT, but it 
increases the validity of the empirical results tremendously. Table 7.1 summarizes the new 
research strategy developed in this study. 
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TABLE 7.1 A RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR SMALL CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING THEORIES 
 ABTF TRT 
Signs of 
failure 
-Negative signs for strategic change  
-Negative signs for strategy 
 implementation  
- Short strategic change process 
-Strictly positive signs for strategic  
change 
-Negative signs for strategy 
 implementation  
-Many behavioral differences among  
decision makers 
Signs of 
success 
-Strictly negative signs for strategic 
change 
-Many behavioral similarities among 
decision makers 
-Positive signs of strategic change  
-Short strategic change process  
-Negative signs for strategy  
Implementation 
Combinati
ons and 
sequences 
- To test for widening problemistic 
search 
- To test for concerted action under 
threat. 
 
The first check is related to the content question. We suggest to make a distinction between 
change that implies a real strategic departure and change that is part of a strategic 
implementation. According to TRT, organizations will not explore fundamental strategy 
changes when they are under threat. Their answer to the content question is thus to eliminate 
the possibility for strategic change and to focus on better strategy implementation after threat. 
Since organizations may be confronted with threats for a long time, the organizational 
response may escalate. It can result in a series of change interventions aimed at implementing 
the strategy better. The process of change in TRT is determined by constriction of control, 
reduction of information processing and a focus on efficient strategy implementation. 
In ABTF, the answer to the content question may entail strategy changes when the 
organizations are under threat. However, strategy implementation efforts are likely to occur 
because boundaries in the organization make it difficult to implement completely new ideas. 
The answer of ABTF to the content question is thus unclear after threats. Instead of 
forwarding a clear answer to the content question, ABTF provides a clear answer to the 
process question. When performance is disappointing, the search for solutions will be limited 
in time and scope because organizations limit the costs of implementing solutions. When the 
costs are considered too high, organizations rather stop searching and learn that their 
aspirations were set too high. 
Unlike the case of failure, ABTF has a clear answer to the content question when the 
organization is successful. It argues that entirely new solutions are difficult to sell in 
successful organizations. Therefore the content answer is restricted to strategy 
implementation efforts after signs of success. This means that ABTF can not explain 
fundamental strategy changes after signs of success. 
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In sum, threats lead to increased focus on strategy implementation in TRT, whereas in 
ABTF threats can lead to the adoption of new strategies as well as to changes to implement 
the current strategy better. Similarly, in TRT success may lead to new strategies and to better 
implementation of strategies, whereas success may trigger only strategy implementation in 
ABTF. Thus, in order to answer to the content question, we have to identify when strategy 
changes occur. When there is evidence in the data of persistent strategy changes during 
failure, it becomes difficult to support TRT. Similarly, when there is evidence in the data of 
persistent strategy changes during success, it becomes difficult to support ABTF. 
The second check focuses on the differences between ABTF and TRT with regard to the 
way coordination is being achieved. In ABTF coordination of responses is achieved by 
satisfaction. In TRT coordination is achieved by constricting control. This difference can be 
highlighted by taking into account the reaction of more than one decision maker in the 
organization. 
In particular, there is support for ABTF when there are many behavioral similarities 
between decision makers after signs of success because coordination is then strongest due to 
satisfaction. All stakeholders should be reluctant to consider changes after positive 
performance feedback. It is therefore important to find mostly strictly negative slopes during 
success, and not just one. A rare occurrence of a positive slope during signs of success may 
suggest that this kind of change obtains support from the organization. It however remains a 
sign that should be inspected carefully. There can only be support for ABTF when the 
positive sign corresponds to a change that is aimed at implementing strategies better. 
For behavior that is in line with TRT, we need to find clear behavioral differences after 
failure. These differences occur because the top of the organization feels the need to take over 
control of decisions that have been delegated downwards in the organization. Therefore, in 
TRT we expect that the actions will be different between the top and the middle manager 
during failure. It is for instance much more likely that top managers will replace middle 
managers, leading to an expected positive relationship between performance and middle 
management turnover during signs of failure. 
The third check is related to the process question. Given that we define small change as 
a low-impact change intervention that does not lead to many other change interventions 
shortly thereafter, we allow that small change consists of some combinations and sequences of 
change interventions. A combination of change interventions occurs when change 
interventions happen at the same time. Change interventions may also occur sequentially. 
Again organizational learning theories identifies combinations and sequences which can 
be considered as small change. A sequence of change interventions after signs of failure is an 
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indication of incremental problemistic search. When the sequence indicates that imperfect 
solutions are tried out and reversed subsequently, there is evidence of ABTF. To support 
ABTF, we should find less sequences or combinations or change interventions after signs of 
success. Similarly, there is strong support for TRT when we find that refocusing on efficiency 
is related to changes that constrict the control. For instance, we expect to find a positive 
correlation between middle management turnover and shifts to implement strategies more 
efficiently. 
Still, we argue that unusual combinations or sequences of change interventions should 
also be investigated. If we find empirical evidence of other combinations or sequences in the 
data, then there is less support for ABTF or TRT. The evidence is then a first indication of 
unanticipated change or of small change cumulating into radical change. 
 
7.2.2 Empirical contributions 
We applied the methodology to three changes - trainer turnover, playing tactics, and player 
transfers - that occurred in 29 soccer clubs, which participated in the Dutch premier league 
between 1990/1 and 2005/6. Soccer clubs are fairly simple organizations, which allowed us to 
use a model with only two key decision makers, namely the chair of the club and the coach of 
the club. The two decision makers make risky decisions about trainer turnovers, player 
transfers and changes in playing styles. We downloaded information on these decisions from 
various websites. The advantage of this approach is that we were able to quickly collect a 
longitudinal dataset without gross measurement errors. We also experienced the drawbacks 
that are typical to using secondary data. It was impossible to measure change interventions in 
utmost detail. 
With the data at hand, we gradually implemented the new research methodology. In 
Chapter 4 we focused on the extensions of the piecewise linear methodology. In Chapter 5 we 
focused more on the integration with organizational learning theories by means of the three 
additional checks. In Chapter 6, we used the transfer periods to introduce entrainment theory. 
Because much is known about the antecedents of within and between-season trainer 
turnover, we first tested the modified piecewise linear model to trainer turnover decisions. 
Our results in Chapter 4 corroborate the results of Dobson and Goddard (2001), which is a 
landmark study of trainer turnover in soccer clubs. They have shown that the role of 
performance feedback is different for within and between-season trainer turnovers. Similarly, 
we find that the chair shifts attention when the season comes to an end. We have strong 
evidence that a chair attaches more importance to backward-looking performance signals 
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during the season and to forward-looking performance signals between seasons. In Chapter 4, 
we consistently find that historical performance feedback determines within-season trainer 
turnover, and that the attainment of direct aspirations determines between-season trainer 
turnover much more than within-season trainer turnover. Regardless of the differences 
between within-season and between-season trainer turnover decisions, we find that they are 
related. ABTF describes trainer turnover decisions most adequately. We find during the 
season problemistic search after short-term performance feedback. We also find between 
seasons clear signs of satisfaction when the club is able to play the qualifying rounds of the 
Champions League. The decisions are also related because we find that a within-season 
trainer turnover increases the odds of between-season trainer turnover. Overall, Chapter 4 
indicates that this sequence of change interventions reflects a tactical plan of the club to 
replace underperforming coaches. There is no evidence for radical change. 
In Chapter 5, we shifted from managerial decision making to organizational decision 
making. In particular, we focused on organizational decision making during the season. We 
applied the three recommendations from Chapter 2 that tie the new research methodology 
closer to TRT and ABTF. First, we made a distinction between strategic shifts and strategy 
implementation. Second, we combined the responses of the chair with the responses of the 
coach. Third, we tested for combinations of change interventions. 
We find that chairs behave in a problemistic way because they fire coaches after 
disappointing short-term performance. We also find that coaches behave more in a TRT way 
because they shift to more efficient strategies after disappointing short-term performance. The 
results in Chapter 5 thus suggest that the observed behavior in soccer clubs does not fit 
perfectly with one of the organizational learning theories. Rather, we found streaks of ABTF, 
TRT as well as of the VRPM. 
We were puzzled by the low fit between the data and any of the organizational learning 
theories, because there are no indications in the data of self-serving behavior either. 
Consequently, we speculate that the low fit between theories is the result of failures to achieve 
coordination between coach and chair. We find in the data evidence that coaches need time to 
build well-oiled teams. It seems that for clubs to improve their organizational strategy, it is 
good to have relatively stable clubs. We also find that new coaches are no more able to 
implement efficiency strategies than incumbent coaches. This result suggests that efficiency 
changes are difficult, but it does not rule out that new coaches have tried to implement the 
strategy more efficiently. Since we only measured realized strategies and realized strategic 
shifts, it was impossible to tell from the data. Because we could highlight that implementation 
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problems may occur in the soccer setting, our analysis suggests that collecting data about 
intended changes and its implementation problems is an interesting area for further research. 
In Chapter 6, we have focused on organizational decision making between seasons. We 
investigated the relationship between trainer turnover decisions and player transfers by means 
of entrainment theory which describes organizational changes according to cyclical patterns. 
Entrainment theory may be an important contribution to the study of small change. This 
theory downplays the possibility of large-scale change because there is time to think of 
change interventions and time to consider the benefits of synchronization. When 
organizational change follow cyclical patterns, there may thus be an indication of controlled 
change. 
Besides entrainment in soccer clubs, we find that there is much more temporal variation 
in the data. Therefore, we conclude that entrainment will not lead to perfect synchronization 
of player transfers and trainer turnover. The reason is that at the end of the season, soccer 
clubs have received many stimuli that can not be ignored. The information creates substantial 
variation in the way clubs set out the transfer policy. Changes in the institutional framework, 
trends, performance feedback, new chairs and their response to performance feedback make 
that clubs behave differently each year in transfer periods. This kind of non-recurring 
information makes that organizations respond differently from what could be expected from 
entrained conditions. The lack of coordination is less surprising given the fact that coaches 
and players are more easily linked to other clubs during the transfer period. 
 
7.3 Overall conclusion 
The results of the three empirical chapters are summarized in the lowest box of Figure 7.2. 
We conclude this chapter with a reflection on the implications of these results for our main 
research question. The reflection is summarized in the middle and top box of Figure 7.2. The 
middle box evaluates our choice for organizational learning theories. 
The three simple model checks had extreme consequences for our understanding of the 
organizational change processes in Dutch soccer clubs. It is not possible to discern statements 
about the organizational behavior based on one change intervention of a single agent because 
the change interventions of other agents point out towards another organizational learning 
theory. 
Even though there is no perfect fit between the data and the theories covered, we are 
inclined to use organizational learning theories further as a theoretical basis for change. The 
reason is that the empirical chapters repeatedly have indicated that the coordination is weak. 
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In Chapter 5 we were unable to find strong coordination between coach and chair during the 
season. We rather found streaks of ABTF and TRT. Moreover in Chapter 6 we find that the 
coordination between decisions during the transfer period was low. The lack of coordination 
  
FIGURE 7.2 RESEARCH ANSWERS HIERARCHY 
   After empirical testing: 
- It is possible that even low-impact interventions 
are difficult to manage. 
 
Before empirical testing:  
- Small change starts with low-impact 
interventions. 
 
Implications for the research agenda  
on organizational change 
 
   
  
↑ 
After empirical testing: 
- Soccer clubs are garbage cans. 
- Suggestion for future research: We need to focus on coordination failures. 
 
Before empirical testing:  
- Adaptation of Greve’s (2003c) research strategy  
 
 
Implications for organizational learning theory  
  
↑ 
Results from Chapter 4: 
 
- Chairs shift attention for trainer turnover decisions when the season comes to an end. 
- There is evidence of problemistic search during the season. 
- There is evidence of satisfaction between seasons. 
-  Change processes are tactical. 
- Suggestion for future research: Can piecewise linear models be used when performance 
feedback is updated on a weekly basis? 
 
Results from Chapter 5: 
 
- There is no evidence of tight coordination between coach and chair during the season. 
- Chairs show problemistic search. 
- Coaches show escalating behavior. 
- Suggestion for future research: We should try to distinguish better between unwillingness 
and incapacity to coordinate behavior. 
 
Results from Chapter 6:  
 
- There is no evidence of tight coordination between trainer turnover and player transfer 
between seasons. 
- Suggestion for future research: There may be an U-shaped relationship between the 
tempo of change and the variance of organizational change. 
 
Results from the empirical chapters 
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in responses between coach and chair, the lack of coordination between player transfer and 
trainer turnover as well as the different antecedents for within and between-season trainer 
turnover decisions suggest that soccer clubs are garbage cans. 
In this model of Cohen et al. (1972) organizational decision making is the result of 
relatively independent streams of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. 
Soccer clubs are garbage cans because they face repeatedly problems by the occurrence of 
negative performance feedback. Chapter 4 has shown that only specific types of performance 
feedback need attention. Therefore solutions and problems are only loosely coupled. Also, 
Chapter 6 suggests that soccer clubs are garbage cans because there are clear differences 
between choice opportunities and problems. Although most of the choice opportunities occur 
during the transfer period, it does not suffice to see the transfer periods as a pacer for decision 
making. It rather seems that problems and solutions are dumped by the participants as they are 
generated. The Garbage Can Model (GCM) could explain the lack of coordination between 
the observed change interventions because it disconnects problems, solutions, choice 
opportunities and decision makers. Since the GCM considers that it is not very likely that any 
change will infect other changes, it may describe how the coordination of the organizational 
learning responses has broken down. 
This point of view triggers an exciting new question that has been insufficiently 
explored in this study. It is especially clear from Chapter 5 that we could have benefited if we 
had information on the intended changes that fail to materialize. The main reason why we did 
not collect this kind of data is that it requires a completely different data gathering approach. 
We found it unfeasible to collect information on the failed intentions for all the clubs. 
Nevertheless, we believe that information on implementation problems can make the link 
between the organizational learning theories and small change stronger. In ABTF 
implementation problems are likely to occur because organizations consider implementing 
imperfect solutions and tend to widen the search after previous attempts. Similarly, a threat-
rigid response is based on an escalated belief in the current strategy. There may be severe 
biases that are not highlighted without sufficient debate and deliberation. A threat-rigid 
response leads to a quick agile response after threat, but by no means guarantees a successful 
implementation. These biases will only show up when the top of the organization starts 
implementing its strategy better. In cases of unsuccessful implementation, we will not observe 
coordinated behavior because the plan breaks own and organizational members fail to 
implement the top-down decision. Then unrealized strategies, instead of unwillingness to 
coordinate action, may be the reason for the lack of behavioral coordination between coaches 
and chairs. 
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Our study also introduces a new methodological question that could be addressed in the 
future. In Chapter 4 we found that the reactions to short-term performance feedback were 
stronger than the responses to long-term performance. The speed at which performance 
information is produced creates a new methodological problem. Since the next match 
provides a new signal that overwrites the signal of the current match, it no longer becomes 
possible to relate actions to the penultimate performance signal. Quick evaporation of 
performance information is a real challenge in the use of piecewise linear models because 
they rely on delays and hastenings.  
Our main suggestion for research arises from the disconfirmed assumption that small 
changes are easy to implement. Weick (1989: 525-526) argues that “a disconfirmed 
assumption is an opportunity for a theorist to learn something new, to discover something 
unexpected, to generate renewed interest in an old question, to mystify something that had 
previously been settled, to heighten intellectual stimulation, to get recognition, and to 
alleviate boredom. However, a disconfirmed assumption is a problem for a nontheorist 
because it suggests that past experience is potentially misleading as a guide for subsequent 
action and that coping may be more difficult”. In a spirit that favors iterative theory building 
exercises, we would like to conclude by arguing that much more exciting work can be done in 
the promising field of small change research. 
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Appendix 1 
 TABLE A.1 RATING OF THE CLUBS IN THE DUTCH PREMIER LEAGUE 
Season starts in: 
Club  
9 
0 
9 
1 
9 
2 
9 
3 
9 
4 
9 
5 
9 
6 
9 
7 
9 
8 
9 
9 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
3 
0 
4 
0 
5 
ADO Den Haag 31 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 36 35 
Ajax 62 65 58 65 88 83 61 89 57 61 61 73 83 80 77 60 
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 48 55 35 43 44 57 64 74 
Cambuur Leeuwarden 0 0 27 20 0 0 0 0 32 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FC Den Bosch 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 33 0 0 19 0 
SVV/Dordrecht 90 25 27 24 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Excelsior 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 
Feyenoord 34 58 65 59 62 63 73 61 80 64 66 64 80 68 62 71 
Fortuna Sittard 33 28 25 0 0 31 39 48 44 38 31 17 0 0 0 0 
Go Ahead Eagles 0 0 27 31 30 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
De Graafschap 0 22 0 0 0 29 45 42 36 33 31 37 23 0 19 0 
FC Groningen 51 42 32 31 34 49 39 31 0 0 33 37 32 37 40 56 
Heracles Almelo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 
SC Heerenveen 26 0 0 31 42 53 50 55 54 68 47 60 47 58 60 50 
MVV 29 42 43 36 30 0 0 32 32 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NAC Breda 0 0 0 44 40 52 40 42 23 0 49 54 52 46 35 33 
NEC 24 0 0 0 34 25 32 44 39 27 40 45 51 34 37 47 
PSV 61 69 60 49 67 77 77 72 61 84 83 68 84 74 87 84 
RBC Roosendaal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 36 40 32 9 
Roda JC 36 41 32 43 76 57 55 38 60 55 59 41 50 53 47 50 
RKC Waalwijk 37 37 41 28 44 44 34 31 27 42 59 48 46 40 47 39 
Sparta Rotterdam 30 39 30 35 34 53 38 41 26 37 25 24 0 0 0 37 
FC Twente 41 39 48 44 59 48 65 43 52 60 41 42 41 48 54 47 
FC Utrecht 46 35 42 26 35 28 38 43 38 46 59 51 47 46 44 55 
Vitesse 42 47 54 47 54 53 55 70 61 63 59 60 33 28 54 44 
Volendam 36 32 43 33 37 27 38 21 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 0 
VVV 0 13 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Willem II 32 36 36 41 47 39 35 55 65 48 51 43 42 49 45 28 
Zwolle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 26 0 0 
N = 29 
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Appendix 2 
TABLE A.2 ACTIVE PLAYERS LEFT AT THE END OF THE SEASON: 1991/2-2005/6 
 
Number of new active players in a team 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Clubs  
Mean N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Season 
1991/2 6 . 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 . 1 . . . . . . . . . 11 
1992/3 7 1 . . 2 2 . 1 1 1 . 3 . . . . . . . . 11 
1993/4 7 . . . 2 2 . 3 2 2 1 . . 1 . . . . . . 13 
1994/5 9 . . . . . 3 1 4 3 . 1 1 . 1 . . . . . 14 
1995/6 8 . . . . . 3 3 4 2 . . 1 . 1 . . . . . 14 
1996/7 11 . . . . 1 . . 1 1 3 2 3 3 . . . . 1 . 15 
1997/8 11 . . 1 . . 1 2 1 . . 1 2 3 1 2 . . . . 14 
1998/9 10 . . 1 . . 1 2 2 2 . 3 . . 1 . 1 . 1 . 14 
1999/0 10 . . 1 1 1 . . 2 1 2 2 . 1 1 . . . 1 . 13 
2000/1 9 . . . 1 1 2 . . 3 2 5 1 . . . . . . . 15 
2001/2 8 . . . 1 2 2 2 3 2 . 2 . . . 1 . . . . 15 
2002/3 8 . 2 . . 1 . 3 2 . 4 3 . . . . . . . . 15 
2003/4 10 . . . . . 2 . 1 2 4 1 3 . 1 1 . . . . 15 
2004/5 11 . . . . . . 1 4 . 3 1 . 3 2 . . 1 . . 15 
2005/6 12 . . . . . 1 1 . 2 3 2 . 4 . 2 . . . 1 16 
All 9 1 4 4 8 11 17 20 29 21 23 26 11 15 8 6 1 1 3 1 199 
Source: Voetbal International sample 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Probleemstelling 
In dit proefschrift verrichten we aan de hand van trainerwissels, spelertransfers en 
veranderingen in speltactieken bij Nederlandse voetbalclubs, hypothetisch-deductisch 
onderzoek naar kleinschalige veranderingen in organisaties. We kiezen voor kleinschalige 
veranderingen omdat ze vaker voorkomen dan grootschalige veranderingen. Ook mag vanuit 
het oogpunt van strategisch management worden aangenomen dat organisatieveranderingen 
over het algemeen niet radicaal zijn, omdat organisaties zich in de regel daartegen zullen 
verzetten (e.g., Durand, 2006). 
Eigenaardig genoeg is er in de organisatieliteratuur veel meer aandacht voor radicale 
verandering dan voor kleinschalige verandering. Radicale veranderingen zijn volgens een 
content benadering fascinerend, omdat de organisatie dan wezenlijk verandert en het dus 
interessant is om de organisatie voor en na de verandering te vergelijken (e.g., Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1997). Radicale veranderingen zijn volgens een process benadering fascinerend, 
omdat verandering aanleiding geeft tot onverwachte wendingen en complexe interacties (e.g., 
Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
De kleinschalige veranderingen die wij bestuderen doen de organisatie niet wezenlijk 
veranderen. Deze veranderingen gebeuren veeleer subtiel. In dit proefschrift hanteren we 
daarom de volgende definitie voor kleinschalige veranderingen; het zijn subtiele 
veranderingsinterventies die niet onmiddellijk aanleiding geven tot andere 
veranderingsinterventies.  
Het bestaande theoretische kader van organisatieverandering is voor ons minder 
interessant, omdat daarin kleinschalige veranderingen niet kunnen blijven bestaan. Een 
kleinschalige verandering, die geen bijkomende verandering opwekt in de organisatie heeft 
volgens de standaardtheorie geen bestaansgrond. Als een kleinschalige verandering niet past 
in een groter geheel, dan moet ze teruggeschroefd worden of afgedaan worden als een 
aberratie.  
Toch nemen we uit de traditionele literatuur over organisatieverandering twee 
klassieke perspectieven mee, namelijk de content en de process benadering. Deze 
benaderingen resulteren immers in vragen die ook beantwoord moeten worden in het geval 
van kleinschalige verandering. In de content benadering is het uiteindelijk belangrijk te 
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achterhalen wat precies verandert in de organisatie. De process benadering brengt in kaart hoe 
de organisatie reageert op een verandering. 
De antwoorden die in de klassieke benadering over radicale verandering worden 
geformuleerd zijn ons inziens zwart-wit. In de content benadering verandert een organisatie 
volledig of ze verandert niet. Hierdoor wordt de wat-vraag voor radicale veranderingen 
verdrongen door afgeleide vragen. Zo vraagt men zich bijvoorbeeld af of radicale 
veranderingen snel of traag moeten gebeuren (e.g., Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Bij 
kleinschalige veranderingen wordt de wat-vraag in ere hersteld. Het is een uitdaging te 
achterhalen welke veranderingen organisaties wel doorvoeren en welke niet. Dit is zoals 
aangegeven in Tabel S.1 de eerste onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
 
TABEL S.1 TWEE ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN OVER KLEINSCHALIGE VERANDERINGEN 
1. De content vraag of (wat-vraag): Welke kleinschalige veranderingen doen zich 
in de organisatie voor? 
2. De process vraag of (hoe-verloopt-het-verder-vraag): Wat is de impact van deze 
veranderingen op de rest van de organisatie? 
 
Ook vinden wij het klassieke antwoord op de hoe-vraag te simpel. Volgens de process 
benadering ontstaat er een veranderingsdynamiek, omdat organisaties geen 
onevenwichtigheden of imperfecties tolereren. Als er ergens een verandering optreedt, dan 
moet de organisatie daar wel op reageren (e.g., Weick & Quinn, 1999). Er wordt dus 
traditioneel van uitgegaan dat veranderingen een grote impact hebben op organisaties. Wij 
vinden dat de klassieke process benadering te weinig onderkent dat reacties op veranderingen 
uit kunnen blijven. Doordat wij die mogelijkheid open laten, wordt de onderzoeksvraag van 
de process benadering in een context van kleinschalige veranderingen opnieuw interessant. 
Hoe de organisatie op een kleinschalige verandering reageert, is bijgevolg de tweede 
onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
Theoretische aanzet 
Daar waar de traditionele veranderingsliteratuur dus de structuur van de onderzoeksvragen 
weergeeft, hebben wij de aanzet tot antwoorden gevonden in een andere onderzoekstraditie, 
namelijk die van het organisationeel leren. Het gaat hier om een traditie die robuust is en 
blijvend ruime academische aandacht krijgt (e.g., Argote & Greve, 2007). Omdat leren in het 
dagelijks gebruik vaak een eufemistische of positieve bijklank krijgt, vinden wij het 
belangrijk eerst te onderstrepen dat organisationeel leren niet noodzakelijk en zeker niet 
alleen geassocieerd mag worden met begrippen als innovatie en kenniscreatie. Het is juister te 
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stellen dat in de organisationele leertraditie onderzocht wordt hoe bestaande organisaties 
omgaan met nieuwe situaties. Immers, anders dan bij individuen ontwikkelen organisaties 
geen automatische reactie op nieuwe situaties. Ze moeten bijgevolg leren omgaan met deze 
nieuwe situaties. De aanpassing komt pas tot stand na een proces van beraadslagen, 
onderhandelen en besluitvorming. Dit proces kan ervoor zorgen dat de aandacht kan 
verschuiven van de nieuwe situatie naar de belangen van verschillende betrokken partijen 
(e.g., Brunsson, 2007). De nadruk bij organisationeel leren komt bijgevolg te liggen op 
interne organisatieprocessen. Kenmerkend voor deze processen is dat zij fundamenteel 
politiek zijn en voor buitenstaanders moeilijk te observeren en te begrijpen zijn. 
Voor het beantwoorden van de twee onderzoeksvragen baseren wij ons op twee 
klassieke bijdragen uit de organisationele leertheorie: A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
[ABTF] van Cyert en March (1963) en Threat Rigidity Theory [TRT] van Staw et al. (1981). 
Quasi-resolutie van conflicten, het vermijden van onzekerheden en een conservatieve 
zoektocht naar oplossingen zijn de interne processen die centraal staan in ABTF (Cyert & 
March, 1963). In essentie suggereert ABTF dat veranderingen alleen zullen worden 
geïnitieerd als het noodzakelijk is en als er aanvaardbare oplossingen voorhanden zijn die in 
de organisatie breed worden gedragen. Bij TRT zijn het inperken van bevoegdheden, het 
beperken van informatieverspreiding en een betere strategie-implementatie de basiselementen 
van het interne proces (Staw et al., 1981). In essentie suggereert TRT dat koerswijzigingen 
niet overwogen worden wanneer er paniek ontstaat. Een bedreiging hoeft daarbij niet 
noodzakelijk aanleiding te geven tot inertie. Het is goed mogelijk dat er acties worden 
genomen om de bestaande strategie beter te implementeren. 
Er zijn duidelijke verschillen tussen de twee leertheorieën. In TRT hoeven kleine 
veranderingen niet noodzakelijk gedragen of begrepen te worden door de hele organisatie, 
hetgeen wel benadrukt wordt in ABTF. In ABTF hoeven de veranderingen zich niet te 
beperken tot verbeteringen van bestaande strategieën maar kan ook een nieuwe koers worden 
ingeslagen, hetgeen uitgesloten wordt door TRT. Hoewel er dus duidelijke verschillen tussen 
de twee leertheorieën zijn over de invulling van de interne processen (e.g., Ocasio, 1993; 
Shimizu, 2007), is het antwoord op de twee onderzoeksvragen zeer gelijkaardig. Dat komt 
omdat beide leertheorieën ervan uitgaan dat de organisatie steeds streeft naar een zeker 
behoud van de organisatie in plaats van naar verandering. 
Bijgevolg geven organisationele leertheorieën een nieuwe wending aan de process 
benadering door aan te nemen dat organisaties niet sterk hoeven te reageren op nieuwe 
situaties. Het wordt zelfs aannemelijk dat niet gereageerd wordt op nieuwe situaties, omdat de 
leertheorieën veronderstellen dat organisaties enkel zullen reageren als er aan bepaalde 
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voorwaarden is voldaan. ABTF en TRT verschillen niet in het feit dat er voorwaarden 
verbonden zijn aan verandering. Ze verschillen enkel in wat de voorwaarden voor reactie 
precies zijn. Voor ABTF moeten veranderingen in de organisatie breed gedragen worden. 
Voor TRT moeten veranderingen passen binnen de huidige strategische oriëntatie. 
Ook geven de leertheorieën een nieuwe wending aan de content benadering. Het wordt 
dankzij de leertheorieën duidelijk dat organisaties op zoek gaan naar veranderingen die 
slechts een kleine negatieve impact hebben op de organisatie of op het deel dat relevant is 
voor degenen die het besluit nemen. Bijgevolg verklaren de leertheorieën dat organisaties in 
de eerste plaats streven naar behoud. Meer bepaald wordt in ABTF de bereidheid tot 
drastische verandering ingetoomd zolang machthebbenden vinden dat de organisatie het 
eigenlijk nog niet zo slecht doet. In ABTF leidt tevredenheid dus tot voorzichtigheid en 
status-quo. In TRT daarentegen wenst men tijdens bedreigende situaties niet af te wijken van 
het gekozen pad. Ook zullen drastische koerswijzigingen niet actief gestimuleerd worden 
wanneer alles goed gaat. Ondanks de verschillen concluderen we dat beide leertheorieën 
ingaan tegen de klassieke content benadering: organisaties zullen veranderingen die maar een 
kleine impact hebben verkiezen boven veranderingen met een grootschalige impact. 
Dit inzicht leidt tot een radicale breuk met de klassieke benadering die zich 
concentreert op grootschalige veranderingen. Hoewel de leertheorieën een vermoeden creëren 
dat kleinschalige veranderingen frequent zullen voorkomen, moeten we concluderen dat de 
onderzoeksvragen niet volledig beantwoord zijn. We weten onvoldoende wat een kleine 
verandering precies inhoudt en wanneer ze kleinschalig blijft. 
Methodologische uitwerking 
Bijgevolg is een methodologisch kader ontwikkeld waarbinnen het mogelijk is om 
kleinschalige veranderingen beter te verklaren. De inzichten van de organisationele 
leertheorieën worden in een dergelijke opzet vertaald naar toetsbare porposities. De moeilijke 
observeerbaarheid van interne leerprocessen vormde daarbij een grote methodologische 
uitdaging. Zo is het bij ABTF niet evident om latente conflicten, risicomijdend gedrag en 
conservativiteit empirisch vast te stellen. Bij TRT doen zich soortgelijke meetproblemen 
voor. Het is een huzarenstuk om aan te tonen dat informatie moedwillig gefilterd wordt om 
paniek in te tomen. 
Dit euvel deed ons echter niet twijfelen aan onze keuze om organisationele 
leertheorieën te gebruiken. Het probleem van niet-observeerbaarheid is immers niet eigen aan 
organisationele leertheorieën. Zo wijzen Godfrey en Hill (1995) erop dat veel 
organisatietheorieën niet-observeerbare elementen bevatten. Volgens Godfrey en Hill (1995) 
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kan er met het probleem van niet-observeerbaarheid op een realistische en wetenschappelijk 
verantwoorde manier omgegaan worden. Wanneer de aandacht wordt gevestigd op de 
meetbare effecten van niet meetbare constructen, kan aangetoond worden dat een theorie 
vermoedelijk bijdraagt tot de verklaring van een onderzoeksfenomeen. Godfrey en Hill (1995) 
menen bijgevolg dat als het empirisch bewijsmateriaal altijd in de richting wijst van een 
bepaalde theorie, dat de onderzoeker dan bereid moet zijn om die theorie voor waar te 
aannemen, ook al zijn de niet-observeerbare elementen uit de theorie niet gemeten. 
Het methodologisch kader dat wij in dit proefschrift voorstellen bouwt daarom verder 
op de inspanningen van Greve (1998; 2003c) om de observeerbare effecten van ABTF op 
verandering te toetsen. Greve (1998; 2003c) maakt daarbij gebruik van piecewise lineaire 
regressiemodellen. Deze modellen zouden in principe gebruikt kunnen worden om een 
fenomeen als regendansen tijdens droogte te verklaren. Het gaat hier immers om een 
observeerbare handeling die waarschijnlijk door sommige mensen overwogen wordt als het 
lang niet meer geregend heeft. De techniek kan meer bepaald uitsluiten of regendansen 
worden uitgevoerd bij beginnende droogte of als laatste redmiddel tegen uitdroging. Deze 
illustratie dient enkel om aan te tonen dat de methodologie van Greve (1998; 2003c) toegepast 
kan worden op elke observeerbare actie bij een nieuwe situatie. Het is een techniek die 
waarschijnlijk iets meer kan vertellen over de onderliggende gedachtengang achter 
observeerbare acties. Uit de wetenschappelijke literatuur (zie hoofdstuk 2 voor een overzicht) 
blijkt dat piecewise lineaire regressiemodellen aangewend zijn door verschillende 
wetenschappers om aan te tonen wat organisaties doen en vooral wat ze niet doen wanneer 
organisaties succes en falen ervaren. 
Wij hebben een aantal wijzigingen doorgevoerd in de methodologie van Greve (1998; 
2003c) om sterkere lessen te kunnen trekken over organisatieverandering. Hoewel het 
probleem van niet-observeerbaarheid is opgelost, wordt de methodologie op dit moment nog 
niet overtuigend toegepast voor TRT (maar zie Shimizu, 2007 voor een uitzondering). Wij 
hebben dus in de eerste plaats gezorgd voor een betere integratie tussen meerdere 
organisationele leertheorieën en de piecewise lineaire regressiemodellen. 
De aaneensluiting dient volgens ons te gebeuren aan de hand van drie stappen die 
schematisch zijn weergegeven in Tabel S.2. Ten eerste menen wij dat alleen op basis van 
koerswijzigingen het onderscheid tussen TRT en ABTF in kaart kan worden gebracht. Ten 
tweede is het noodzakelijk om zoveel mogelijk afzonderlijke hypothesen over het gedrag van 
belangrijke agenten in de organisatie te formuleren. Alleen zo kan het onderscheid tussen 
organisatiegedrag en individueel gedrag in organisaties worden gemaakt. Ten derde moet het 
effect van de achilleshiel van een realistische onderzoeksbenadering worden verkleind door 
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complementaire testen uit te voeren. Immers alleen als de onderzoeker verschillende soorten 
testen uitvoert, kan men voldoende zeker zijn dat een theorie met niet-observeerbare 
elementen organisatieverandering verklaart. 
 
TABEL S.2 EEN ONDERZOEKSOPZET VOOR KLEINSCHALIGE VERANDERINGEN 
Oplossing Reden 
Hypothesen
8
 
over 
koerswijzigingen 
 
 
 
            + 
Alleen koerswijzigingen kunnen het onderscheid maken tussen ABTF en TRT.  
 
Propositie 1: Tijdens periodes van succes verwachten wij geen 
koerswijzigingen volgens ABTF, maar in beperkte mate wel volgens TRT. 
 
Propositie 2: Tijdens periodes van bedreigingen verwachten wij geen 
koerswijzigingen volgens TRT, maar in beperkte mate wel volgens ABTF. 
Hypothesen over  
meerdere 
agenten 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          + 
Alleen door naar de acties te kijken van meerdere agenten kunnen we het 
onderscheid maken tussen individueel en organisatiegedrag.  
 
Propositie 3: Volgens ABTF verwachten wij dat de meeste agenten geen 
drastische veranderingen doorvoeren tijdens periodes van succes. Strategie-
implementatie kan altijd. Een occasionele koerswijziging wijst in de richting 
van TRT. 
 
Propositie 4: Volgens TRT verwachten wij dat de meeste agenten veel 
drastische veranderingen doorvoeren tijdens periodes van bedreiging. De top 
van de organisatie neemt de controle over en verplicht de lagere echelons om 
de strategie beter uit te werken. 
Hypothesen voor  
meerdere testen 
Alleen bewijs van meerdere onafhankelijke testen leidt tot plausibele 
antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen. 
 
Propositie 5: Bij langdurig verlies kunnen volgens ABTF sequenties van 
veranderingsinterventies wijzen op uitdijende zoektochten naar oplossingen.  
 
Propositie 6: Bij bedreiging kunnen volgens TRT combinaties van 
veranderingsinterventies wijzen op inperkingen van controle. 
 
Ten eerste moet er dus een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen koerswijzigingen en strategie- 
implementatie. Strategie-implementatie definiëren we als alle acties die voortvloeien uit de 
bestaande strategische oriëntatie. Deze acties komen tot stand na een proces van exploitatie en 
kunnen op gelijk welk tijdstip worden overwogen. Acties die het resultaat zijn van processen 
van exploratie definiëren we als koerswijzigingen. Het zijn juist deze koerswijzigingen die het 
verschil tussen ABTF en TRT duidelijk maken. Volgens TRT komen geen koerswijzigingen 
voor tijdens bedreigingen, terwijl ABTF wel onderkent dat ontevreden organisaties het over 
een andere boeg gooien. Hoewel ABTF koerswijzigingen mogelijk acht is het 
onwaarschijnlijk dat deze veranderingen radicaal of daadkrachtig zijn, omdat organisaties niet 
over de juiste competenties en ervaring zullen beschikken om dit direct met succes te doen. 
                                                 
8
 In Tabel S.1 staan proposities, dus ongetoeste hypothesen (Emory, 1985). 
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Ook tijdens periodes van succes leidt de toepassing van TRT en ABTF tot verschillende 
verwachtingen over de aanwezigheid van koerswijzigingen. Volgens TRT kunnen tijdens 
periodes van relatief succes koerswijzigingen voorkomen, omdat de strikte controle 
afgezwakt wordt. De verantwoordelijkheden en informatie worden meer gedecentraliseerd 
waardoor het niet langer noodzakelijk is om alleen maar aan de implementatie van de huidige 
strategie te denken. In deze omstandigheden is het dus mogelijk dat ergens in de organisatie 
wordt geëxperimenteerd. Koerswijzigingen hoeven niet voor te komen, maar ze zijn wel 
mogelijk. Volgens ABTF zijn koerswijzigingen tijdens succesvolle periodes uit den boze, 
omdat men van oordeel is dat geen onnodige risico’s genomen moeten worden. Initiatieven 
mogen immers het broze evenwicht tussen verschillende belangenpartijen niet verstoren. 
Alles wat de latente conflicten tussen belangengroepen in een organisatie kan verstoren wordt 
bijgevolg geweerd. 
Hoewel koerswijzigingen in geen enkele leertheorie noodzakelijk of prominent 
aanwezig zullen zijn, is aandacht voor koerswijzigingen noodzakelijk om het onderscheid te 
kunnen maken tussen ABTF en TRT. Dit onderscheid is direct gerelateerd aan de eerste 
onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
Ten tweede moeten er hypothesen voor verschillende besluitnemers worden getest om 
het onderscheid tussen individueel en organisatorische gedrag te kunnen maken. Er is slechts 
sprake van bewijs voor consistent gedrag op het niveau van de organisatie als alle 
besluitnemers in de organisatie conform een bepaalde leertheorie handelen. Om deze testen 
goed uit te voeren moet rekening worden gehouden met het moment waarop coördinatie van 
verschillende gedragingen het meest valt te verwachten. Daarom moeten voor ABTF 
hypothesen geformuleerd worden tijdens periodes van succes. Koerswijzingen tijdens 
periodes van succes kunnen immers een teken zijn dat men niet zoveel belang hecht aan het 
evenwicht tussen belanghebbenden. Koerswijzingen tijdens periodes van succes stroken 
daarom niet met de verwachtingen die vanuit ABTF kunnen worden afgeleid. 
Bij TRT is coördinatie vooral van toepassing tijdens periodes van bedreiging. Volgens 
een TRT scenario is het onwaarschijnlijk dat de top van de organisatie ontslag neemt bij een 
bedreiging. De top is er immers van overtuigd dat de gekozen strategie juist is, maar beter 
moet worden geïmplementeerd. Ontslag in de top van de organisatie is eerder bewijs voor 
ABTF of een voorbode voor een radicale koerswijziging (e.g., Lant et al., 1992). Ook is het 
onwaarschijnlijk dat in een TRT scenario het middenkader informatie tracht achter te houden 
voor de rest van de organisatie. Dit soort individueel gedrag zou erop wijzen dat de top van de 
organisatie er niet in slaagt de controle over te nemen. 
Summary in Dutch 
 
202 
De coördinatie in TRT en ABTF verschilt echter niet alleen in de tijdsdimensie. Bij TRT zal 
de coördinatie veel zichtbaarder worden nagestreefd dan bij ABTF. Dit leidt tot nieuwe 
onderzoeksopportuniteiten. In het geval van TRT moet niet alleen gekeken worden naar acties 
die niet aannemelijk zijn, maar ook naar acties die waarschijnlijk wel zullen gebeuren. Ten 
eerste zullen tijdens bedreigingen onnodig geachte experimenten en niet-kern activiteiten snel 
teruggeschroefd worden. Ten tweede zullen we structuurwijzigingen en het ontslag van 
middenkader zien als poging van het management om beter controle uit te oefenen. Ten derde 
verwachten we dat het middenkader actiever de plannen van de top zal trachten uit te voeren. 
Zij zullen meer bepaald bereid zijn om strategieplannen uit te voeren die niet breed gedragen 
worden in de organisatie. 
Tot slot moeten er volgens ons ook hypothesen geformuleerd worden die niet getoetst 
kunnen worden aan de hand van piecewise lineaire regressiemodellen. Om te komen tot 
andere manieren van testen zijn we te rade gegaan bij de populatie-ecologie. (Amburgey et 
al., 1993). Zij testen immers op veranderingsmomentum. Het idee dat veranderingen 
aanleiding kunnen geven tot meer veranderingen kan volgens ons ook toegepast worden op 
organisationele leertheorieën. Er kan meer bepaald in ABTF getest worden op 
veranderingsmomentum tijdens periodes van falen. Oplossingen die uiteindelijk niet 
succesvol bleken te zijn, zullen volgens ABTF leiden tot het uitproberen van nieuwe en 
andere oplossingen. Ontevredenheid kan dus volgens ABTF aanleiding geven tot een 
uitdijende zoektocht naar nieuwe oplossingen (e.g., Beck et al., 2008). 
Ook bij TRT kunnen combinaties van veranderingsinterventies nuttig zijn. 
Combinaties tonen aan dat de top van de organisatie alles in het werk stelt om de situatie 
onder controle te krijgen. Zo verwachten we dat nieuw aangestelde agenten zich vooral zullen 
richten op betere strategie-implementatie eerder dan op koerswijzigingen tijdens periodes van 
falen. 
Wij menen echter niet dat testen op sequenties en combinaties van veranderingen op 
zich uitsluitsel kan geven over de schaal van verandering. Er is geen lakmoesproef. Om het 
onderscheid te kunnen maken tussen kleinschalige en grootschalige veranderingen kiezen wij 
voor een combinatie van testen en voor een hypothetisch-deductische methodologie. Alleen 
door bewijsmateriaal vanuit verschillende perspectieven naast elkaar te plaatsen, kunnen 
realistische uitspraken gemaakt worden over organisatieverandering. 
Empirische toetsing 
Deze benadering hebben we toegepast op Nederlandstalige profvoetbalclubs. De keuze voor 
voetbalclubs behoeft enige uitleg, omdat de generaliseerbaarheid van het onderzoek - door het 
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specifieke karakter van deze organisaties - in gedrang komt (e.g., Wolfe et al., 2005). Dit 
minpunt wordt echter ruimschoots gecompenseerd door de vele onderzoeksopportuniteiten 
die verbonden zijn aan het bestuderen van voetbalclubs. Ten eerste zijn voetbalclubs heel 
zichtbare organisaties als gevolg van de uitgebreide media-aandacht. Omdat de meeste acties 
uitgebreid worden belicht in de media, stelt het probleem van de niet-observeerbaarheid zich 
minder hardnekkig bij voetbalclubs. Ten tweede zijn, vanuit het oogpunt van de 
organisatietheorie, voetbalclubs al bij al vrij simpele organisaties. Omdat bijgevolg 
aangenomen kan worden dat de belangrijkste strategische keuzes gemaakt worden door een 
beperkt aantal personen, kunnen het aantal hypothesen drastisch ingeperkt worden. Wij 
vonden het geen overdreven misspecificatie om een model met slechts twee belangrijke 
agenten op te stellen. De besluitvormers in ons model zijn het clubbestuur en de trainer. 
Voor de hypothetisch-deductische benadering hebben wij eerst de sportsetting verkend 
aan de hand van een studie van de academische sportliteratuur en aan de hand van een 
empirische analyse van gepubliceerde feiten over Nederlandse voetbalclubs in de Eredivisie. 
We kwamen daarbij tot het inzicht dat trainerwissels, spelertransfers en veranderingen in 
speltactieken belangrijke beslissingen zijn die een zekere strategische dimensie hebben. We 
merkten verder op dat trainerwissels zo lang mogelijk worden uitgesteld en dat er veelvuldig 
gebruik wordt gemaakt van interim-trainers. Verder suggereert de literatuur dat clubs zweren 
bij vaste opstellingen. Clubs gaan dus uit van hun eigen sterkte in plaats van systematisch 
wijzingen in de opstelling aan te brengen in functie van de tegenstander (e.g., Grund & 
Gürtler, 2005). We vonden ook dat alle clubs de gemiddelde leeftijd per spelerscategorie op 
peil houden en dat spelers die niet vaak op het veld staan uit de selectie verdwijnen. Opnieuw 
is het zo dat zowel de literatuur als onze data-analyse suggereert dat organisatiestrategie een 
grote verklarende rol lijkt te spelen bij spelertransfers. 
Het is op basis van deze exploratieve analyse echter niet mogelijk om veranderingen te 
bestempelen als koerswijziging of als efficiëntie verbetering. De analyse laat ook niet toe om 
duidelijkheid te scheppen over de relaties tussen verschillende veranderingen. We weten 
bijvoorbeeld onvoldoende of trainerwissels gepaard gaan met meer spelertransfers. Om meer 
duidelijkheid te scheppen hebben we vervolgens een systematische analyse gedaan van de 
veranderingen in de 29 voetbalclubs die tussen 1990/1 en 2005/6 deelnamen aan de 
Nederlandse Eredivisie. 
In een eerste analyse staat de besluitvorming omtrent trainerwissels van het clubbestuur 
centraal. We weten immers uit de bestaande academische sportliteratuur dat trainerwissels 
vooral verklaard worden aan de hand van clubprestaties (e.g., Dobson & Goddard, 2001). Aan 
de hand van piecewise lineaire regressiemodellen kunnen wij deze bevindingen uit de 
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literatuur herhalen. Wij koppelen deze empirische bevindingen te kaderen aan leertheorieën. 
Er lijkt een gevoel van tevredenheid op te treden als clubs het goed hebben gedaan. We 
concluderen ook dat er niet zomaar op zoek wordt gegaan naar een zondebok voor slechte 
resultaten. Aangezien de meetbare effecten suggereren dat het clubbestuur op zoek gaat naar 
oplossingen voor duidelijke problemen binnen de mogelijkheden van haar kunnen, denken we 
dat ABTF de beste leertheorie is om trainerwissels te verklaren. 
Een andere opvallend resultaat is dat het clubbestuur zich tijdens het seizoen op andere 
informatie baseert dan tussen seizoenen. Tijdens het seizoen waakt het clubbestuur er voor dat 
de performantie niet zakt onder historische minima. Tussen de seizoenen speelt het verleden 
nauwelijks nog een rol, maar zijn de opportuniteiten om Europees te spelen bepalend voor 
trainerwissels. Clubs die erin slagen om deel te nemen aan kwalificatierondes voor de 
Champions League zullen beduidend meer inspanningen doen om hun succesvolle trainers 
langer aan zich te binden. Clubs die niet goed hebben gepresteerd, zullen sneller een 
trainerwissel overwegen, zeker als de trainer reeds tijdens het seizoen is vervangen. Dit 
resultaat kan gekoppeld worden aan de psychologische managementliteratuur waarin men de 
verandering van aandachtspunten modelleert (e.g., March & Shapira, 1992). 
Het is tevens mogelijk om aan de hand van onderzoek naar verschillende soorten 
performantiesignalen te verklaren waarom precies het overschrijden van historische minima 
tijdens het seizoen en het behalen van tickets voor de Europese toernooien aangewend worden 
voor besluitvorming (e.g., Mezias et al., 2002). In beide gevallen gaat het om signalen die 
heel duidelijk weergeven hoe de trainer presteert. Het zijn dus signalen die door het 
clubbestuur niet kunnen worden genegeerd. Dit is anders bij ambigue signalen, die niet door 
het clubbestuur hoeven worden opgepikt. Zo zal bijvoorbeeld tijdens het seizoen geen 
aandacht worden geschonken aan het behalen van Europese tickets. We denken bijgevolg dat 
trainerwissels niet mogen worden gezien als koerswijzigingen. We zijn eerder van mening dat 
trainerwissels gezien moeten worden als tactische aanpassingen aan nieuwe omstandigheden. 
Zowel tijdens als tussen seizoenen zijn trainerwissels er om aanvaardbare performantie in de 
nabije toekomst te behalen. 
De tweede analyse richt zich op besluitvorming op het niveau van de organisatie. De 
analyse is dus uitgebreid door de besluitvorming van het clubbestuur te vergelijken met die 
van de trainers. Trainers mogen immers niet alleen gezien worden als symbool voor een 
bepaald spelbeleid. Zij komen ook in actie en proberen kromme situaties recht te trekken. 
Omdat beide besluitvormers kunnen reageren op nieuwe informatie is het interessant om na te 
gaan of er sprake is van coördinatie tussen trainer en clubbestuur. Deze analyse hield zich 
strikt aan de door ons vooropgestelde onderzoeksmethodologie. Er werd dus een onderscheid 
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gemaakt tussen koerswijzigingen en strategie-implementatie en tussen reacties van 
clubbestuur en trainers. Tot slot, werden meerdere testen gecombineerd. 
We vonden dat het clubbestuur zich tijdens het seizoen probleemoplossend gedraagt, 
terwijl het gedrag van de trainers meer in de richting van TRT lijkt te gaan. We baseren ons 
daarbij vooral op een duidelijke stijging in efficiëntie na ontgoochelende resultaten. Als deze 
resultaten teruggekoppeld worden naar de leertheorieën, moeten we concluderen dat het 
organisatiegedrag eigenlijk niet verklaard kan worden door één leertheorie. Omdat er dus niet 
echt sprake is van duidelijke coördinatie, hebben we getest op individueel gedrag binnen 
organisaties. De resultaten lijken er echter ook niet op te wijzen dat trainers en clubbestuur 
ieder hun eigen gangetje gaan. We vermoeden daarom dat de zwakke coördinatie tussen 
trainer en bestuur niet zozeer te maken heeft met onwil, maar eerder wijst op 
coördinatieproblemen tussen de twee besluitnemers. Aangezien wij geen data hebben 
verzameld over intenties en mislukte pogingen om bepaalde plannen uit te werken, gaat het 
hierbij slechts om speculatie.  
Het is dus op basis van onze data - die weergeven welke acties zich werkelijk hebben 
voorgedaan - onmogelijk om met voldoende zekerheid te concluderen dat trainers bepaalde 
plannen niet konden implementeren. Om deze kwestie goed te kunnen onderzoeken, is een 
andere dataverzamelingstrategie nodig. Omdat deze aanpak veel tijd zou kosten, zien we dit 
als een interessante piste voor verder onderzoek. Voor dit proefschrift is het ons inziens 
voldoende om te wijzen dat deze coördinatieproblemen onze these onderschrijven dat 
grootschalige veranderingen niet zo vaak voorkomen. 
Tot slot onderzochten we de mogelijkheid tot coördinatie tussen de seizoenen. In 
principe zijn er tussen de seizoenen de meeste mogelijkheden voor het clubbestuur om 
meerdere veranderingen door te voeren en ze op elkaar af te stemmen. We vroegen ons 
daarom af of gebruik werd gemaakt van afstemming door het onderscheid te maken tussen 
tactische accommodaties, subtiele koerswijzigingen en discontinue veranderingen. We hebben 
ons daarbij gebaseerd op de punctuated equilibrium theorie (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) en 
de social entrainment theorie (Ancona & Chong, 1996). De punctuated equilibrium theorie 
veronderstelt dat discontinue veranderingen zich uiterst sporadisch voordoen, bijvoorbeeld na 
de aanstelling van een CEO. Bij de social entrainment theorie zullen wijzigingen zich op een 
meer gecontroleerde manier voordoen omwille van een streven naar synchronisatie. Om 
bewijs te hebben voor de social entrainment theorie, moeten spelertransfers bijgevolg sterk 
correleren met trainerwissels en minder met andere temporele antecedenten zoals 
performantiesignalen en wijzigingen in het clubbestuur. 
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In de data is er geen bewijs te vinden voor perfecte entrainment. Het is duidelijk dat de 
synchronisatie verstoord wordt door tijdspecifieke informatie. Zowel veranderingen in het 
institutionele veld, als uitzonderlijke performantie van de club en verschillen in reacties op de 
performantie tussen nieuw-aangestelde en oude voorzitters van de club verstoren de 
synchronisatie tussen spellers transfers en trainerwissels. De analyse suggereert dus opnieuw 
dat het clubbestuur de regie niet volledig in handen heeft en duidelijk rekening moet houden 
met de beslissingsdiscretie van zowel de trainer als de spelers. 
Conclusie 
Hoewel er vaak hoopvol of cynisch gekeken wordt na een trainerwissel is het onverstandig 
om conclusies te trekken op basis van de handelingen van één persoon in de organisatie. Onze 
analyse maant aan om niet te snel uitspraken te doen over organisatieverandering. Er zijn 
immers duidelijke indicaties dat trainers en clubbestuur werkelijk ander gedrag vertonen, ook 
al proberen zij hun gedrag in principe op één lijn te brengen. In alle analyses komen 
duidelijke indicaties van satisfactie en probleemoplossend gedrag voor bij het clubbestuur 
zoals gedefinieerd in ABTF. Onze analyses tonen ook aan dat trainers gedrag vertonen dat 
meer in lijn is van TRT. Hun gedrag is met andere woorden gericht op efficiëntie tijdens 
moeilijke periodes en laat voorzichtig opportunisme doorschemeren als het goed gaat. 
Omwille van deze verschillen is het ook niet verwonderlijk dat wij geen duidelijk bewijs 
vonden voor een sterke coördinatie tussen de twee besluitvormers. Wanneer de club 
veranderingen wil of moet doorvoeren treden er vermoedelijk coördinatieproblemen op. 
De coördinatieproblemen suggereren duidelijk dat organisaties het best beschreven 
worden als garbage cans (Cohen et al., 1972). Clubs moeten gezien worden als niet-perfect-
op-elkaar-afgestemde stromen van problemen, oplossingen, agenten en beslissings-
opportuniteiten. In een dergelijke constellatie is het mogelijk dat verschillende agenten 
verschillende problemen ervaren, verschillende oplossingen zien en verschillende 
beslissingsmomenten hebben. In een dergelijke context zullen zich bijgevolg 
coördinatieproblemen voordoen en is zelfs het plannen van een kleinschalige verandering 
geen sinecure. De in dit proefschrift aangereikte onderzoeksmethodologie is daarom ook voor 
vervolgonderzoek over organisatieverandering nuttig. Ons advies is duidelijk; hou bij de 
bestudering van organisatieverandering drie stappen voor ogen: 1) tracht het onderscheid te 
maken tussen koerswijzigingen en betere uitwerkingen van de strategie, 2) beperk de analyse 
niet tot één besluitvormer en 3) gebruik meerdere testen alvorens tot een conclusie te komen 
over organisatieverandering. 
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